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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation works to provide a virtue ethical analysis of oppression and 
towards the establishment of an obligation which necessitates active engagement in 
resistance to oppression.  In this way, this project can be seen as proceeding in a twofold 
manner; on one hand this project contains a descriptive element, where oppression and its 
harmful influence is systematically exposed and laid bare for moral analysis, and, on the 
other hand it contains a normative element, where this moral analysis is done and the 
grounds of obligations for resistance are established.   
The use of virtue ethics, as a framework for such a project, certainly affords many 
benefits but at the same time poses many unique challenges.  The unique and beneficial 
aspects a virtue ethical approach provides to the complex social, political, and moral 
quagmire that is oppression finds its roots in the general arguments advanced by virtue 
ethicists in defense of virtue. 
Michael Slote has noted that there are roughly five main concepts in ethics; (1) 
general moral concepts, such as good and bad or right or wrong, (2) rational concepts, 
which relate to actions, decisions making, and choice, (3) “admirability and the kindred 
concepts,” which indicate the ways morality is conferred or admitted in social 
relationships, (4) personal well-being or welfare, which is “the idea of things going well 
for someone or in someone’s life, and, (5) “the class of notions that can be used to 
evaluate states of affairs, histories of events, and the like.”1  For Slote, these five classes 
of concepts represent the different “common sense” ways which ethical notions can be 
understood.  Slote not only defends virtue ethics in that it is uniquely able to capture 
                                                           
1
 Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford University Press, 1992), 198-199. 
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these five categories of ethical notions, but sights this accomplishment as “add[ing] 
impetus to the recent revival of virtue ethics.”2  While Slote does not defend or privilege, 
in principle, so-called “common sense” approaches to ethics, he does defend virtue ethics 
over consequentialist (and specifically act-utilitarian) theories as virtue is better equipped 
to address and utilize these concepts.  For Slote, “utilitarianism… allows for a reduction 
of all its moral terminology to the idea of producing or resulting in good states of affairs, 
and the latter idea and others of its category can in turn be reduced to the category of 
personal good.”3  This sublimation of the complexity of ethical notions, and therein the 
breadth of moral life in its expansive reality, which utilitarianism encourages is 
“irrecusably reductive” and leaves utilitarianism ill-equipped to deal with the reality of 
morality and moral understandings. 
 Arguments similar to Slote’s have been launched against deontological ethics.  
Stan van Hooft chronicles, in detail, how virtue ethics “does a better job of performing 
the four tasks of moral theory: to understand morality, to prescribe norms, to justify 
[moral norms] and to describe how [moral norms] fit into our lives.”4 For van Hooft, 
deontology cannot sensibly advance a conception of the social lives of humans as morally 
important in its own right, and in holding the centrality of reason in both life and how life 
is lived deontology must either ignore or devalue other moral aspects of life. 
 These claims, and the arguments which support them, coalesce into a general 
picture of dissatisfaction about ways of moral theorizing which do not, in the words of 
Rosalind Hursthouse, take seriously the role of “moral education, moral wisdom or 
discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of 
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 Slote, From Morality, 3. 
3
 Slote, From Morality, 199. 
4
 Stan van Hoff, Understanding Virtue Ethics (Acumen Publishing, 2006), 48. 
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the emotions in our moral life, and the questions of what sort of person I sold be, and of 
how we should live.”5  In this way, these arguments can be seen as the germination and 
blooming of the critiques made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her seminal 1958 piece “Modern 
Moral Philosophy.”6 
Following in the vein of these defenses of virtue (and therein the critiques made 
of other forms of moral theories), this project utilizes the comprehensive framework of 
virtue ethics as a valuable tool for the evaluation of oppression, and the benefit of such an 
approach is a natural extension of these general arguments.  Oppression, as it will be 
shown, is an extremely complex social phenomenon and exerts its harmful influence on 
the oppressed in a vast array of ways, and virtue ethics’ moral holism is especially apt at 
being able to not only descriptively account for the affected aspects of life but also 
provide a normative assessment of these effects.  
 While virtue ethics is particularly well suited for the descriptive task of morally 
assessing the damaging impact of oppression in the lives of the oppressed in a rich and 
meaningful way, it poses a unique set of challenges when one moves from the descriptive 
project to the generation of prescriptive requirements in the face of such moral harm.  
Virtue ethics has not only been assailed, often unfairly, for being unable to adequately 
generate schemas for action guidance in a general way, but the “recent revival of virtue 
ethics” (to borrow a phrase from Slote) has been in large part motivated by Anscombe’s 
plea for a return to ethics without obligation.  While I will argue, in chapter three, that 
this general critique is unfounded and that virtue ethics does, in fact, present a conception 
of action-guidance, the second half of this project seeks to not only generate a specific 
                                                           
5
 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999), 3. 
6
 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy, 33, no. 124 (1958). 
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schema for action-guidance in response to oppression but to root these actions in to a 
conception of obligation.  It is here that virtue ethics poses a unique challenge for this 
project as such a framework has traditionally eschewed such concepts and many of 
virtue’s most staunch proponents have argued against such attempts. 
 Before moving on to outline, in more detail, the work in the chapters to follow, it 
is important to note while this project uses, continually, the broad label “virtue ethics” 
and actively seeks a virtue ethical interpretation of oppression, it is within Aristotelian 
and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that this work is being done.  While virtue ethics have 
been developed in conjunction with consequentialism7 and deontology,8 and the 
possibility of virtue theories being found in the work of Hume9 and Nietzsche10 have 
been explored, this project does not seek, nor utilize, a synthesis of these positions.  With 
this admission made clear, the subsequent chapters can be outlined such that the shape of 
this project can be seen in greater detail. 
Chapter one outlines the broad conception of oppression which is deployed 
throughout the project, and is primarily drawn from the paradigmatic examples of racism, 
sexism, classism, and heternormatity.  At the outset it is argued that comprehensive 
theories of oppression, which seek to exhaustively schematize oppression in all possible 
variants such that oppression can be differentiated from other forms of political and 
moral wrongs, can act as an obstacle for moral analyses of obvious cases of oppression.  
Further it is argued that a comprehensive theory of oppression is unnecessary for such 
                                                           
7
 See Julia Driver’s Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
8
 See Nancy Sherman’s Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), and, Onora O’Neill’s “Kant’s Virtues,” in How Should One Live: Essays on the Virtues, ed. 
Roger Crisp (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
9
 See Christine Swanton’s “Hume and Virtue Ethics,” in Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. Paul Russell 
(Oxford University Press, 2014). 
10
 See Christine Swanton’s “Nietzsche and the Virtues of Mature Egoism,” in Nietzsche’s On The 
Genealogy of Morals: A Critical Study Guide, ed. Simon May (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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work to proceed.  In lieu of advancing or endorsing a rigid theory of oppression, this 
chapter works from an understanding of oppression as an emergent social phenomenon 
which is deeply entangled with unjust social structures to identify five salient features of 
oppression.  The salient features identified here are: (1) oppression is a social 
phenomenon and affects individuals qua their membership in social and economic 
groups, (2) oppression is harmful for the oppressed, (3) oppression is not, in and of itself, 
a chosen state of existence by the oppressed, (4) oppression exerts its harmful influence 
over a protracted period of time, and, (5) oppression cannot be reduced to any single facet 
and exists as a confluence of factors, harms, and social structures.  The conception of 
oppression which emerges here lays the groundwork for the morally assessment of 
oppression which is to follow. 
Chapter two takes the conception of oppression outlined in chapter one and, using 
the framework of Aristotelian (and neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics, works to substantiate 
the prima facie claim that oppression is wrong as it inflicts moral damage on the 
oppressed.  In short, this chapter argues that oppression acts, in a multitude of ways, as an 
obstacle for the achievement of flourishing.  This chapter is broken down into three 
sections.  In section one, the ways oppression works as a limitation of virtue is explored.  
Here, it is shown that specific virtues are made either impossible, overly onerous, or 
burdened by the existence of oppression.  In each of these ways specific virtues are 
radically affected and, more often than not, made an impossibility for oppressed people 
and thus oppression can be shown to be a force which curtails the possibility of 
flourishing.  In section two, the ways oppression systematically manipulates the external 
goods necessary for the achievement of flourishing is explored.  Here, it is argued that 
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Aristotelian virtue ethics advances the view that certain material goods are necessary, yet 
not sufficient, for the achievement of flourishing and these necessary goods are 
systematically manipulated under conditions of oppression.  This systematic 
manipulation means that the external goods necessary for flourishing are often 
unavailable to the oppressed.  In section three, oppression is connected to so-called “base 
and shameful actions.”  This section begins exegetically and works to uncover Aristotle’s 
view of base actions, and it is argued that Aristotle’s account of such actions suffers from 
important shortcomings.  Yet, by building on Aristotle’s views, in light of these 
shortcomings, a coherent view of base actions can be established and it will be 
demonstrated that oppression often curtails flourishing by forcing the habituation of these 
base actions.  In total this chapter works to connect the harmful effects of oppression via 
virtue ethics and uses this encompassing framework to trace the harmful effects of 
oppression to our desires, our emotions, our choices, our habits, our interactions with 
others, and our political existence as social beings.  The resulting picture of oppression 
and its harms not only demonstrates the extent and depth of oppression's devastating 
effects on the oppressed, but works to ground the claim that the existence of oppression 
mandates obligatory responses from virtuous agents. 
Chapter three takes up the challenge of establishing, in the virtue ethical 
framework, a strong moral obligation which requires agents to resist oppression and 
obligates individuals to actively engage in liberatory struggles against oppressive forces.  
Admittedly, there is an immediate and apparent tension between the project of virtue 
ethics and the idea of strong obligations.  Yet, it is argued that such an obligation can still 
be found in virtue ethics.  To defend this view, this chapter begins by outlining 
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Hursthouse’s virtue-based account of action guidance as found in the so-called ‘v-rules.’  
For Hursthouse, the v-rules are derived from the existence of the virtues themselves and 
create a schema of rules for the achievement of flourishing.  While the v-rules themselves 
do not generate obligations, this chapter works to show that the v-rules entail a vast set of 
derivative rules (or ‘d-rules’) which do obligate agents in a variety of ways.  Of 
significance here is the way that the v-rules, and their entailed d-rules, obligate agents to 
act in such a way as to resistance the damning influence of oppression as it is a barrier to 
flourishing.   
The fourth and final chapter works to give substance to the broad obligation, 
established in chapter three, that agents are under to resist oppression.  It is argued here 
that the dischargement of this obligation cannot be fulfilled through the development of 
certain intellectual or emotional capacities which might allow individuals to understand 
and then judge (properly) their experience of oppression with moral outrage.  If it is 
oppression's inherent harms that make flourishing impossible for the oppressed (and 
therefore creates the moral mandate for resistance), then it is these harms, along with the 
practical mechanisms which level these harms, that resistance must be directed.  While 
some of the harms inflicted by oppression are emotional and psychological in nature, 
these harms cannot be reduced to merely "internal" states which can be solved by 
transforming an agent's dispositions.  Thus, it is argued that virtue ethics, in its demands 
that we meet oppression head-on, cannot be reduced to an obligation to cultivate a 
disposition and must focus upon action determination.  The resistance necessitated by 
virtue ethics must function to directly and purposefully attack and dismantle the 
apparatuses of oppression which make avenues to flourishing impossible for the 
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oppressed.  To provide substance to this call for action determination in resistance 
struggles, a model, drawn from the practical world of activist organizing, is imported and 
explained such that one is able to see a clear path towards the fulfillment of the obligation 
to resist.  In the end, this chapter defends the robust account of revolutionary action put 
forth and defends against the possible worry of demandingness. 
Broadly speaking, this project was largely inspired by the works of Lisa Tessman 
and Rosalind Hursthouse, who in many ways work at opposite ends of the virtue ethics 
spectrum.  I was extremely fortunate to be able to spend time in New Zealand working 
closely with Hursthouse during the writing of this dissertation, and during our time 
together she often claimed that we did not need to answer “those political problems” as 
they were best left to “political philosophers.”  While Hursthouse’s work often engages, 
deeply, in ‘political’ questions, she sees a divide between political philosophy and moral 
philosophy and her work focuses on what has traditionally been in the arena of moral 
philosophy.  Tessman, on the other hand, works expressly to engage virtue ethics in the 
social and political arenas, and her work on the so-called ‘burdened virtues’ and their 
connection to liberatory struggles is, to my mind, the best example of how virtue ethics 
can, and must, be used to address these ‘political’ questions.  Tessman, I would suspect, 
sees no strict divide between these two spheres. 
 The work which follows here could be characterized as an attempt to synthesize 
these two perspectives.  I disagree with Hursthouse’s characterization of distinct spheres 
and do not see a divide between ‘moral theory’ and ‘political philosophy.’  Yet, I agree 
with her that virtue ethics begins with a moral framework and that it is through this 
framework that virtue ethics works, even when addressing political and social questions.  
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Thus, this project works to keep moral assessment and obligation at the core of the 
arguments, and avoids (for example) the political works of Aristotle.  Following 
Tessman, whose work on the burdened virtues encapsulates one relatively narrow 
although extremely important aspect of oppression, this work continually returns to 
questions of flourishing and the acquisition of virtue and can contrasted with other work 
which might seek to keep justice, or injustice, at its theoretical nucleus.  In the end, I 
believe that Tessman is right and that the framework of virtue ethics necessitates active 
engagement in political and social questions and, in these engagements, virtue ethics can 
truly excel at addressing these problems and laying the groundwork for moving beyond 
them.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
OUTLINING A CONCEPTION OF OPPRESSION 
 
 
 
It might be believed that the natural starting point for a protracted project on 
oppression and moral resistance would be the establishment, or at least the outlining, of a 
comprehensive theory of oppression.  Such a theory, once detailed and defended, would 
provide the foundation for the moral work of chronicling oppression’s damning effects on 
the lives of the oppressed and the need for resistance struggles.  Yet, no such 
comprehensive theory of oppression will be found here, although this first chapter will 
outline a broad understanding of oppression and will highlight some of oppression’s 
salient features.  This broad understanding of oppression will serve to launch subsequent 
moral discussions of oppression, oppression’s harms, and the need for moral resistance 
struggles. 
 Before outlining the understanding of oppression which is at work in this project 
the seemingly bold move to omit a robust theory of oppression from this project needs to 
be explained and defended.  It will be argued here that not only is such a theory 
unnecessary for moral philosophizing about oppression and resistance but that attempts at 
comprehensive theories of oppression might actually act as roadblocks for further 
important work on these topics. 
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Section 1 - The Failures of Comprehensive Theories of Oppression 
 
Oppression is not a foreign concept to anyone working academically in political 
and moral philosophy or to those who work in activist and revolutionary movements.  
While the concept of oppression, or at least being oppressed, is understood by most 
people, an understanding of exactly what oppression is, and how it is differentiated from 
other forms of moral and political harm, remains oddly elusive.  Racism, sexism, 
heteronormativity, and classism are all paradigmatic examples of oppression and, often, 
these examples serve as stand-ins for robust 'theories of oppression.'  Identifying a theory 
of oppression, where oppression is exhaustively schematized and where oppression in all 
possible variants and nuances is differentiated from other forms of political and moral 
wrongs, often takes a back-seat to other more substantial questions about how oppression 
manifests in the lives of the oppressed or how the lived struggle against oppression ought 
to take shape.  Too many, and I would include myself in this group, the concept of 
oppression and its strict ontology are less important than the question(s) about how 
oppression is to be resisted.  Thus, paradigmatic examples of oppression often act as a 
placeholder for a complete theory of oppression and allows for us to agree on 
oppression's obvious existence. 
Considerable academic and activist work has been devoted to the topic of 
oppression.  Deeply theoretical accounts, descriptions, and treatments of oppression have 
emerged from both academics and activists to chronicle, in detail, oppression’s 
influences, existence, and root cause(s), yet, to my mind, a comprehensive and all-
inclusive theory of oppression remains peculiarly intangible.  Attempts to chronicle 
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oppression, such that oppression in all its varied forms, be they real, historic, or even 
potential, rely on the belief that oppression can be schematized into a singular theoretical 
framework.  To this end, what might be called ‘ontologies of oppression’ can be seen to 
fall into two rough camps; one which seeks to encompass the idea of oppression into a 
particular theoretical framework, and, the other which seeks to identify oppression via 
necessary and sufficient conditions.  It is my belief that both camps ultimately fail to 
provide a compelling unified conception of oppression and here I would like to, briefly, 
explain why. 
 This first camp, which seeks a theory of oppression within a particular 
philosophical theory, takes forms of oppression and works towards a singular paradigm 
such that all the different types or kinds of oppression can be shown to share a common 
core within a distinct theoretical framework.  The pre-existing theoretical framework is 
imported into discussions of oppression and acts both as the intellectual scaffolding for 
the construction of an account of oppression as well as works to move oppression into the 
fold of the existent theoretical structure.  No better example of this can be found then in 
the work of Marxists.  
 Marxists have long tried to craft unified theories of oppression where the 
historical causes of oppression can be identified and the common essence of various 
forms of oppression can be unearthed and shown to be a part of 'Oppression.'  For the 
Marxist, this unified theory of oppression situates the oppression of workers at the 
ideological center of their account and then seeks to subsume other forms of oppression 
as variants of the oppression of the working class.  Thus, the oppression of women and 
people of color are explained as exploitative relationships of capital and private property 
13 
 
and are treated as merely different, but no less pernicious, forms of class exploitation.  
This attempt to consolidate various forms of oppression into a singular theory has led to 
what Heidi Hartmann has called an "unhappy marriage" between feminism and 
Marxism.11  For Hartmann, the early Marxist's conception of oppression essentially 
analyzed patriarchal oppression in terms of women's relationship to capital and private 
property12 and could not take seriously the relationship between men and women.13 
Feminist critiques of such sublimation helped show how simple Marxist analyses could 
not take the oppression of women seriously as an issue in its own right, and in many ways 
such critiques did not fall universally on deaf ears.  Hartmann cites the work of Eli 
Zaretsky as an example of a Marxist theorist who took the feminist critique of traditional 
Marxism seriously and attempted to avoid the sex-blind nature of classical Marxism and 
who tried to synthesize feminism and Marxism together.14  For Hartmann (and others 
such as Lydia Sargent15), this attempt, while not sex-blind, still replicated the Marxist 
trope of sublimating patriarchal oppression into class divisions.  According to Hartmann, 
Zaretsky's analysis "ultimately rests on the notion of separation, on the concept of 
division, as the crux of the problem" such that patriarchal oppression remains "a division 
attributable to capitalism."16  Similar analyses have shown problems of the same kind in 
sublimation of race and racism in the Marxist analysis, and such problems lead Leonardo 
                                                           
11
 Heidi Hartmann, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive 
Union,” in Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism, ed. 
Lydia Sargent (South End Press, 1981). 
12
 The most famous of such "early Marxist attempts" at analyzing the oppression of women can be found in 
Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, which was written in the year 
immediately following Marx's death. 
13
 Hartmann, “Unhappy Marriage,” 3. 
14
 Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life, (Harpercollins, 1986), and also, “Socialist 
Politics and the Family,” Socialist Revolution (now Socialist Review) 19 (January-March 1974), 83-98. 
15
 Lydia Sargent, “New Left Women and Men: The Honeymoon is Over,” in Women and Revolution: A 
Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism, ed. Lydia Sargent (South End Press, 
1981). 
16
 Hartmann, “Unhappy Marriage,” 6 (emphasis in original). 
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Zeus to (borrowing the title from Hartmann) identify the "unhappy marriage between 
Marxism and race critique."17  
 Ultimately, attempts to craft a singular vision of oppression, which can explain 
both the historical causes and material conditions, for various forms of oppression fail in 
both their descriptive content as well as their in their normative uptake as such endeavors 
must take one of the paradigmatic forms of oppression as the common crux and then 
engage in various forms of sublimation.  It is in this intellectual act of sublimation that 
one fails to take seriously the unique epistemological, historical, and contextual facts of 
various forms of oppression and it seems that such attempts, regardless of noble intent, 
are doomed to failure.  It was the failure of unified theories of oppression which led Iris 
Marion Young to note that "attempts by theorists and activists to discover a common 
description or the essential causes of the oppression of all these groups have frequently 
led to fruitless disputes about whose oppression is more fundamental or more grave."18 
 Whereas so-called unified theories of oppression seek to fold oppression into a 
particular theoretical framework, such as Marxism, other theories of oppression seek to 
unify oppression into a codified set of necessary and sufficient conditions.  Attempts such 
as these do not, at least overtly, try to fold oppression into larger theoretical discussions 
but rather try and establish a set of criteria drawn from examples of oppression into a 
rigid schema of essentially shared characteristics.  Unfortunately, attempts of this nature, 
to devise a unified conception of oppression from a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, also fail to provide a compelling account of oppression. 
                                                           
17
 Leonardo Zeus, “Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Race Critique: Political Economy and the 
Production of Racialized Knowledge,” Policy Futures in Education, vol. 2, no. 3-4, 483-493 (2004). 
18
 Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Oppression, Privilege, & Resistance, eds. Lisa 
Heldke and Peg O’Connor (McGraw Hill, 2004), 2. 
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One problem with attempts to explain oppression by a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions is that most attempts of this nature devolve into protracted 
discussions of warranted inclusion or exclusion.  When oppression is rigidly defined 
through the identification of a set of necessary (and sufficient) conditions odd sets of 
counterfactuals emerge and demand that one engage in bullet-biting to either include or 
expel groups from the category of the oppressed.  Take for example Kenneth 
Clatterbaugh's analysis of feminist theories of oppression.19  In part, Clatterbaugh 
outlines what he calls "limitation theories" of oppression.  For Clatterbaugh, "the basic 
idea [of limitation theories of oppression] is that when options are denied to individuals 
in virtue of membership in a group, that limitation constitutes oppression.”20  
Clatterbaugh rejects such conceptions of oppression (which he attributes to Marilyn Frye 
and the early work of Alison Jaggar) because there are "obvious cases of limitation that 
are not oppression" and this leads us to the spurious belief “that everyone is oppressed.”21  
As an example of these abundant and "obvious" cases he cites various examples 
including the limitations imposed on "well-known Hollywood personalities" who “cannot 
travel freely in the city or eat at a favorite restaurant without a crush of admirers."22  
Clatterbaugh deploys this example as a form of reducto ad absurdum, and obviously does 
not think that celebrities are oppressed qua their celebrité, and uses this odd 
counterfactual to dismiss ‘limitation theories’ as being built on unclear and indefensible 
conditions for defining oppression.  For Clatterbaugh, such counterfactuals (and the 
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reductos they create) clear the path for the advancement of his view of oppression (which 
he dubs “dehumanizing theory”).  What is ultimately ironic about Clatterbaugh’s 
argument is that such counterfactual banter, which he uses to dismiss one attempt at a 
unified theory of oppression, actually works as a reducto to all forms of oppression 
established on strict categories of necessary and sufficient conditions.  The critical 
response to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions is the testing of these conditions 
against innumerable counter-examples, no matter how contrived.  Discussions which 
begin as attempts to understand the reality of lived oppression devolve into utterly 
fantastical discussions of examples so-far removed from the experience and reality of 
oppression that these theories must either accommodate counterfactuals into their criteria 
(making their conception of oppression “purely theoretical”) or engage in bullet-biting 
such that their conception of oppression omits cases of fantastical oppression.  
 Similar self-critiques can be found in the ever evolving work of Ann Cudd.  Cudd 
has written prolifically on oppression and often her work revisits her own ideas such that, 
beyond the obvious ever necessary work to clarify and refine ideas which all theorists 
face, she continually and subtly alters her conception of oppression such that it can 
handle marginal cases.  In 1994, Cudd posited four necessary and jointly sufficient 
criteria of oppression.23  These four "criteria of oppression" were: (1a) "oppression must 
involve some sort of physical or psychological harm," (2a) "Oppression applies in the first 
instance to groups who are identifiable independently of their oppression," (3a) "Some 
persons benefit, (or think they do), from the oppression," and, (4a) "Oppression must 
involve some coercion or force."   By 2005, Cudd had refined these four criteria to four 
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"conditions" which are identifiable in oppression.24  These four conditions are: (1b) the 
harm condition: "individuals are harmed by institutional practices (e.g., rules, laws, 
expectations, stereotypes, rituals, behavioral norms)," (2b) the group condition: 
individuals suffer harms in (1b) because of their membership (or perceived membership) 
in a social group," (3b) the privilege condition: "there is another social group that benefits 
from the institutional practice in (1b)," and, (4b) the coercion condition: "there is 
unjustified coercion or force that brings about the harm."  While each of these conditions 
closely mirrors the four criteria she outlined over a decade before, these conditions are 
subtly altered.  For example, in her later work Cudd had moved to from a strict criterion 
of benefit (3a) to a broader understanding of benefit as a result of privilege (3b).  
Similarly, the fourth condition, while mirroring the fourth criteria, moved from defining 
oppression via strict coercion (as a matter of available choices) to unjustified coercion.  
Here, Cudd found that without overtly tying the coercion criteria to an established theory 
of justice (which she imports from most directly from Rawls and less directly from 
liberalism in general), the criteria of coercion allowed-in too many counterfactuals to 
accurately capture oppression and therein distinguish oppression from other social forms 
of preference and choice limitation.   
 My point in noting this evolution of ideas in Cudd's work is not to critique her 
changes or justify why she saw the need alter her views in her later and more mature 
work, but rather to show that rigorous work on a comprehensive theory of oppression 
(which to my mind, no one has been more rigorous than Cudd) predicated on necessary 
and sufficient conditions comes at a heavy cost; namely that counterfactuals, and how 
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one deals with such marginal cases, must become the primary focus of such work.  
Continually clarifying and therein either allowing-in or shutting-out X or Y from the 
concept of oppression such that the concept of oppression can remain a defensibly rigid 
designator has become the central focus of Cudd’s analysis.   
 Deeply related to this problem emerges a second problem within Cudd's work on 
oppression.  Cudd expressly ties her theory of oppression to a liberal (if not libertarian) 
moral framework.  While this move severely limits the ways individuals and states can 
engage in  resisting and dismantling the social and economic apparatuses of oppression, it 
also means that Cudd (over)emphasizes aspects of oppression such that they are able to 
coincide with a liberal worldview.25  For Cudd, the evolving conception of oppression her 
work presents remains centrally focused on individuals, rights violations, and the 
manipulation of what could otherwise be unfettered choices made by the oppressed.  
While the liberal framework Cudd works within provides the necessary normative tools 
for assessing these lost values, and determining that it is oppression which causes these 
losses, as morally wrong, it also works descriptively.  Cudd defines oppression with the 
same moral tools she uses to normatively assess oppression.  As a liberal, Cudd sees the 
coercion of choice as a central transgression and descriptively mounts a definition of 
oppression as a form of coercion.  The result of this is that both the descriptive analysis 
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and the advancement of normative goals must remain situated within a singular 
theoretical framework and thus unlikely to curry favor with those who reject this 
framework. 
In both the work of the Marxists and the analytic philosophers (such as Cudd) we 
can see how comprehensive theories of oppression face serious, if not insurmountable, 
hurdles.  In both cases, serious critiques emerge to challenge the conceptions of 
oppression they advance and, interestingly, the emergence of these ruinous critiques was 
doomed to happen.  To advance an ironclad, all-encompassing, and universal theory of 
oppression is to demand rigid compliance from various forms of oppression into a unified 
theory.  The demand of compliance, as outlined above, results in either dogmatic 
sublimation of alternative views (as in the case of the Marxist) or the endless devolution 
into counterfactuals.  In either case, any account of oppression which seeks to work 
beyond mere descriptive analysis or analytical ontology becomes distracted or 
handcuffed to these discussions.  The ability to theorize about what is to be done, or how 
oppression impacts moral understandings, is placed into a secondary position behind the 
immediate task of first understanding, in total, what oppression truly is.  In this way, a 
strong theory of oppression hinders the ability to analyze oppression within a moral 
framework. 
 Not only can a strict theory of oppression hinder moral work on the topic, it seems 
that such a comprehensive view is unnecessary for proceeding into discussions about the 
moral implications of oppression and the moral demand to respond to oppression.  It is 
not the case that all, or even a majority of, philosophical work on oppression suffers fatal 
flaws derived from attempts at a crafting comprehensive theories of oppression.  In fact, 
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most of the work done on the topic of oppression has been done without a robust theory.  
Seminal works on the topic of oppression, such as Frye’s work The Politics of Reality26 
and Young’s “The Five Faces of Oppression,” make remarkable insights into the reality 
of oppression and help position oppression as a paramount moral and political evil 
without either first establishing a rigid and clear conception of oppression or relying on 
such a strict model.  Other protracted accounts of oppression and its harms, such as 
Tessman’s work on oppression as it intersects with the virtues27  and Harvey’s work on 
the way oppression is “civilized” into society through things such as humor and role 
expectations,28 do not need a codified and foundational account of oppression.  In each of 
these works we can see that theorizing about oppression need not begin, nor rest on, a 
rigid and strict conception of oppression.  Thus, no such attempt at a unified theory of 
oppression will be established or forwarded here in this work. It is not the goal of this 
chapter, or this entire project for that matter, to conceptualize what oppression really is 
but rather to trace oppression’s considerable moral influence and establish resistance to 
oppression as morally necessary. 
 The move to omit a theory of oppression from a work expressly focused on 
oppression and moral resistance does not free one to simply move forward to analyzing 
oppression and its harms and then working to establish the need for moral resistance.  
One cannot simply distance a work on oppression, such as this, from the otherwise 
different project of working on an exhaustive description of oppression and then freely 
and liberally use the term oppression without using it with reckless abandon. To this end 
it is necessary to outline an operating conception of oppression which can serve to launch 
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the moral work which is at this project’s core.  It is to this task that the remainder of this 
chapter will be focused. 
 
Section 2 - A Broad Understanding of Oppression 
 
The conception of oppression which will be deployed here, and then used 
throughout this project, begins by identifying oppression as an emergent social 
phenomenon which is deeply entangled with unjust social structures.  These unjust social 
structures allow and support the existence of oppression.  In essence, unjust social 
structures can be said to ‘aid and abet’ actions and instances of oppression, and it is this 
intermeshing of oppression with unjust social structures which helps differentiate 
instances of oppression’s manifestation from other seemingly similar cases of harm, 
abuse, and disadvantages.   The unjust social arrangements which I have in mind here 
include (a) the patriarchal power relations between men and women, (b) heteronormative 
assumptions which normalize heterosexuality and subsequently demonize other 
expressions of sexuality, (c) racist or racialized views of people, and, (d) classist 
divisions between economic groups.  It is these unjust social arrangements which give 
rise to the paradigmatic examples of oppression; namely sexism, heteronormativity, 
racism, and classism.    
The complex interplay between existent social arrangements and oppression is 
evidenced by the considerable array of linguistic ambiguity in the terms surrounding 
“oppression.”  Often the term ‘oppression’ is used in a nounal form and done so to pick-
out the general existence of a coercive and destructive force.  But ‘oppression’ also 
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carries a verbal form (as in “to oppress”) which indicates the deployment (in action) of 
such coercive and destructive forces, as well as an adjectival form (as in “oppressive”) 
which describes something as pertaining to oppression (in its nounal form).  These 
linguistic variations, when deployed, might be seem to be working to advance a singular 
definition of oppression.  To describe something as ‘oppressive’ might seem to indicate 
that it is predicative of an ontological category which can be understood ‘above and 
beyond’ its instantiations.  Similarly, to use oppression in its verbal form might seem to 
indicate that oppression simply exists as a category or type of action (or even intention).  
In either of these cases, the use of the varied linguistic forms of oppression might be 
taken as evidence of a conception of oppression which omits (or at least downplays) a 
myriad of others ways oppression exists.   
This linguistic ambiguity leads to confusion as to what ‘oppression’ refers; is 
oppression properly predicated of a unique system of disadvantages which is socially 
distinct from other forms of systematic harm, or is it properly predicated only to those 
actions which disadvantage and harm others, or rather does it indicate the experience of 
oppression in the lives of the oppressed?  In short, it would appear that each of these is 
true yet each, individually, fails to encompass the reality of oppression.  In some ways it 
is proper to describe something as oppressive when it is an instance of a larger unjust 
social arrangement and in other ways such a use of the term oppression fails to 
distinguish instances of oppression from the structural mechanisms which create the 
circumstances for such instances of harm.   
The picture of oppression which this project deploys is that oppression is an 
amalgamation of all these concepts.  Oppression cannot be reduced to merely the discrete 
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instances of oppressive actions and forces, but at the same time cannot be understood 
without accounting for the vast plurality of actions and forces which together create a 
social web of disadvantage, harm, and abuse.  In this way, it is often helpful to talk about 
“manifestations of oppression” when considering the concrete examples and instances of 
social harm and abuse, and other times it is necessary to talk about oppression in a 
general and encompassing way to capture the totality or milieu of such a social existence.  
In a similar way, it is often necessary to talk about oppression as it affects classes of 
people (such as in the claim that “women are oppressed”) but this does not deny that this 
oppression exists only in the ways that individual women directly experience the 
systematic effects of unjust social arrangements. 
A conception of oppression such as this, which operates and exists at both the 
superstructural level of general societal arrangements which negatively affect groups 
while at the same time only manifest in the concrete experience of  oppressed people, 
helps us, at this initial stage, to differentiate between seemingly similar actions which 
vary in their relation to oppression.  Take, for example, the actions of a physically 
abusive partner.  When the victim of domestic violence coincides with larger unjust 
social arrangements, the actions of the abuser can be described as oppressive.  When the 
victim of abuse fails to be a member of a socially disadvantaged group, the actions of the 
abuser fail to be oppressive, although no less harmful and deplorable.  While domestic 
violence is perpetrated by both men and women, and the gender of the perpetrator may 
not play a substantial role in the moment of abuse, it is surely the case that the gender of 
the perpetrator, in relation to the gender of the victim, carries with it a wide range of 
damning effects.  Domestic violence perpetrated by men against women is aided and 
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supported by patriarchal social arrangements which contribute to victim silencing, are 
supported by beliefs of prerogative and provocation, and result in eschewed paths for 
legal recourse (to name just a few).  In this way, two seemingly similar instances of 
domestic violence, differentiated by gender, must be assessed differently qua that which 
qualifies as oppressive.   
From this broad picture of oppression as deeply entangled with unjust social 
arrangements it is possible to further identify five salient features of oppression.  These 
features are (1) oppression affects individuals qua their membership in social and 
economic groups, (2) oppression is harmful to the oppressed, (3) oppression is not a state 
chosen by the oppressed but rather a state imposed upon them, (4) oppression exerts its 
harmful influence over a protracted period of time, and, (5) oppression cannot be reduced 
to any single facet and exists as a confluence of factors, harms, and social structures.  By 
flushing out these salient features the broad picture of oppression being advanced here is 
given further depth and clarity.  So it is to these salient features that attention must be 
turned. 
 
1.  Oppression is a social phenomenon and affects individuals qua their membership in 
social and economic groups 
 
Because oppression emerges as intimately bound-up with unjust social arrangements, 
the social nature of oppression, meaning that it affects individuals and does so qua their 
membership in social and economic groups, is the most striking feature of oppression.  
This social nature of oppression is evidenced in the literature on oppression as it is the 
most common thread found throughout this literature.  While one can talk about an 
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'oppressed individual,' it is not the case that the oppression that they experience is leveled 
against them in a singularly individualistic way, but rather that they exist as a member of 
an oppressed group.29   
 These social (and economic) groups to which oppression manifests are not merely 
collections of individuals.  Individuals may be grouped in countless ways, either though 
self-association or by another's categorization, yet each and every type of categorization 
need not be understood as a group.  Here it is helpful to distinguish a difference between 
'groupings' and 'groups.'   A grouping of individuals may be done through any number of 
characteristics whereas individuals are identified as similar to others through some shared 
characteristic or trait.  Groupings need not be significant to either the individual grouped 
or to the one categorizing individuals as part of a group.  For instance, individuals may be 
grouped by hair color or dominate handed-ness, and these groupings, to greater or lesser 
degree, may be said to accurately categorize individuals. 
 While groupings may be more or less morally arbitrary, ‘groups’ are deeply 
connected to the ways that an individual's identity is constructed.  Groups are constituted 
around shared norms, beliefs, ways of knowing, and collective history and thus play 
important roles in how one experiences life, how one understands and comes to 
knowledge, and how one views their collective past.  Participation in a group, whether 
self-chosen or not, has a constitutive impact on individuals, whereas groupings of 
individuals merely identify common or shared traits.   
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 In some cases the social groups of which one is a member is a matter of choice 
and self-identification.  Individuals who adopt a particular religion may be said to choose 
the norms, beliefs, and understandings of a religious tradition and thus voluntarily 
transform themselves into a member of a specific group.  In other cases, the placement of 
individuals into social groups can be done through colonial gaze of others.  Indigenous 
persons, in the United States, may have seen themselves simply a collection of different 
peoples, but the arrival of colonial forces created the single category of "Indian" or 
"Native" whereas the norms, beliefs, and histories of indigenous people were transformed 
into a social or cultural group through its identification as "the other."  It is in this 
identification of "the other" that the relational nature of group-to-group dynamics can be 
seen.  Social groups emerge in relation to other social groups.   
 While social groups not only classify but also constitute individuals, social groups 
are fluid and dynamic and individuals can participate in a plurality of social groups.  
Social groups change and shift, affecting inclusion and exclusion parameters, and do not 
exist as unchanging fixed categories.   
 It is within the dynamics of social groups that oppression operates.  When a social 
group, and the norms and identities it constitutes, is placed into a subordinate position 
within a dominant social framework of normalization the subordinate group is subject to 
oppressive forces.   These systematic forces which coerce, subjugate, and prejudice a 
social group are hallmarks of oppression.  While an individual in a subordinate social 
group will directly experience the force of oppression, it is their participation in a social 
group which makes them oppressed.  It is not the case that the oppression that one 
experiences is leveled against them as a unique individualized target of prejudice, but 
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rather the individual is subject to oppression qua their inclusion within an oppressed 
social group.   
 As mentioned earlier, this social nature of oppression is the most common and 
shared thread found throughout the work of different theorists and in different theories 
concerning oppression.  While different theorists have emphasized different types of 
social or economic groups, all stress that it is into the social dynamics of the 
subordination of social (or economic) groups that oppression exists. 
 
2)  Oppression is harmful for the oppressed 
 
The most obvious salient feature of oppression is that it is harmful for those 
oppressed.  It would seem that the identification of harm is often the first step in 
identifying oneself as an oppressed person and is the most directly experienced effect of 
oppression in the lives of the oppressed.   Oppressed people experience the harmful 
effects of oppression directly and often it is the naming of these harms which reveals the 
individually-experienced harm as present in the lives of people of a particular social or 
economic group.  In this way, the harms of oppression are not only real, but the 
experience of these harms can serve as an epistemic base for the oppressed to identify 
their oppression.30 
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The most discernable of harms caused by oppression are the physical and 
economic harms leveled against the oppressed.  The living conditions of the global 
working class and the systematic use of targeted violence are easily recognizable and 
often the harm most chronicled through the media.  The recent killing of Eric Garner, an 
unarmed black man choked to death by a white NYPD officer, and the union busting 
tactics of Coca-Cola which have left at least four union leaders dead in Colombia both 
exemplify not only the reality of oppression’s use of physical harm, but also the way that 
this harm is easily transmitted across the globe through images, eye-witness reports, and 
accounts of first-hand experience.  In a similar way, the economic reality of poverty and 
wantingness is easily identifiable and demonstrable when looking at the lives of the 
working class.  In many ways it is easy to see poverty and see the ways that groups of 
people are deprived economic opportunities and benefits, and therein harmed. 
Less apparently obvious are the ways oppression inflicts harm on individuals in 
non-physical and non-material ways.  The oppressed, in addition to these physical and 
material forms of harm, are also subject to a myriad of emotional and psychological 
harms.  Oppressed people can suffer from an eroded sense of value, be emotionally 
manipulated into states of irascibility, and (through material manipulation) kept in states 
of ignorance.  These types of emotional and psychological harm experienced by the 
oppressed, while less apparent, are no less damaging and detrimental than the obvious 
cases of physical harm and must be counted for when considering oppression’s harms.31 
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It should be said that different individuals as well as different oppressed groups 
will experience these harms in a variety of ways and to a variety of degrees.  These harms 
can be experienced acutely or chronically, and may vary between individuals or groups.  
It seems impossible to identify a singular experience of oppression’s harm, or even 
identify an exacting measurement of the damage these harms ‘ought’ to inflict on 
different individuals or groups if they are to be victims of oppression.  Yet, between 
different oppressed groups there does exist a common tie of harm, and the various effects 
of oppression must be seen, at least in part, as an overlapping tapestry of harm.  While the 
forms of harm caused by oppression are chronicled, in detail, in chapter two, it seems 
sufficient to say here that oppression is harmful and that oppression harms the oppressed 
in a plurality of ways.32 
 
3)  Oppression is not, in and of itself, a chosen state of existence by the oppressed 
 
 This third salient feature of oppression, which identifies oppression as an imposed 
and unchosen state by the oppressed, is a natural outcropping of the ways that oppression 
affects individuals qua their membership in social groups.  Since many of the social 
groups to which one may belong, which are subject to unjust arrangements, are not 
necessarily voluntary associations, the oppression which affects the members of these 
groups cannot be said to be chosen by oppressed. In this way, the ascendancy of 
dominate social orders is imposed upon the subordinate group and not the object of 
choice. 
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 To this claim there might be some who argue that there are cases where a group 
chooses subordination and can be said to, as a social group, choose their role as 
oppressed.  Take for example a religious community of women in which the wider 
religious community mandates the subordination of women to men in both the religious 
and social aspects of life.  Here, the dutiful women actively participate in their 
subordination and oppression and choose to remain in such a position of subservience.  
Such examples exist in many religious communities and it might be claimed that such 
examples undercut the claim that oppression is always imposed upon the oppressed and 
never a chosen state of affairs by the oppressed.   
It is my belief that these communities do not represent people choosing to be 
oppressed, although their choices do allow for their oppression.  In such cases the 
subordinated groups are surely choosing to exist within a set religious group defined by 
norms, beliefs, and values.  Such a group of religious women would be choosing to 
accept the norms of a type of religious devotion, which in turn is oppressive, but they are 
not choosing to be oppressed for the sake of being oppressed.  Communities such as these 
may come to accept their subordination as a necessary part of a religious doctrine, but it 
is the religious doctrine which is the object of choice.  A group or community may come 
to accept its subordination or oppression within a larger community, but this acceptance 
is not equivalent to having the group's subordination be the end that they seek through 
their actions or choices.  A similar case can be made in other such instances of seemingly 
self-chosen oppression.  Take for example a woman who decides to have a biological 
child and further decides to work at home as a care worker for her offspring.  This 
woman may be reinforcing gender stereotypes of domesticity and motherhood by her 
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actions but her choice is not motivated by the desire to reinforce these stereotypes.  It 
would seem that given the (albeit fictitious option) to have a biological child and raise the 
child herself without this action feeding into sexist stereotypes of domesticity, this 
individual would prefer this option.  Here, in this contrived yet real example, we can see 
that the sexist norms which mandate women to be mothers to remain authentic in their 
femininity is not the object of her choice, but rather the accidental byproduct of her 
choice.  The same seems true for other forms of oppression.  Oppressed individuals may 
be reluctant to abandon oppressive structures the oppressive structures themselves are not 
the objects of choice.  Thus many African Americans chose to remain in debt-bondage to 
their former slave owners long after their legal emancipation, yet it was not their debt-
bondage that was the object of their choice but rather the relative security of existent 
conditions weighed against the unknown which meant choosing such arrangements.  The 
racism was imposed, and all things being equal, was not the object of choice of the 
oppressed.   
 It needs to be clear that I do not want to dismiss or deny the important ways in 
which oppressed individuals may become participants (either actively or passively) in 
their own oppression.  I simply want to claim that oppression, or being in an oppressed 
state, is not the object of choice by the oppressed as an end that they actively seek.  In 
this way, oppression is imposed upon subordinate groups as part of a paradigm of 
hegemony.   
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4)  Oppression exerts its harmful influence over a protracted period of time 
 
 Time, and temporal continuance, also plays an important role in understanding 
oppression and must be seen as one of its salient features.  On one hand, this feature of 
time can be understood as the duration of an oppressive structure, and on the other we 
can see how oppression affects individuals over protracted periods of time. To this first 
feature, oppression, as a systematic confluence of forces, persists over a relatively long 
period of time.  Because oppression works, in part, by manipulating social and economic 
mores, and by establishing and using moral attitudes, oppression is an enduring force.  
Oppressive systems do not arise overnight, nor do they subside and die in a moment.  
Forms of oppression are prolonged and exert their harmful influence sustained periods of 
time.  This durational life of oppression ties to the second way which the temporal nature 
of oppression must be understood.  In this second way, oppression is not something that 
individuals pass in-and-out of, and being oppressed is not a transient state.  Much like 
how oppression persists over long periods of time, individuals perdure as oppressed 
people.   
 Identifying oppression as enduring and temporally persistent helps distinguish it 
from other forms of related political and social wrongs often conflated with oppression.  
Oppression should be distinguished from other unjust arrangements such as exploitation, 
servitude, being downtrodden, and being held in bondage (to name just a few).  While 
these social and economic arrangements are often the hallmark of oppression, they do 
remain distinct.  Evidence for this move to distinguish oppression from other forms of 
injustice is exhibited in the ways one can be said to be removed from an unjust social 
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arrangement yet not be liberated from oppression.  Here, one can look to cases where 
individuals or groups have (even temporarily) extracted themselves from unjust social 
conditions yet, never the less, remained oppressed.  Take for example the workers at 
Chicago’s Republic Windows and Doors.  In 2008, UE workers (United Electrical, Radio 
and Machine Workers of America) were informed that the company was immediately 
closing their production plant.33  Workers announced that they had no intention to see the 
plant close, occupied the facilities, and continued assembly production.  After garnering 
much media attention, the plant remained open and in use until it was bought by Serious 
Energy (a rival company).  These workers, running the plant collectively and as a 
collective, were successful at (temporarily) freeing themselves from the exploitation of 
management yet were not free from being oppressed members of the working class.  A 
similar example can be seen by returning to the previously mentioned example of US 
chattel slavery and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.  While the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment effectively ended chattel slavery in the US, the newly “freed” 
African Americans were not liberated from the oppression.  In both of these cases we can 
see how individuals or groups can be said to have escaped one unjust arrangement (be 
that ‘exploitation’ in the case of Republic Windows and Doors and ‘legal bondage’ in the 
case of newly freed American slaves) yet remained firmly under the thumb of oppression.  
While it is true that individuals suffering under oppression are exploited and often in 
some form of bondage, it remains the case that one can free themselves from these 
arrangements without being liberated from oppression.   
                                                           
33
 For a detailed description of the initial work of the UE to keep Republic Windows and Doors open, as 
well as its operation until dissolution, see Alejandra Cancino, “Former Republic Windows and Doors 
Workers Learn to be Owners,” The Chicago Tribune (November 6, 2013),  
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These examples illustrate the ways that oppression, and being oppressed, must be 
distinguished and, partially, disentangled from other ways in which unjust social 
arrangements manifest.  The move to highlight the temporal longevity and ability to 
perdure as salient feature of oppression helps us do just this.  While it is not possible to 
establish an ‘oppression-or-not’ clock or calendar, the paradigmatic examples of 
oppression reveal a salient feature of lasting continuance.  In addition, oppression’s 
perdurance also helps explain why attempts to “root out” and eliminate oppressive 
structures requires an attention to this longevity. 
   
5)  Oppression cannot be reduced to any single facet and exists as a confluence of factors, 
harms, and social structures 
 
The fifth and final salient feature of oppression that needs to be highlighted is the 
nonreducable nature of oppression.  By identifying oppression as ‘nonreducable’ is to 
claim that oppression cannot be parsed down to any one salient feature or any individual 
moral transgression, evil, or moral harm.  As revealed by the paradigmatic examples, 
oppression emerges as a systematic confluence of forces, and the reality of oppression is 
that it resists being diminished to a singular moral wrong. 
 To reduce oppression to a single moral evil, or even a short-list of moral 
transgressions, is to deny the systematic nature of oppression.  The existence of 
oppression is one of a wide range of social, political, and economic influences which 
exerts its damning influence on oppressed peoples in a variety of political and moral 
ways.  So to pin oppression as simply, for example, a series of unjust structured political 
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arrangements is to overlook the vast array of ways which oppression operates beyond the 
confines of juridical injustice. Similarly, to reduce oppression to being merely the result 
of the immoral and unjust actions of an oppressor is to overlook the important ways that 
individuals will be privileged through the existence of oppression yet not be the evil and 
maniacal overlord who intends the enslavement of others.  Oppression, both in its causes 
as well as in its effects, defies attempts at reduction and its systematic nature is one of 
complicated factors.  It is in the identification of this fifth salient feature which keeps 
reductive accounts of oppression from being advanced and seeks to keep the reality of 
oppression’s systematic nature in place. 
 
Section 3 - Conclusion 
 
The understanding of oppression being advanced here is that oppression is a 
purduring, harmful, and unchosen state which affects individuals qua their membership 
in social groups and which, in turn, is supported by, and entangled with, unjust social 
arrangements.  This picture of oppression is born out of the paradigmatic examples of 
oppressive structures like racism, sexism, classism, and heteronormativity and works to 
keep these paradigmatic examples at the center of its understanding.  This admittedly 
broad conception of oppression navigates the terrain between, on one hand, strict theories 
of oppression (and the pitfalls they entail), and, on the other hand, an overly loose 
conception of oppression which lacks critical engagement. 
In the end, the picture of oppression being used here may not be equipped to 
universally address potential counterfactuals, or systematically distinguish oppression 
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from the social arrangements which work to support the existence of oppression.  To this 
charge, I will freely admit, although it is necessary to temper this charge by reiterating 
two important points made earlier.  First, an all-encompassing, ironclad, unwavering 
theory of oppression is not the aim of this chapter, or this project.  The focus of this 
project is to analyze the harmful effects of oppression in the lives of the oppressed within 
the framework of virtue ethics and then work toward the establishment of our responsive 
obligations to oppression within this framework.  Second, an ironclad and universal 
theory of oppression is not necessary for such work to proceed.  This general conception 
of oppression, which mirrors other such descriptions that eschew and forsake all-
encompassing theoretical attempts, creates a broad yet thick understanding of oppression 
which can be further analyzed through the theoretical framework of Aristotelian (and 
neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics.  Through the lens of virtue ethics the harms of oppression 
on the oppressed, which were briefly touched upon in this chapter, can be brought into 
sharp focus and can be chronicled in detail.  It is the result of the descriptive exploration 
of analyzing oppression’s damning harms that works to motivate the need for individuals 
and communities to engage in resistance struggles.  But before looking at the morally 
available resistance to which people are obligated, this descriptive analysis of 
oppression’s influence on the oppressed, done from within the virtue theoretical 
framework, must occur and it is to this task that the next chapter is focused. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
IDENTIFYING THE WRONGS OF OPPRESSION IN VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
 
 
 I take it as given that oppression is, prima facie, morally wrong and it inflicts 
moral damage upon those who suffer under its influence.  This chapter will move from 
this prima facie claim to substantiate the ways that oppression harms individuals as 
understood by virtue ethics.  This harm is inflicted on a multitude of levels and, for the 
virtue ethicist, can be divided into a three-part categorization; oppression's effect on the 
acquisition of virtue, oppression's manipulation of external goods, and oppression's 
necessitation of base and shameful actions.  Corresponding to these three categories, this 
chapter has been divided into three sections which relate to three nexuses of harm caused 
by oppression.   
 Each of these sections utilizes etiological arguments which trace the influences of 
oppression to the harm leveled against oppressed individuals.  In short, oppression limits 
the availability of flourishing and warps individuals characters into states of viciousness.  
The labeling of these states as "vicious" may sound odd at points because, as it will be 
shown, the damage leveled against individuals is often not chosen or volitional.  Yet, the 
etiological explanation of oppression's coercive force directly results in individuals being 
pressed into harmful states of vice. 
 By showing how, in these three arenas, oppression curtails flourishing, we are 
able to generate an Aristotelian obligation to resist oppression as oppression denies 
flourishing to not only individuals but also entire communities of people.  
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Section 1 – Oppression as a Limitation of Virtue 
 
 It is clear that external influences are capable of effecting changes in the 
emotional and psychological states of moral agents.  Oppression, as a force, affects the 
moral character of individuals and thus the existence of oppression limits individuals in 
their ability to be virtuous.  This can be seen both in relation to the moral virtues as well 
as the intellectual virtues.  Here, I wish to show how this is the case.  In general, we need 
to see how virtues are affected by oppression and this effect manifests in three broad 
ways.  First, some virtues are made a practical impossibility for oppressed individuals 
and the possibility for the achievement of these virtues is eliminated.  Second, some 
virtues are affected in that their acquisition is made extremely difficult for the oppressed 
person.  In a third way, some virtues become what Tessman has called “burdened,” in 
that the proper and appropriate mean for the virtue is extreme.34  In this third case, the 
agent does in fact inculcate a virtue as opposed to a vice but the virtue, due to the 
existence of oppression, is damaging and dangerous to its possessor.  To illustrate how 
the virtues are (a) eliminated, (b) affected, or, (c) burdened, the specific moral virtues of 
temperance, courage, and so-called "good-temperedness," along with the intellectual 
virtues of wisdom and knowledge, will be outlined.  These virtues illustrate, in specific 
detail, how the virtues are unduly manipulated by oppression in these three ways.  This 
manipulation of virtue curtails agents in their habituation of these moral virtues and limits 
the availability of virtue and therefore flourishing.  In each of these instances (and in 
reference to both types of virtue), it is essential that we see how oppression acts as a 
                                                           
34 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 2005, and, “Burdened Virtue of Political Resistance,” in Feminist 
Interventions in Ethics and Politics, eds. Barbara S. Andrew, Jean Keller, and Lisa H. Schwartzman 
(Rowmann and Littlefield, 2005). 
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causal force which inhibits individuals from developing the virtues necessary for the 
achievement of happiness (flourishing).  
 
A.  Temperance 
 
 Let us first turn to the virtue of temperance, as it is through temperance that we 
can see how some virtues are made a complete impossibility by the existence of 
oppression.  To understand how oppression makes temperance impossible for the 
oppressed it is necessary to first outline Aristotle's conception of temperance (and therein 
his understanding of appetites). 
 Aristotle differentiates, at Nicomachean Ethics (NE) 1118b8, two different senses 
of appetite; "common appetites" and "peculiar appetites."35   Common appetites are 
described as "natural" and connected to our base physical existence while peculiar 
appetites are described as preferences related to taste and individuated desires for 
particular foods.  The desire in common appetites is physiological in nature and rooted in 
our need for food as a means for sustaining our physical existence.  Peculiar appetites 
appear, for Aristotle, to be not physiological in nature but rather preferential to taste.   
 Charles Young argues that "[Aristotle's] distinction between common and peculiar 
appetites is better seen, not as a distinction between two different kinds of appetite, but 
rather as a distinction between different grounds for our having the appetites we do."36  I 
agree with Young and resist moves to distinguish two different types of appetites.  Such a 
move is not supported by the text.  To claim that there are two different types of appetites 
                                                           
35 The entire project uses the W.D. Ross translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.  Any use of different 
translations, when used for points of comparison, will be noted at that time. 
36 Charles Young, “Aristotle on Temperance,” The Philosophical Review 97, no. 4 (1988), 531. 
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would require the identification of two independent virtues to govern these two types of 
appetites.  Aristotle would have to distinguish different (but related) virtues of 
temperance as he does with generosity and magnificence in chapters one and two of Book 
IV.  Since Aristotle does not do this it is disingenuous to the text to claim that his 
descriptions of common and peculiar appetites are meant as a difference in kind.   
 If we accept Young's account, as I suggest that we do, we are given a picture of 
temperance by Aristotle which responds to our layered and complex relationship to food.  
At a basic level we desire food for survival, but our desire for food does not simply 
reduce to physical need and can, after the physiological need is met, become preferential 
for pleasure and enjoyment. 
 Interestingly, these two sources of desire regarding food require that we provide 
two corresponding accounts of intemperance, particularly in relation to situations where 
these desires are unsatisfied.  When peculiar appetites go unfulfilled we are left with what 
Aristotle calls a "craving" (1118b10).  These cravings are a form of profligacy and 
beyond the mean of temperance.  The specific criteria of time, place, degree, manner, and 
motive (1106a22, 1109a26) in relation to the doctrine of the mean yield an assessment of 
such errant desires.  For example, one may experience a peculiar appetite for a food 
which is ethically repugnant (such as foie gras or veal), or have a peculiar complaint at an 
inappropriate time (such as complaining that the food at a funeral is not to your liking).  
In this way, we can be intemperate in regards to our peculiar appetites and this 
intemperance is explained through the enumerated criteria of the doctrine of the mean 
found repeated in Book II. 
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 On the other hand, when common appetites go unfulfilled we are left having to 
provide a different moral analysis.  While the conditions of time, place, manner, and 
motive remain morally relevant, common desires are first weighed against the criteria of 
satisfaction.  That is, the primary moral question of our physiological desires for 
sustenance relate to the ability to realize these desires through survival eating.  When 
common appetites are met our immediate desires for food are satiated.  This satiation is 
temporary and these desires will reemerge at a later time when our bodies again desire 
nourishment.  In this way, common desires can be called 'hunger.'  While possibly 
complicated by peculiar cravings for a particular food when we are hungry, the common 
appetites are satisfied not through particularly desired foods but rather by eating some 
food.  To satisfy a common desire, food must be consumed.  For common appetites, it is 
only after the possibility of satiation is made manifest that we can raise further evaluative 
concerns about the conditions of these desires.   
 Thus, Aristotle claims, "in the natural appetites [read: common desires] few go 
wrong, and only in one direction, that of excess" (1118b15).  Aristotle seems quite 
correct in claiming that there is, but with one exception, only errors of excess in regards 
to common appetites.  The error of deficiency in regard to our common appetites would 
only arise in individuals who, do to physiological37 or psychological38 disorders and 
                                                           
37
 Specifically, this is the medical condition of cachexia.  Cachexia, sometimes called "chronic wasting 
disease," is "a complex metabolic syndrome associated with underlying illness and characterized by loss of 
muscle with or without loss of fat mass,” Evans, W. J., Morley, J. E., Argilés, J., Bales, C., Baracos, V., 
Guttridge, D., Jatoi, A., Kalantar-Zadeh K., Lochs, H., Mantovani, G., Marks, D., Mitch, W.E., 
Muscaritoli, M., Najand, A., Ponikowski, P., Fanelli, F.R., Schambelan, M., Schols, A., Schuster, M., 
Thomas, D., Wolfe, R., Anker, S.D.  (2008). "Cachexia: A New Definition." Clinical Nutrition 27, no. 6 
(2008), 794.  Cachexia is a medical condition which is the result of larger illnesses, sickness, or disease 
where individuals experience a radical reduction (or elimination) of the natural desire for food.  While most 
often associated with cancer, it also occurs in patients with pulmonary disease, chronic kidney disease, 
sepsis, and even Crohn's disease.  If, via medication, patients cannot regain their nutritive desires they must 
be fed through gastric tubes or other artificial means. 
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diseases, would not possess the natural instinct for nourishment.  Where Aristotle is 
patently wrong is in his claim of rarity concerning this vice of excess.  In fact, it would 
appear that the countless people who suffer in poverty experience this excessive desire.  
When the basic need for food goes unfulfilled, placing individuals in a state of starvation, 
or is fulfilled without the requisite nutrients needed for proper functioning of the body, as 
in malnutrition, the individual suffers from an excessive desire for food.  As odd as this 
sounds, underfed, starving, or malnourished people are physiologically forced into a state 
of wanton intemperance, and this intemperance is one of excess.  Considerable clinical 
research in nutrition, psychology, and physiology can attest to this counter-intuitive 
claim. 
 Ancel Keys, as lead researcher, headed the Minnesota Starvation Experiment 
which sought to explore and explain the psychological and physiological effects of food 
deprivation.39  During the experiment, which began in 1944, subjects were placed on 
progressively restrictive diets and their psychological states were detailed.  First subjects 
were put on a 3,200 calorie per day diet to determine their "ideal weight."  Following this 
initial period (which was, for most subjects, a caloric restriction from their everyday 
eating habits), subjects had their caloric and food intake severely restricted for 24 weeks 
where they were allowed to return to "normal eating habits" only after they had achieved 
a weight-loss goal of dropping 75% of their initial body weight.  During the 24-week 
                                                                                                                                                                             
38 It is possible that eating disorders such as anorexia represent a psychological disorder which results in 
insensitivity to food.  While acknowledging this possibility I am wary about reducing eating disorders to 
mere food insensitivity.  Research into eating disorders, such as anorexia, has shown that these conditions 
are rooted in "emotional, physical, and spiritual wounds" which merely manifest in one's relation to food.  
Carol Emery Normandi and Laurelee Roark, It’s Not About Food: End Your Obsession with Food and 
Weight (Penguin Putnam, 1999),  xvii. 
39 Jean Polivy, “Psychological Consequences of Food Restriction,” Journal of the American Dietetic 
Association 96, no. 6 (1996). 
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starvation period, subjects ate minimal diets of potatoes, bread, and pasta thus mimicking 
the eating conditions faced by soldiers and civilians during World War II.  Keys found 
that when the subjects were placed into a state of starvation they "became increasingly 
focused on food; they collected recipes, hung pinup pictures of food, and changed career 
plans to food-related activities such as becoming a chef.”40  Keys found that extreme food 
deprivation results in not only an increase in the desire for food, but also an increase in 
intensity of desire.  Once subjects achieved their weight-loss goal, they were placed upon 
unrestricted diets for 12 weeks where they were permitted to eat unlimited amounts of 
food of their own choice.  Keys found that during this unrestricted eating period subjects 
over-ate, gorged, and binged, and in some cases even stole food when food supplies were 
readily available.  Similar results were found by researchers questioning Canadian 
prisoners of war who had been subject to food deprivation during their incarceration.41  
Interviewees reported patterns of binge eating which continued from the time of their 
initial release and well into their civilian life after the war. 
 Whether in cases of voluntary starvation (as exhibited during the Minnesota 
Starvation Experiment) or involuntary starvation (as exhibited by Canadian POW's), the 
effect of food deprivation seems to be the development (and maintenance) of excessive 
common desires for food.  While Aristotle notes, and criticizes, "belly-gods" (or "those 
people... that fill their belly beyond what is right," 1118b19) as an example of 
intemperance, what he does not see is that the same excessive desire for food is found in 
those who are systematically denied access to food.  The only difference, qua 
temperance, between the belly-god and those experiencing starvation appears to be the 
                                                           
40 Polivy, Psychological Consequences,” 598. 
41 Jean Polivy, Sharon B. Zeitlin, C. Peter Herman, and A. Lynne Beal, “Food Restriction and Binge Eating: A 
Study of Former Prisoners of War,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 103, no. 2 (1994).  
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ability to satisfy the excessive common desire.  In both cases, there exists an errant desire 
of excess relating to common desires and the existence of this excessive desire results in 
intemperance. 
 This discussion of the virtue of temperance demonstrates the ways that oppression 
can deny the availability of virtue and therefore limit flourishing but the significance of 
this example extends beyond merely elucidating this point and holds further special 
significance in this discussion.  The special significance of temperance in relation to 
oppression comes from the important ways in which this specific virtue intersects with 
the practical maintenance of power and oppression.  Rolf Künnemann and Sandra Epal-
Ratjen, writing on behalf of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
highlight what they call "food-related oppression" claiming the manipulation of food is 
one of the most common ways that individuals and groups are held under manipulative 
and oppressive control.42  Further, they claim, "control over the access to food and food-
producing resources of other people and peoples is one of the most fundamental sources 
of power over them.”43  The immoral misuses of this power  are forms of oppression, and 
there are important definitive correlations between oppressive political structures and 
their manipulation of food and food availability.    
 In the most bold and egregious forms, food is directly and intentionally targeted 
as a weapon of political and social control and thus can be used as a vehicle for enforcing 
and maintaining oppressive structures.  Food, due to the bare necessity that it serves, is a 
particularly effective tool for subjection and manipulation.  One striking and 
paradigmatic example of this can be seen in the distribution (or lack thereof) of food by 
                                                           
42 Rolf Künnemann and Sandra Epal-Ratjen, The Right to Food: A Resource Manual for NGO’s (AAAS 
Science and Human Rights Program, 2004), 18. 
43 Ibid 
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syndicated warlords during the civil war in Somalia.  In 1991, after losing the backing of 
the Russian Soviets, the communist government of Somalia was overthrown and the 
country erupted into a brutal civil war.  The civil war was primarily fought between two 
militias, one led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other Mohammed Farah Aidid.  Both 
men, commonly described as "warlords,” used the systematic withholding of food to 
further their cause.44  One of the immediate results of the outbreak of the civil war was a 
widespread famine which, according to the UN, caused over 240,000 deaths.45   The UN 
created a special taskforce, named United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) to 
respond to the pressing needs of civilians.  In conjunction with US forces who carried out 
their own "humanitarian" missions, the UN attempted to supply food to relieve the effects 
of the famine but their attempts ultimately failed.  The failure of this humanitarian aid 
was due to the fact that food relief efforts were funneled primarily through the warring 
factions.  Aidid and Mohamed both accepted food from the UN and distributed the food 
to civilians as a reward for support for their faction.  Civilians were given a choice 
between supporting one of the aligned militia groups and aiding the war efforts or 
starvation.  This direct withholding of food from the civilian population represents the 
most severe form of oppression manifest through food manipulation.   
 Beyond cases of intentional and forced food manipulation, such as those 
represented by the case of the Somali civil war, the existence of so-called "food deserts" 
also works as a tool of oppressive food manipulation.  The term "food desert," first used 
in the 1990's in Scotland, does not currently have a uniform or agreed upon definition and 
                                                           
44 Stephen Reese, Oscar Gandy, and August Grant’s, Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our 
Understanding of the Social World (Routledge, 2001) provides a lengthy case study of the use of the term 
"warlord" in reference to Mohamed and Aidid as used by major media outlets in the Western world.  The 
consensus is that this term was not only widely used, but used accurately. 
45 Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia: A Situation Analysis,” WRITENET (2000), 3. 
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the term encompasses a wide range of related topics.46  Some define food deserts based 
upon availability and affordability of healthy food,47 while others define food deserts as 
locations where food options are limited to types of businesses of limited employees.48  
In short, a food desert is a geographical area in which healthy food availability is limited 
and food options are predominately served by convenience stores and fast food services.  
The term "food desert" is contrasted with "food oases" where a food oasis is a location 
where a plurality of healthy food options exist at affordable prices.  In food deserts there 
may be an abundance of food and an abundance of food outlets, but by-and-large it is 
only highly processed "empty calorie" food, rich in fat, sugars, sodium, and hydrogenated 
oils, all of which have deleterious health effects.  Fresh vegetables, fruits, and nutritious 
alternatives are scarce, if available at all.  Food deserts have become an important topic 
of scholarship for urban planners, public health officials, civic engineers, dietitians, and 
activists because almost all studies and surveys of food deserts show that food deserts 
exist disproportionately in economically poor areas, be they rural or urban,49 and 
disproportionately affect people of color.50   
                                                           
46 Steven Cummins and Sally Macintyre, “’Food Deserts’ – Evidence and Assumption in Health Policy 
Making,” BMJ 325, no. 7361 (2002).  
47 Ibid. 
48 Deja Hendrickson, Chery Smith, Nicole Eikenberry, “Fruit and Vegetable Access in Four Low-Income 
food desert communities in Minnesota,” Agriculture and Human Value 23 (2006). 
49 See Linda Alwitt and Thomas Donley’s, “Retail Stores in Poor Urban Neighborhoods,” Journal of 
Consumer Affairs 31, no. 1(1997), and,  LaVonna Blair Lewis, David C. Sloane, Lori Miller Nascimento, 
Allison L. Diamant, Joyce Jones Guinyard, Antronette K. Yancey, and Gwendolyn Flynn’s “African 
Americans’ Access To Healthy Food Options in South Los Angeles Restaurants,” American Journal of Public 
Heath 94, no. 4 (2005).  
50 See Marva Lewis and Joy Osofsky’s “Violent Cities, Violent Streets: Children Draw Their 
Neighborhoods,” in Children in a Violent Society, ed. Joy Osofsky (Guildford Press, 1995), and, Jason P. 
Block, Richard A. Scribner, and Karen B. DeSalvo’s “Fast Food, Race/Ethnicity, and Income,” American 
Journal of Preventative Medicine 27,no. 3 (2004), and,  Kimberly Moreland, Steve Wing, and Ana Diez 
Roux’s “The Contextual Effect of the Local Food Environment on Resident’s Diets: The Atherosclerosis Risk 
in Communities Study,” American Journal of Public Health 92, no. 11 (2002). 
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 While it is clear that victims of starvation do not have their food needs met, and 
therefore are intemperate, it is, on the surface, less clear how food deserts relate to 
common desires.  It might appear that food deserts, and the coerced unhealthy choices 
they impose upon residents, relate to peculiar desires, yet it can be shown that food 
deserts create a similar intemperance of excess to starvation in relation to common 
desires.  Common desires are distinguished from peculiar desires in their root cause, and 
the root cause of common desires for food is physiological in nature.  Physiologically, the 
body desires, for health and maintenance, certain nutritional qualities.  Proteins, complex 
carbohydrates, and nutrients are all desired by the body for healthy function and these 
nutrients are exactly what is often missing in diets constructed within food deserts.  
While a preference for romaine lettuce over green-leaf lettuce is a peculiar desire, the 
need and desire for produce is common.  In food deserts, these basic biological needs are 
not being met, and the common desires not satisfied.  If physiological desires are not met, 
individuals are left wanting.  It is this wanting for that which cannot be fulfilled that 
marks the vice of intemperance. 
 Shown through the cases of both the Somali civil war and existence of food 
deserts, individuals and communities suffering under oppressive systems of food 
manipulation are left with their appetites unfulfilled.  In Somalia, the unfulfilled common 
appetites resulted in starvation, malnutrition, and, all too often, death.  In American food 
deserts, the unfulfilled common appetites result in malnutrition, public health crises, and, 
in some cases, premature death.  If the clinical research into starvation and malnutrition is 
correct, and people who exist with their common appetites left unfulfilled experience an 
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increase in unsatisfied desire, then both of these oppressive circumstances perpetuate 
vice. 
 There are important differences between the starvation experienced in Somalia 
and the needs left unfulfilled by food-deserts, and it needs to be made clear that the 
parallels being drawn here between these cases are not done to equate, in total, the 
experiences, the suffering, or the consequences of each case.  It's plain to see that victims 
of forced starvation suffer in their gluttony exponentially more than do individuals living 
in food-deserts.  And individuals in food-deserts may "quiet" their common desires 
through eating undesirable food whereas the victims in Somalia lacked this possibility.  
Additionally, those trapped in food-deserts possess, to some degree, an ability to (even 
temporarily) leave the area which cannot fulfill their needs whereas Somali civilians 
lacked this possibility. 
 While we must acknowledge these differences, the physiological (and moral) 
evaluation remains.  If an individual exists with their common and physiological needs 
unmet, they are pressed into a state of vicious excess which is subject to evaluation by 
virtue ethics.  The oppressive structures which manipulate food availability create an 
atmosphere where the virtue of temperance is made impossible and thus these oppressed 
people are morally harmed.  Further, it is the oppressive regimes and circumstances 
which necessitate this harm. 
 
 B.  Courage 
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 The effect that oppressive structures have on virtues is not limited to making them 
impossible for oppressed people.  While temperance may be made a practical 
impossibility for those suffering under the conditions of oppressive regimes, other virtues 
are affected by the existence of oppression, yet not to the point of complete 
unavailability.  Some virtues, due to the existence and effect of oppression, are onerous 
and their development appears to verge on the supererogatory. 
 One particularly powerful and poignant instance of this limitation of virtue can be 
seen in the manipulation of fear through systematic violence.  Ann Cudd, in her thorough 
exploration of oppression, claims that “violence is and has always been a critical 
component in the origin and maintenance of oppression.”51  Cudd sketches and chronicles 
the complex ways in which violence, both overtly and implicitly, is utilized as a tool for 
maintaining oppression, concluding that we can see the power, influence, and 
ramifications of violence in systematic oppression by looking at the "statistical evidence 
that a group acts in a more constrained or less beneficial way" due to their exposure to 
said violence.52  Here, I would like to provide some statistical evidence of just this sort 
which connects oppression and violence and substantiates the effects of exposure to 
violence on the availability of virtue.  While Cudd's project is to chronicle the connection 
between violence and oppression, her conclusion of groups being forced to act in "more 
constrained or less beneficial way[s]" has broad implications for virtue ethicists and our 
understanding about the availability of virtue. 
 When talking about violence it is essential that one distinguish between acute and 
chronic violence.  Acute violence occurs when individuals are faced with temporally 
                                                           
51 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 85. 
52 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 91. 
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limited situations of violent interaction.  This violent interaction arises, occurs, and 
dissipates within a measurable time and the violence experienced by individuals is 
limited to this temporal window.  Chronic violence, on the other hand, is the persistent 
exposure to violence where the violence experienced by the individual is not limited to 
any specific moment but rather experienced as perduring and continual.  Acute violence, 
according to psychologists Jinan Usta and Jo Ann Farver, is typified by the 1992 Los 
Angeles riots or sniper attacks in school yards.53  Chronic violence, on the other hand, is 
“where shootings, stabbings, gang activities, and being robbed re-occur with 
unpredictable frequency.”54  Joy Osofsky defines chronic community violence as the 
“frequent and continual exposure to the use of guns, knives, drugs, and random 
violence.”55  In both the case of acute and chronic violence the exposure to violence 
affects the fear response of those exposed.  
 This move to distinguish between acute and chronic violence (or acute situations 
of fear from chronic situations of fear) is vaguely present in Aristotle's description of 
courage.  In describing courage, Aristotle quickly rattles off an extensive list of times or 
situations where courage is needed; moving quickly between the chronic (facing the 
challenges and possibility of poverty [1115a11, 1115a17], facing disease [1115a29], and 
experienced in the lives of sailors at sea [1115a29, 1115b1-3]) and the acute (in facing 
situations of disgrace [1115a11], the possibility of quick and eminent death [1115b5], 
times where one is flogged for a crime [1115a20], facing an insult to one's family 
[1115a22] and situations of battle [1115a30]).  While Aristotle expressly notes the need 
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for courage in all of these situations, and in the face of both types of violence, what he 
fails to address is the scope and depth of the effect that both acute and chronic violence 
have on individuals in their development of the virtue of courage.  While it is true that 
each of these situations requires courage, and courage can properly respond to each of 
these situations, what Aristotle does not address is how these situations transform 
individuals in their moral development.  Courage must be developed in response to 
chronic and acute violence as it is in these circumstances that fear is, and should be, 
experienced and therefore where courage is exercised.  It is in violence's transformative 
effect that the availability of courage is limited and warped. 
 The negative effects of acute violence are abundantly clear, and it does not seem 
necessary here to outline, in depth, the severity and details of harm one can experience by 
being the victim of a violent crime or situation.  In fact, a full exploration of the 
psychological and emotional damage that acute violence carries is a full project unto 
itself.  It seems sufficient here to merely point out that being party to acute violence 
typically results in, during the short term, shock and denial, while longer term harms 
include "unpredictable emotions, flashbacks, strained relationships, and even physical 
symptoms like headaches and nausea."56  It has even been shown in multiple studies that 
being a third-party to acute violence can, and often does, result in the same harmful 
outcomes.57 
 On the other hand, the negative effects of chronic violence require a deeper 
explanation and this is so for three reasons.  One, there has been considerably less 
                                                           
56 American Psychological Association, “Trauma” (2013).   
57 For an extensive literature review of these studies see Lorraine E. Ferris, Jane Sandercock, Brian 
Hoffman, Marvin Silverman, Harvey Barkun, John Carlisle, and Cheryl Katz’s “Risk Assessment for Acute 
Violence to Third Parties: A Review of the Literature,” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 42, no. 10 (1997). 
52 
 
research done into the effects of chronic violence; two, this research is less well known; 
three, chronic violence has the most effect on oppressed people. 
 To explain the harms of experiencing chronic violence, children are of particular 
importance as it is through their psychological and moral development that we can see 
the long-term harmful effects of exposure to violence.  Usta and Farver claim that 
"isolated events are thought to have less serious effects on children because they are short 
in duration, after which things can ‘return to normal.’ However, children’s reactions may 
be more adverse when the violent incidents are intense and recurring."58  Chronic 
violence is more serious than acute in that the continual harmful effects create a situation 
where things cannot “return to normal" and the harms experienced by the individual are 
lasting and transformative.  
 Research studies done on Lebanese children in Beirut,59 children on Chicago's 
South Side,60 children in Boston,61 children in Washington D.C.,62 and children in New 
Orleans63 all show that preschool and school-age children exposed to chronic violence 
exhibit symptoms of (or similar to) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.  These young 
children experience sleep disturbances, have difficulty paying attention and 
concentrating, and often “are less likely to explore.”64  These different studies chronicle a 
uniformity of harms experienced by young children living in neighborhoods of chronic 
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violence.  Where the studies diverge is in their assessment of these harms as the children 
enter adolescence.  Some adolescents, who live with chronic violence, exhibit excessive 
aggressiveness, irritability, anxiety, and disproportionate drives for revenge seeking.  
Other adolescents, from the same or similar communities, grow emotionally numb, 
become non-reactive to continued violence, and are anesthetized and desensitized.  It 
appears that a majority of children exposed to chronic violence develop behavioral traits 
of either (a) numbness and indifference, or, (b) aggressiveness, irritability and 
vengefulness.  While varying positions have been outlined for the cause of this 
divergence,65 researchers note that these divergent behavioral states are carried on into 
adulthood.   
 While the source (or cause) of the divergence in behavior of adolescents (and 
adults) exposed to chronic violence remains the subject of psychological investigation, 
the two identified states of character (via the divergent behavior between numbness and 
aggressiveness) are important for understanding of courage and confidence.  If the result 
of experiencing chronic violence is either numbness and indifference or aggressiveness, 
irritability or vengefulness, either state is one of tremendous moral damage.  In fact, these 
two divergent states appear to align with a virtue assessment of courage in that it appears 
that people come to have their fear warped into either rashness or insensitivity, and both 
are states of vice which are expressly accounted for by Aristotle.  Aristotle describes 
courage as the moral virtue pertaining to fear and confidence (1107b1), and like all other 
moral virtues operates as a mean (1107a20-25).  While governing the feeling/capacity for 
fear, an appropriate and moderated response to fear must be accompanied by confidence 
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to be properly called courage.  Courage is not simply standing steadfast in a fearful 
situation, but doing so knowing that one can achieve a worthy end.  It is controlled fear 
that allows one to remain physically present in fearful situations (or at least not 
immediately tuck-tail and run at the first sign of danger) and confidence that allows for 
the courageous person to persist in these conditions.  This combination of proper fear and 
confidence is courage and to develop the virtue of courage one must, in the words of 
Daniel Putnam, "[exercise] deliberative choice in the face of painful or fearful 
circumstances for the sake of a worthy goal" and have "faith in oneself to act for the best 
in threatening circumstances for the sake of a worthy goal."66  It is specifically this virtue 
of courage, as the combination of the proper control of fear and proper use of confidence, 
which is directly affected by violence.  The exposure to chronic violence, punctuated by 
acute violence, warps and transforms the individual's fear response and erodes 
confidence.  The divergent behavior presented in the current psychological literature of 
adolescents who were, when children, exposed to chronic violence quantifies and 
substantiates the moral erosion of confidence and the warping of fear.  For the virtue 
ethicist, the behavior exhibited by these exposed individuals is not merely indicative of 
psychological states of trauma, but is of further importance in that it is tangible proof of 
the harmful effects of oppression's use of violence on people's states of character and the 
virtue made (un)available to them.   
 What differentiates this example of courage from the example of temperance is 
that even with prolonged exposure to chronic violence, individuals may be able to 
develop proper courage.  Examples of individuals developing (and deploying) courage 
while suffering under the material conditions of oppression and violence can be seen in a 
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vast array of arenas involving social, political, and economic justice movements.  Union 
organizers (such as Frank Little and César Chávez), civil rights activists (such as Rosa 
Parks and Medgar Evers), anti-war activists (such as Sophie Scholl, Dr. Kurt Huber, and 
other members of the 'Weiße Rose'), theological activists (such as Gustavo Gutiérrez and 
Leonardo Boff), and even sports figures (such as Jackie Robinson and Megan Rapinoe) 
faced conditions of overwhelming violence and oppression yet were, remarkably, able to 
cultivate and deploy courage.  Each of these individuals cultivated courage in 
circumstances of violence and oppression enabling them take strong political and moral 
stances in the face of overwhelming backlash.  Individuals such as these are rightly held 
up as heroes due to the extreme nature of the circumstances which they faced while both 
developing and using  their courage.  These heroic individuals not only help inspire 
others to struggle for justice, but also show that the cultivation of courage remains 
possible, but extremely and onerously difficult, in the circumstances of chronic violence.  
 While it is important to see how courage remains possible while enmeshed in 
oppressive structures, it is equally important to see that the ability to cultivate courage 
while in these circumstances is excessively difficult, and success borders on the 
supererogatory.   
 
C.  Proper Anger 
 
 To this point we have seen how oppression affects virtue in that in some cases it 
makes their acquisition extremely difficult, if not supererogatory.  Other virtues (or 
would-be virtues), such as temperance, may be affected to such an extreme degree that 
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their acquisition is impossible while suffering under oppression.  In these ways, 
oppression acts as a causal force which coerces individuals into non-virtuous states.  Yet, 
there are some instances where oppression actually aids in the development of virtue, yet 
the virtue developed in response to oppression may tend toward the extreme.  This then is 
a third way in which virtues are affected by oppression.  These virtues, which Lisa 
Tessman calls "burdened virtues," differ from the above examples of temperance and 
courage in that the above cases describe how an agent can be habituated by oppression 
(or oppressive forces) into vice, whereas the burdened virtues are, in fact, extreme, yet 
virtuous.   
 Tessman describes burdened virtues as those "traits that while practically 
necessitated for surviving oppression or morally necessitated for opposing it, are also 
costly to the selves who bear them."67  People faced with oppression, of themselves or 
others, are faced with a dilemma; either accept their lot in life, and resign themselves to a 
life bereft of flourishing, or, resist oppression in the hopes of achieving happiness.  For 
Tessman (and myself), "the alternatives to resisting oppression are unacceptable," and 
thus oppressed people are forced to develop traits which allow them to adequately resist 
and survive oppression.68   
 One of the strongest examples of a burdened virtue is that of proper anger.  Here, 
I wish to outline Aristotle's conception of anger, as an emotion, as well as the virtue that 
governs this passion.  Given an understanding of this Aristotelian virtue we can then turn 
to contexts of oppression and see how this virtue is burdened and the harmful cost that 
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the individual must pay for inculcating such a virtue within the circumstances of 
oppression.  
 Aristotle describes, on multiple occasions (1103b19, 1105b21, 1106b18, 
1135b20, 1147a14),  anger as a passion or feeling.  For Aristotle, this feeling of anger 
admits of an excess, a deficiency, and also a mean.  Thus, there is a virtue which applies 
to this specific passion.  The virtue governing our feelings of anger is called "good-
temperedness" (by Ross) or "mildness" (by Irwin) and is situated between irascibility, as 
the vice of excess, and inirascibility, as the vice of deficiency (1108a4-9).   
 On two occasions Aristotle claims that the virtue governing anger is hard to name.  
At 1125b27, he claims "the middle state [of anger]... [is] unnamed" and the extremes are 
"almost without a name."  At 1108a4, he claims that the mean state of anger, along with 
the two related vices, "can scarcely be said to have names."  Thus, what Irwin translates 
as 'mildness' and Ross translates as 'good-temperedness' is, even for Aristotle, an odd 
naming convention.  I find both of these labels less than satisfactory and prefer to call this 
virtue 'proper anger.'   
 My discontent with the naming conventions given by Irwin and Ross stems from 
the way these terms appear to reduce the virtue governing anger to something closer to 
meekness than justified anger.  While it is the case that Aristotle claims that "good 
temper in the middle position... inclines towards the deficiency," it does not seem fully 
warranted to reduce, even linguistically, proper-anger to something akin to timorousness 
or mildness.  Aristotle does claim that anger is properly directed and experienced when 
done "at the right things and with the right people..., and [for] as long as [one] ought" 
(1125b32-33).  Further, the person who is defective in anger, or the inirascible person, is 
58 
 
"thought a fool" for "not [being] angry at the things they should be angry..." (1126a4).  
The language here is clear: there is proper anger.  Given that Aristotle believes that there 
is a time, place, manner, duration, and degree for righteous anger it seems disingenuous 
to imply that individuals ought to cultivate a sense of mildness.  Rather, individuals ought 
to cultivate a sense of proper-anger which is subject to the standard constraints of the 
other moral virtues.   
 One might object to the conception of anger being advanced here on the grounds 
that Aristotle does, in no uncertain terms, not only warn us about the dangers of excessive 
anger but also links it to incontinence in Book VII, Chapter 5.  It might be claimed that 
these two pieces of textual evidence indicate that 'mildness' (as tending toward meekness) 
captures the spirit of Aristotle's warnings and is a more apt understanding of this virtue 
than 'proper-anger.'  Such a reading of Aristotle does not seem beyond the bounds of 
reason and is, to my mind, the traditional reading of anger in Aristotle.  Yet, I do feel that 
this position fails to account for two important points.  First, Aristotle's warnings 
regarding anger do not seem unique but rather merely hark back to his discussion of 
natural tendencies in Book II, Chapter 9.  Here Aristotle asserts that in addition to each 
individual's natural tendencies towards one extreme or the other regarding any particular 
virtue, each virtue admits an objective natural tendency.  These natural tendencies of the 
virtues are those extremes which are "more erroneous" and easily fallen into than their 
opposite extreme (1109a33).  Anger, like all virtues, admits a more dangerous extreme, 
yet the existence of this more erroneous vice need not push our conception of the mean of 
anger to 'mildness' any more than the natural tendency of courage toward cowardice 
should push us to accept rashness as more akin to the virtue.  Secondly, while Aristotle 
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does connect anger to incontinent states, he does this with a number of different passions 
including greed and honor (1148b13), cowardice (1149a5-7), intemperance (1149a23), 
and, (in fact) "every excessive state" (1149a5).  While anger does make this list, and is 
tied to a form of incontinence, it does not seem that Aristotle draws this connection in a 
way that would indicate a special relationship.  The connection of irascibility to 
incontinence is merely an illustration of the multitude of ways in which one may be 
incontinent, and as such cannot be used as support for the belief that the spirit of 
meekness should be read into Aristotle's account of 'proper anger.' 
 It is because righteous anger exists as a virtue that the harmful and warping 
conditions of oppression result in this virtue becoming distorted.  The warping of anger, 
unlike the effects oppression levies against courage and temperance, is to burden this 
virtue and the individual who bears it. 
 Following Marilyn Frye,69 Elizabeth Spelman,70Audre Lorde,71 Diana Meyers,72 
María Lugones,73 and bell hooks,74 Tessman chronicles the ways in which anger (and 
even rage) play a pervasive role in the lives of the oppressed.  From lesbian separatists to 
black nationalists, anger plays an important role in the lives of the oppressed in that it 
"signals a recognition of the wrongness of the subordination and refusal to accept it."75  
Beyond merely reacting aptly to subordination, Tessman points out that anger also plays 
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an important epistemic role.  "[A]pproaching the world with a rancorous emotional 
attitude as opposed to a more genial or "nice" one enables one to feel what one is not 
expected or permitted to under dominant values."76 
 Anger allows the oppressed to acknowledge their oppression, condemn the 
oppression, and see further ways in which oppression harms them.  Proper anger, as 
outlined by Aristotle, is to be measurably felt and expressed by individuals in 
proportional response to warranted circumstances.  For those suffering under systematic 
oppression, the proper time for righteous anger is the duration of the oppression.  This 
makes the experience of proper anger close to a perpetual feeling.  Further, the 
experience and feeling of anger, as virtuously controlled, must be proportional to the 
injury occurred.  For the oppressed, the degree of anger that is proportionate to the 
injustice of oppression not only pulls away from the 'mildness' claimed by Irwin's naming 
convention but urges us well into irascibility if not rage.  Here, Aristotle's claim about 
"the fools" who do not feel anger seems especially poignant and the "if you are not 
outraged then you aren't paying attention" rallying cry of consciousness raising activists 
seems to capture proportionate response to the experience of oppression.  Beyond mere 
foolishness, those who do develop proper anger as a proportional response to injustice 
fail to have the virtue.  Those individuals who keep their anger firmly rooted in the 
abstract mean tending toward inirascibility as Aristotle suggests do not have the virtue of 
proper anger.  They fail to have the appropriate emotional response to the circumstances 
they find themselves in, and thus fail to have the virtue.  Much like the firefighter or 
soldier who maintains a pedestrian conception of courage while facing death, the 
oppressed individual who maintains a mild form of moderated anger cannot be said to be 
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virtuous.  The appropriate and proportional response to the extremes of oppression 
manifest as excessive virtues and thus, these extreme virtues are 'burdened.' 
 These burdened virtues carry a heavy cost for those who bear them and it is this 
cost that Tessman sees as acting to "complicate this generally positive appraisal of 
oppositional anger."77  Tessman maintains, rightly, that while the anger experienced by 
the oppressed is excessive it is not extreme.  In fact, excessive anger in the circumstances 
of oppression more than fulfills the demands of virtue in that it occurs at the right time, in 
the right way, and can be directed at the right target.  Yet while virtuous, this trait of 
cultivated anger (or even rage) "create[s] a tension" because while it "enables resistance 
(and thus may further an eventual goal of flourishing for all), [it] disables a good life for 
their bearers."78  Developing proper anger in response to oppression, and becoming 
irascible, is psychologically harmful yet necessary.  These burdened virtues, while 
necessitated by oppression, are regrettable.  All things being equal, we do not want to be 
piqued, irascible, or indignant, but precisely because all things are not equal, we must 
become exactly these things.  For Tessman, the virtuous agent with habituated burdened 
virtues can come to regret the self they have become, yet also understand that the 
circumstances of their existence necessitate this revolutionary self.  For Tessman, "there 
should be no glory in resistance to injustice, just a sad and regretful recognition of its 
necessity."79  This sad regret comes as the moral remainder of the burdened virtues and is 
paid for by the oppressed.   
 In this third way, victims of oppression are put into a catch-22.  The very tools 
needed to fight their enslavement or oppression and achieve happiness are the means 
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which keep them from happiness.  This is a no-win situation for the oppressed and in 
conjunction with the elimination of some virtues (as outlined above via temperance), and 
the moving of other virtues into the realm of the supererogatory (as outlined above via 
courage), demonstrates a third way which virtues (and their bearers) are harmed by 
oppression. 
 
D.  Intellectual Virtues 
 
 Through the examples of temperance, courage, and anger we can see the three 
different ways in which virtues are eliminated, limited and affected, and burdened for 
oppressed people.   Moving beyond the moral virtues, the intellectual virtues are also 
curtailed by oppression.  One of the salient features of oppression is the unequal 
distribution of goods beyond the bounds of fortune.  As indicated above, this may 
concern the availability of food, but is not limited in form to any particular good.  The 
intellectual virtues, for Aristotle, require cultivation via teaching and learning, and thus 
education is essential for their formation and development.  This education can take the 
form of schooling, but also mentorship and upbringing.  In each of these ways, if others 
are the victims of oppression, and this oppression has a negative effect on their 
characters, then the teachers, mentors, and care-takers needed for the development of 
intellectual virtues will be either limited or nonexistent.  We know that oppression denies 
equal access to education of equal quality, but we need to see that oppression also affects 
other forms of ‘teachers’ who are needed for the achievement of intellectual virtues.  
Sally Haslanger, in her account of oppression, comments on the work of Dorothy 
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Roberts, who argues that the current child welfare policy of the United States is racist.80  
One of the core claims made by Roberts is that “Black children are more likely to be 
separated from their parents than children of other races” and thus “Black children spend 
more time in foster care” and therefore Black children “receive inferior services.”81  If 
Black families are subject to undue scrutiny by social service agencies and this scrutiny 
results in the destruction of a high number of Black families and the institutionalization 
of Black children, then it seems more than plausible that these children will lose the 
necessary education and training which are required for the achievement of intellectual 
virtue.  I am not arguing that the nuclear family is the only necessary means for the 
development of intellectual virtue or that children in dangerous homes should be left in 
these homes because family structure trumps safety and welfare.  Rather, what Roberts’ 
account shows is that this undue burden placed upon Black families undermines not only 
the individual families but also the Black community.  These children, who become 
wards of the state, lack a community (and therein educators and parents).  While unjust, 
the harm of this hyper-scrutiny and the undue willingness to place Black children into 
underfunded group-homes transcends concerns of justice for the virtue ethicist and must 
be seen as a way in which oppression limits or burdens individuals in their achievement 
of, in part, the intellectual virtues. 
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E.  Honor and Esteem 
 
 If the causal force of oppression is destructive in that it is detrimental to an 
individual’s character and thus limits flourishing in individuals, it must also be true that 
this damage caused in the lives of others continually negatively affects others.  In the 
Aristotelian moral framework there are goods of the soul which are accorded by others 
which are necessary for flourishing and these goods are either denied or perverted by 
oppression though the corruption of others.  One significant and important way that the 
corruption of others affects the individual is through a corruption of honor and esteem.  
The assessment of honor and esteem plays an important social role within Aristotelian 
virtue ethics.  Here, I wish to first outline Aristotle's conception of honor and esteem and 
show the important role that it plays in moral development.  From here, I wish to show 
how this conception of honor is corrupted by oppression, and more specifically, how 
oppression damages entire communities of honor-bestowers and thus perpetuates the 
corruption of each member. 
 Aristotle adamantly claims that honor should not be the end to which our lives are 
aimed.  Those who seek honor as a good-in-itself are chastised by Aristotle in Book I, 
Chapter 5, in what he calls "the political life."  Aristotle claims that people of "superior 
refinement" often believe that honor is equivalent to happiness and thus honor is what we 
ought to identify as our end.  For these individuals, being held in high esteem by others, 
and honored above all others, verifies their goodness.  Aristotle responds to such a belief 
by pointing out that being honored does not, in fact, guarantee goodness because it 
"depend[s] on those who bestow honour rather than on... who receives it" (1195b24).  
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One may be honored by dishonorable people, and held in high esteem, yet have earned 
this privilege for all the wrong reasons.  It seems reasonable to claim that the best car 
thief will be honored and respected by other car thieves in virtue of their supreme 
abilities, yet this honor is (clearly) ill-founded and does not demonstrate the goodness of 
this venerated individual.  Returning to this claim in Book IV, Aristotle says that 
"[people] who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are those who enjoy 
power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a superiority 
in something good is held in greater honour" (1124a21-24).   These wealthy aristocrats 
assume that in virtue of their social and economic superiority they are deserving of honor 
and esteem.  Yet Aristotle again points out that this is not the case because wealth and 
social superiority are not guarantees of virtue.  For Aristotle, "the good [person] alone is 
to be honoured" (1124a25).   
 Honor is only properly bestowed to the virtuous individual in virtue of their 
goodness.  Thus, for Aristotle, honor is described as "a noble object" (1116a29) and a 
"prize" (1123b35, 1163b3) which, when properly understood, is awarded as an accolade 
of virtue.  When honor is properly bestowed as the reward of virtue it becomes placed 
among things which are good in themselves (1096b18).  
 Beyond merely being an awarded good for the achievement of virtue, honor can 
be bestowed on those, in a limited way, who seek virtue.  In this way, honor can be used 
as a tool for moral development and growth.  Aristotle points out that honor can be 
bestowed as a means for encouraging noble acts (1113b24-26) and can serve as a means 
of judging paths toward happiness (1097b1-4).   In this way non-virtuous people can be 
given limited esteem by others to help reinforce correct behavior and actions.  Thus, these 
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people, who "desire honour from good [people], and [people] who know," are able to 
"[confirm] their own opinion of themselves" as on a path of moral growth based on the 
"the strength of the judgment of those who speak [well] about them" (1159a16-23).  In 
this way the honor and esteem of others acts as a tool for moral reinforcement, allowing 
individuals to verify that their actions and habits are working towards the achievement of 
virtue.  This echo's Aristotle's beliefs about the need for good friends as one of the 
functions of good friends is moral reinforcement (11157b5ff). 
 Honor, and being esteemed, thus plays an important role in self-evaluation and 
self-assessment.  It is through the assessment of others that individuals are, in an 
important way, given a tool for verification of positive moral growth and moral 
fortification.  Because oppression makes people non-virtuous and the esteem required for 
virtue must come from virtuous people who provide esteem and respect qua your virtue 
then oppression limits proper self-assessment, self-evaluation, and self-esteem.  Honor is 
warped and corrupted in an oppressive society, and the appropriate basis of honor and 
esteem is corroded.  Given the importance of honor and esteem within the Aristotelian 
framework this corruption of honor via the moral corruption of others is a significant 
problem.  The manipulation which oppression mandates runs much deeper than merely 
harming others in their individual pursuits of virtue but also limits honor and esteem by 
corrupting communities of individuals as bestowers of honor. 
 Consider the example of body-image and beauty norms as set for women of the 
western world.  Naomi Wolf82and Ann Garry83 have both outlined the harmful ways in 
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which the socially constructed beauty standards set for women place women into a 
“double-bind” or a “double standard.”  The starvation imagery of beauty, and the need to 
“dress to impress,” create social categories of gender evaluation whereas women are not 
only tied expressly to their bodies but are evaluated and judged based upon their 
ability/willingness to conform to these standards.  For Garry, women are placed into 
ongoing social schemas where their compliance to beauty standards allows for them to be 
judged as “good women” through their sexualization, but which at the same time also 
harms them as they are equally judged as “bad [sexualized] women.”84 The women who 
refuse to comply with patriarchal beauty standards are negatively judged (and thus 
socially harmed), while those who comply become sexualized and, again, harmed.  This, 
for Garry, is the crux of the double-standard.  The creation and maintenance of beauty 
standards, which unduly and unfairly harms women, creates and maintains a social order 
where women are harmed by being held in poor esteem by others and thus not held as 
worthy of respect.  This lack of social respect can also be internalized such that 
individuals who lack the respect of others may come to view themselves as unworthy of 
the very respect they are not given.  Individuals systemically denied esteem lose not only 
the external and instrumental good of proper esteem used for moral development, but also 
may develop an internal disposition of negative self-assessment where they deem 
themselves not worthy of esteem in the first place.  What is truly troubling, for the virtue 
ethicist, is that the double-bind of gender exploitation means that women are harmed, 
internally and externally, by conforming to social norms but also harmed by rejecting 
these social norms. 
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  If oppression limits not only the virtue of the individual but also the virtue of 
others, and does so to the point of vice, then the cultivation of many virtues appears 
impossible.  For Aristotle, the acquisition of many of the virtues requires both the proper 
disposition of the individuals as well as the virtuous character of others.  These influential 
others, most often typified by Aristotle as forms of friendship, aid individuals by 
providing support, strength, and moral knowledge needed for moral growth.  In short, 
others are needed, in part, to properly bestow honor and esteem such that moral growth is 
encouraged in others.  Since oppression damages those individuals around us which we 
need as bestowers of honor and esteem, then oppression's influence must be seen as a 
pooling of individual and community damage where communities and individuals of 
oppressed people are denied access to the means for the acquisition of virtue. 
 
Section 2 – Oppression and the Manipulation of External Goods 
 
 While it is essential to understand that oppression curtails flourishing by 
inhibiting agents from achieving and maintaining virtue, this alone is far from a complete 
account of the ways which oppression both harms and limits individuals as understood by 
virtue ethics.  To fully understand how oppression curtails flourishing one must also 
account for oppression’s detrimental effect via the manipulation and limitation of 
external goods.  This is because, for Aristotle, external goods are (in addition to virtue) 
necessary for happiness.  To demonstrate this there are three argumentative premises 
which must be outlined and explained.  They are (1) external goods are necessary for 
flourishing (and while virtue alone is necessary for flourishing, it is not sufficient), (2) 
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Aristotle explicitly accounts for this within the NE, and his account is found in his 
description of “fortune,” "luck," and "chance," and, (3) fortune, or moral luck, cannot be 
understood as mere happenstance.    
 Aristotle, in Book I of the NE, claims that “it is impossible, or not easy, to do 
noble acts without the proper equipment” (1099b1).   This proclamation comes after 
Aristotle has defined the human good, via functionally accounting for human qualities 
(1097b25), as “the activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are (sic) more 
than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete” (1098a17-19).  While 
virtue, as an activity of the soul, is clearly necessary for (and privileged in) the 
achievement of happiness, virtue alone cannot guarantee flourishing.  This is because, as 
we have indicated above, the virtues require agents to either use external goods (e.g.; 
liberality requires the agent to not only possess money but be willing to part with money 
for the good of another) or rely on the external goods of community/friends for 
development (e.g.; knowledge cannot be produced solipsistically, but requires teachers, 
mentors, and other virtuous people).  Without the necessary external goods, an agent 
cannot develop or maintain virtue.   
 This view is not without its detractors.  Paul Farwell argues that external goods 
cannot be essential for the development of virtue, and holds that a view such as the one 
presented here is implausible.85  Farwell claims, that while external goods may be helpful 
for exercising some virtues, virtue writ large does not require external goods. Farwell 
hangs his argument on three rough premises.  The first is that even without an abundance 
of external goods, virtue can still be exercised.  Second, he claims that many virtues 
require no external goods for their acquisition.  And third, that via Aristotle's example of 
                                                           
85 Paul Farwell, “Aristotle, Success, and Moral Luck,” Journal of Philosophical Research 19 (1994). 
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Priam we must conclude that virtue must persist even when all external goods are 
removed.  I wish to take this criticism head-on, and address these claims individually.  In 
each case I show not only how Farwell is mistaken but how in seeing his failures we are 
given an account of the necessity of external goods for virtue. 
 Farwell first claims that while external goods can be used to engage in certain 
types of virtuous activity, the external goods are not essential for evaluating the character 
of an agent.  Citing Aristotle's understanding of liberality and generosity, Farwell claims 
that the virtue of liberality need not be restricted to the wealthy due to the amount of 
money they choose to give away.  Paralleling the famous story from Scripture (Mark 
12:43, Luke 21:2), Farwell claims that "the poor [person] who gives a small amount of 
money may be more liberal than the rich [person] simply because he (sic) has less to 
give."86  Here, Farwell is undoubtedly correct.  Liberality, as a virtue, must be a 
willingness to part with money and cannot be tied expressly to the amount of money that 
is given.  This is something that even Aristotle notes (1120b7).  Yet this alone does not 
show that the external good of money is not necessary for liberality, it merely shows that 
the amount given is not sufficient for evaluating the state of character of the giver.  If one 
had no money, then giving money would be impossible and one could not engage in acts 
of liberality.87 Farwell wishes to hang liberality, in total, on the willingness of the agent 
to part with money, and this alone cannot be the case.  The exercising of liberality 
requires not only this willingness but also a success condition whereas money is 
successfully given and thus hits the mark of the virtue.  One may be willing to part with 
money, even for noble ends, but if they have no money to give they cannot be said to be 
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87 This individual may be able to be generous in other ways, but the specific virtue of liberality does 
require the giving of money. 
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liberal as they are not giving. This is the game that many people play with the possibility 
of winning the lottery.  Many may claim that when they win the lottery they promise to 
give a set amount or set percentage to charity.  While possibly expressing noble hopes, 
without the actual lottery winnings these are empty promises and are not indicative of 
their liberality.   Further, while small amounts of external goods, even on Farwell's 
account, are needed to engage in liberal acts, Farwell fails to see that this action does not 
constitute the virtue of liberality.  To develop liberality, one must engage in liberal acts 
habitually and inculcate not only the desire but also, and more importantly, the 
willingness to part with money.  While possibly developing generosity in other non-
monetary ways, those without any expendable income cannot ritually commit liberal acts 
and cannot develop liberality.  They may hope that their non-monetary generosity 
cultivates a sense of giving which may "spill over" into the giving of money when the 
rare opportunity of expendable money is available, yet without the actual giving of 
money liberality cannot be practiced and therefore cannot be developed into the virtue.  
In summary, Farwell claims, "a small amount of external goods does not prevent [the 
giver] from acting virtuously, and likewise a large amount of wealth or power 
underscores the need for virtue, since wealth and power have no ethical worth by 
themselves  but depend on how the noble and virtuous person uses them."88  What 
Farwell fails to see is how both the rich person and the "poor person" both have external 
goods, and use these external goods, even in his own language, to develop virtue. 
 Farwell's second argument is that there are “other virtues [which] require no 
special external goods: self-control and gentleness in temper for instance.”89  Here, I wish 
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to raise two objections.  First, if Farwell is right in this claim, it is important to see just 
how numerically limited these virtues would be.  If there is some limited set of virtues 
which are developed without any connection to external goods, the list would be quite 
short.  For the individual who did develop these scarce virtues, there would be many 
more virtues which they would not be able to develop, and this hypothetical individual 
seems lacking in so many respects that to pronounce them virtuous seems a 
bastardization of Aristotle's conception of the complete life.  Beyond this, there is a 
deeper problem with Farwell's argument.  Farwell specifically cites two virtues, self-
control and gentleness, and boldly claims "no special external goods" are necessary.  To 
claim that external goods do not play a role in the development of these virtues is to deny 
any causal connection between external goods and these virtues, and this seems patently 
false.  Looking specifically at the two virtues listed by Farwell, self-control and 
gentleness, there are plenty of important connections between them and external goods.  
Gentleness is surely influenced by one's upbringing, and if one's care givers (as an 
external good) help habituate these feelings in a child which, through time, can develop 
into virtue, then we cannot claim no causal influence.  In a similar vein, self-control can 
be shown to connect to external goods.  Self-control, manifest in acts of self-control, 
requires an availability of external goods to prompt and condition the agent such that they 
can refrain from these goods.  Without the presence of an object which could be taken by 
an action lacking self-control it seems wholly impossible to claim this agent exercised 
self-control in not taking what was not present.  For example, one cannot be said to be 
dieting or fasting when they have no food (or access to food); this person simply goes 
without.  To claim that the real possibility of obtaining food is unnecessary for positing 
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an agent's self-control over their impulses would be to claim that agents can be said to 
control their impulses in the face of no other possibilities. Self-control, then, is both 
inculcated and enacted only in reference to the specific and real external goods available 
to agents.   
 The final argument presented by Farwell, and his most noxious, is that 
Aristotelian virtue ethics maintains a conception of steadfastness of character in the face 
of a radical loss of external goods and that this steadfastness of character shows that 
external goods have no influence on virtue.  Here Farwell anchors his argument directly 
in Aristotle's claim that the virtuous person cannot be swayed from happiness even when 
the victim of extreme and repeated misfortunes.  Aristotle most famously claims this in 
Book I, and raises the example of Priam whereas even in extraordinary circumstances 
Priam "can never become miserable" (1101a6).  Priam loses family, wealth, and health 
yet fails to devolve into misery or vice.  
 I am sympathetic to Aristotle's arguments here and tend to agree that virtue, once 
fully developed, cannot be easily lost simply do to external constraints or circumstances.  
Thus, Aristotle's example of Priam seems quite apropos, but it is only because these 
individuals have had the necessary luxury to develop virtue that they cannot lose it.  In 
the case of Priam, the individual suffering does so only after long periods of moral, 
physical, and financial prosperity and in this way these examples are necessarily 
backwards looking.  Given the combination of luxury and privilege together with virtue, 
the loss of privilege does not necessitate the loss of virtue and true happiness.  Yet this 
does not negate the claim that external goods are necessary for the development of virtue.  
In fact, this seems to show the exact opposite.  It is precisely because of the abundance of 
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necessary external goods that these individuals were able to become virtuous and 
therefore steadfast in character.  The goods were necessary for the virtue's development, 
and what Aristotle shows is simply that prosperity is not equivalent to virtue (or 
happiness).  It would seem that Farwell fallaciously reasons that the inability for Priam to 
lose virtue is identical to that person who begins without external goods.  This line of 
reasoning is both unsupported by the text as well as argumentatively bankrupt.  When 
Aristotle returns to this discussion in Book VII, he not only notes that the external goods 
are necessary, claiming "this is why the happy man needs the goods of the body and 
external goods" (1153b17, emphasis added), but continues to say that even though 
happiness and virtue are intertwined we must not make the mistake of confusing the two.  
Aristotle concludes "because we need fortune as well as other things, some people think 
good fortune the same thing as happiness; but it is not that "(1153b21, emphasis added).  
Understanding this necessity of external goods allows us to understand why Aristotle 
claims that “happiness [flourishing] seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition [to 
virtue]” (1099b7).  It is this necessity that Farwell fails to understand.  Aristotle does 
provide a clear account, through numerous and repeated claims, that external goods are 
necessary for the development of virtue. 
 By necessitating external goods for the achievement of virtue, and therein 
flourishing, Aristotelian ethics must carry with it an analysis of the dispensation of these 
needed goods.  While many of these goods can be acquired by agents in pursuit of the 
good life, there are many cases where the acquisition of these goods lies beyond the 
agent's control.  Thus, Aristotle's conception of external goods carries with it a 
conception of moral luck of which Aristotle was very aware. 
75 
 
 Aristotle's most detailed discussion of luck and chance are found not in the ethics 
but rather in the Physics (specifically II, 4-6).  Here, Aristotle accounts for luck (in its 
various forms) as a type of accidental causation.  This metaphysical, and strictly causal, 
account of luck and chance is taken up by Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics (EE) and 
extended to that luck which effects moral endeavors.90  This discussion of luck and 
chance as it pertains to the moral sphere is later altered and softened by Aristotle in the 
NE. 91  While the NE does contain a conception of luck and chance it is a less technical 
conception than found in both the EE and the Physics. Specifically, what is missing in the 
NE is an attempt to regularly use the terms luck or chance in any rigid or schematized 
way.  In contrast, in the Physics and the EE, Aristotle argues that luck and chance have 
specific applications and pertain to a categorized understanding of accidental causation 
relating to special subsets.  In these other works "luck" coincides with deliberative reason 
and thus only occurs within the human realm while "chance" can effect animals, plants, 
or even rocks.92  In the NE, these terms lose their strict designation and are used more 
interchangeably to identify those things, actions, and/or events which morally affect an 
agent and which are beyond the agent's control. Similar to his use of "luck" or "chance" 
to identify these non-intentional causal interventions, Aristotle also uses the term 
                                                           
90 See Kent Johnson’s, “Luck and Good Fortune in the Eudemian Ethics,” Ancient Philosophy 17, no. 1 
(1997), and, Anthony Kenny’s, Aristotle and the Perfect Life (Oxford University Press, 1992).  
91 I subscribe to the prevailing view that the EE is an early version of Aristotle's ethics and the NE is a later, 
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are trodden under foot" (197b8-10). 
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"fortune."93  In general, luck, chance, and fortune are simply used to identify "that which 
is not within an agent's own control and yet affects the agent in a morally relevant way."94  
 One specific, and oft cited, instance of Aristotle's identification of moral luck is 
found in his claim that beauty is necessary for the achievement of happiness (1099b3).95  
Without beauty, virtue seems either impossible or unduly difficult because beauty is 
socially needed for the development of friendship and love.  The hideous person is likely 
to scare away potential friends and the psychological damage of being repulsive in the 
eyes of others will have a detrimental effect on this ugly person.  Because aesthetic 
qualities, like Aristotle’s other listed goods of “good family and goodly children,” are not 
chosen by the agent but rather given to the agent, the distribution of these qualities is, for 
Aristotle, constituted by fortune.   
 In a broader and less specific example of moral luck, Aristotle claims: 
 
Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small 
pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of 
life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will 
make life happier..., while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for 
they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities.  (1100b22-30). 
 
                                                           
93 By and large, most of the uses of "fortune" in the NE are connected to those instances of moral luck 
which are beneficial to the agent (1124a30, 1124b19, 1125a32, 1153b23, 1171b17) and are contrasted 
with examples of "misfortune" (1100a6, 1100a17, 1153b19, 1155a11, 1171b5, 1176b1).   
94 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 13. 
95 When discussing the physical attributes of "beauty" and "ugliness," Aristotle (at 1099b3-4, 1159b16) 
flips between the two as if they were mutually exclusive.  Unlike Plato, who in the Symposium, discusses a 
wide variety of ways someone can be beautiful (or said to be beautiful), Aristotle seems to treat beauty 
and ugliness, in regards to physical attractiveness, as merely opposite conditions of physical appearance.  
While setting aside his discussions of beauty in regards to mimetic art (Poetics), mathematics 
(Metaphysics V), and "being" and "becoming" (Topics 102a6), Aristotle holds a dichotomous 
understanding of physical beauty and ugliness such that the presence of one negates the presence of the 
other.  See John S. Marshall, “Art and Aesthetic in Aristotle,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 12, no. 
2 (1953).  Thus, to claim that 'Aristotle holds beauty necessary for the achievement of happiness' is 
equivalent to claiming that 'Aristotle holds that being not ugly is necessary for the achievement of 
happiness.'  
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 Passages such as this, in conjunction with his understanding of specific goods 
such as beauty, demonstrate that Aristotle understands that any ethical system which 
requires external goods for the achievement of happiness must accept that these goods 
are, in many cases, beyond the agent's control and therefore agents are subject, to a 
greater or lesser extent, to moral luck. This is by no means a unique insight by Aristotle.  
Conceptions of moral luck appear to have played a central role in the philosophies of 
Aristotle’s contemporaries thus leading Aristotle to claims that “some identify happiness 
with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue” (1099b8-9).  Aristotle 
distinguishes his view from those of his contemporaries by (correctly) identifying the 
reality of moral luck yet not reducing virtue and happiness to merely the product of 
fortune. 
 Aristotle's inclusion of moral luck, as one factor in the achievement of virtue and 
happiness, seems wholly correct yet his description of luck is also lacking.  Identifying 
"luck," "chance," and "fortune" as existent factors beyond an agent's control is correct but 
it fails to account for the ways that these factors are subject to intentional manipulation.  
Here, the language of “luck” and "chance" seems to do a disservice in that may lead one 
to believe that external goods are merely distributed by happenstance.  While surely some 
goods are distributed by happenstance, others are systematically apportioned and the 
moral good they serve is limited to those who find themselves in a position of privilege. 
 It is those goods which are allotted not by pure happenstance but by design which 
connects external goods to oppression.  Social structures and regimes act as vehicles for 
the dispensation of external goods and oppressive structures can, and do, limit these 
goods to oppressed people.  If the limiting of these goods is a barrier for the achievement 
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of virtue and happiness, and oppression acts to limit these goods, then oppression can act 
via the dissemination of external goods as a barrier for happiness. 
 The most obvious example of this oppressive manipulation of external goods is 
found in money and wealth.  Disparity in wealth and capital divides economic classes and 
the wealth that individuals possess, or have access to, cannot be attributed to either 
willingness (or unwillingness) to gain on one hand, and, chance apportionment on the 
other.  Poverty, something Aristotle refers to as an evil (1115a11), as near death 
(1116a13), and as a grave misfortune (1155a11), is often handed down generationally96 
and the economic privilege afforded to some is paid for by the poverty of others.  The 
privilege of cheaper and more widely available goods has always relied on systems of 
economic slavery to produce and distribute these goods while keeping production costs as 
low as possible.  We can see this in institutionalized systems of slavery and bondage 
where all wealth is taken from individuals and the fruits of their labor are sold for the 
economic benefit of not only the seller but also the buyer.  Wage slavery works in, 
economically, similar ways such that workers are paid sub-living wages in order to keep 
the products they produce competitively priced for mass consumption.  It is not merely 
happenstance that these individuals are placed into states of poverty, but rather a 
necessary and supported form of economic exploitation of a given mode of capital 
production and distribution.  Disparities in wealth are not merely coincidental but 
economically designed and the moral good that money provides is distributed unequally 
between classes, races, and geographical regions. 
 Beyond money, many of the goods of the body that Aristotle highlights as morally 
necessary are influenced through the availability of external goods.  While health is a 
                                                           
96 See Ruby K. Payne’s, A Framework for Understanding Poverty (Fourth Edition), (Aha! Process, 2005). 
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bodily good needed for achieving virtue and happiness, access to health care is the 
necessary means for maintaining proper health and is an external good which works in 
service of the bodily good.  Access to health care, and more specifically denied access to 
health care, is a manipulation of an external good which (in conjunction with access to 
wealth), can prohibit individuals from achieving the goods necessary for happiness.  
Similarly, as cited above, while beauty is a bodily good, the social expectations of beauty 
standards are external goods which are structured in such a way as to disadvantage 
individuals beyond their control. 
 A further way one can see the manipulation of external goods beyond the bounds 
of agent control is in the political structures of the state.  Often, political structures assign 
goods to individuals based upon their membership.  One's citizenship can be a matter of 
birth or choice, but when one is born with a citizenship designation which limits voting, 
access to social services, basic political freedoms (such as freedom of movement) these 
individuals suffer at the loss of these external goods.  Mirroring Aristotle's claim for the 
need of "good birth" in a proper family, similar "good birth" is needed in citizenship 
affiliation.  Being born a Palestinian is obviously beyond the control of a child born to 
Palestinian parents living in the Occupied Territories, but this person's restricted freedom 
of movement and governance is not merely a confluence of random factors but rather the 
denial of basic rights by an unjust and oppressive occupying authority. Similarly, being 
born an African American prior to the 15th Amendment to the US Constitution, which 
guaranteed voting rights to all citizens regardless of race or ethnicity, is morally unlucky 
but the moral harm perpetrated against these individuals was an intentional product of 
racist political structures. 
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 In each of these examples, individuals suffer morally due to factors outside their 
control, and thus are victims of moral luck.  But these harms are intentional, systematic, 
purposeful, and oppressive.  It is circumstances such as these that demonstrate the moral 
harm that manipulated external goods levels against individuals.  Once we see that these 
external goods are necessary for Aristotelian flourishing and that Aristotle accounts for 
the necessity of these goods and that it is not merely unexplained causal effects which 
limits these goods we can see how the manipulation of external goods is used to oppress 
people and how these oppressed people are curtailed in their pursuit of the good life. 
 
Section 3 – Oppression and Base and Shameful Actions 
 
 In this final section I will show how oppressive forces harm agents through the 
habituation of base and shameful actions.  This third assessment, in addition to the above 
stated arguments concerning the affected/eliminated/burdened nature of virtues and the 
manipulation of external goods, helps substantiate a final way in which oppression's 
harms must be evaluated by virtue theory.  In part, this section acts to show the 
shortcomings of Aristotle's view of base and shameful actions, but it also attempts to 
build on Aristotle's views in light of these shortcomings to advance a conception of base 
actions that accounts for the material conditions of oppression while also explaining the 
immense danger these actions cause. 
 In order to understand Aristotle's conception of base and shameful actions we 
must first see the complex nature of his assessment of "the base" as presented throughout 
the NE.  Aristotle uses the term "base" throughout the NE but does so in no less than 
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three distinct yet related ways.  In each of these ways he more often than not contrasts 
"the base" with "the noble."  This recurring juxtaposition begins in Book II where 
Aristotle claims "there are three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the 
advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, [and] the painful" 
(1104b30).  Here, Aristotle expressly contrasts "the noble" and "the base" and labels them 
as contraries.  Following this schema, when he identifies the category of the base he 
continuously invokes this contrary relationship with the noble (see 1113b9, 1117b9, 
1120a13, 1173b28, 1175b29, 1179b13, 1179b30).   
 The first way Aristotle uses the term 'base' is to identify certain human impulses.  
In Book VII, when discussing the dual role of pleasure as morally significant yet also 
morally corrupting, Aristotle notes specifically that "there are pleasures that are actually 
base" (1152b21).  Here, it is the pleasures, or the drive for the satisfaction of this 
pleasure, that is deemed base.  The pleasure at hand here is the pleasure of children and 
brutes.  The baseness of this type of pleasure is rooted in its simplistic, low, and 
animalistic qualities.  This discussion from Book VII is mirrored in Book X as Aristotle, 
in returning to the discussion of pleasure, identifies the noble sources of pleasure and 
contrasts them with the base (1173b28).  Again, the base sources are delineated as those 
tied to our basest instincts. 
 The second sense of base that Aristotle uses throughout the NE is intimately tied 
to the first, yet importantly different.  Aside from identifying base impulses, Aristotle 
identifies "base objects" (1175b30).  Base objects are simply those objects which are 
desired by base instincts.  It is important to see that while Aristotle is again invoking 
'base' to describe a type of desire or impulse, he is also disconnecting base from the 
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impulse and identifying it as residing within the object desired.  While base impulses 
desire base objects, base objects possess baseness independent of their desirability.  The 
clearest example of this, as hinted at by Aristotle, is found in appetites and food.  While 
one's base desires may impel one toward bingeing on junk food, the baseness of junk 
food as an object of desire is not simply reduced to its being desired via base impulses.  
Rather, the baseness of junk food is rooted in its utter lack of nutrition.  So while base 
desires drive agents to base objects, baseness is a quality possessed independently by 
objects as well as contained in certain impulses.  Thus, in the closing pages of the NE, 
Aristotle claims that "virtue [is] loving what is noble and hating what is base" (1179b30).  
Proper desire, manifest as "love," is virtuous but is still ontologically distinct from the 
objects of love which, for virtue, must also not be base.  Thus, in the second way 
Aristotle identifies "base" as an independent quality of select objects.   
 The third and most often used sense of the term 'base' employed by Aristotle 
throughout the entirety of the NE, and the sense of 'base' that is central to this section, is 
as an assessment of actions.  At points, Aristotle identifies specific actions which are 
base.  He claims that telling falsehoods or breaking promises is base (1127b5), taking as 
compared to giving is base (1120a14), and bravely facing pain is noble whereas to not do 
so is base (1117b8).  In addition to specifically identifying individual base (or not-noble) 
actions, Aristotle accounts for the baseness of actions in general.  If we return to 
Aristotle's first use of the term 'base,' as noted above, base defines one of the ways, if not 
the central way, we must avoid acting.  The actions Aristotle proposes, which are to be 
assessed as either base or noble, are restricted to those actions which arise as voluntary 
choices.  To understand base actions, we must first see that one of the conditions of a 
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base (or noble) action is that the action is, to a large degree, under the agent's control.  
Here, it is worth quoting Aristotle at length: 
 
For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice 
versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will 
be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our 
power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power.   Now if it is in our 
power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this 
was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or 
vicious (1113b713). 
 
 In typically elliptical form, Aristotle claims that baseness, as the quality of certain 
actions or willful inactions, is restricted to those actions or inactions in which we have the 
power (read: ability) to act or not to act.  This baseness of action is thus easily applied to 
"bad actions" in general (1179b13), and more specifically to actions of adultery, theft, 
and murder (1107a11).  While obviously immoral actions are easily called base by 
Aristotle, he famously devotes a large section of Book III to assessing the nature and 
scope of voluntary actions in accordance with the evaluation of their nobility or baseness 
as most contentious action (or inaction) fails to be clearly and definitively voluntary. 
 In describing how actions accord with freedom, Aristotle references two 
hypothetical situations where necessary actions are done under coercion yet which cannot 
be properly called ‘involuntary.’  The two examples given by Aristotle are of the tyrant 
and the ship captain.  In the tyrant example Aristotle proposes a hypothetical scenario 
where “a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one’s parents and 
children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise 
would be put to death” (1110a5-8).  The ship captain is presented as in an analogous 
situation, where she is caught in a storm and must throw the ship’s cargo overboard to 
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secure the safety of herself and her crew (1110a9-12).  In both scenarios, the moral agent 
is presented with a situation in which they are coerced into base and shameful actions due 
to an external influence.  For Aristotle, these actions are justified and “worthy of choice” 
because (a) the end of the action is “done from fear of greater evils or for some noble 
object,” (b) while the action is base the action would otherwise not be performed if the 
external constraint were removed, and, (c) “any sensible man” would perform these 
actions in these situations.  Aristotle’s assessment of these so-called mixed actions is 
done to show that evaluation of actions must be “used with reference to the moment of 
action” and that the strict and simplistic criteria of “the moving principle” cannot 
categorize all actions as either completely voluntary or completely involuntary.  While 
these examples illustrate Aristotle’s assessment of free actions, they also shed light on the 
base and shameful actions which can be necessitated by oppression. 
 Much like the tyrant, the existence of oppression forces agents to perform base 
and shameful acts.  Where oppression differs from Aristotle’s example of the tyrant is 
that oppression does not exist wholly in discrete and dramatic moments but rather affects, 
coerces, and conditions agents over prolonged periods of time.  Aristotle’s example of the 
tyrant depends on two implied premises.  The first is that if this one base action is 
performed then the noble end (of saving the family) will be accomplished.  The second is 
that this base action is discrete and performing this action, in unique situations of 
mitigating circumstances, will not affect the development and maintenance of one’s 
character.  These two premises fail to obtain in cases of oppression.  Oppression’s 
longevity, and the continuous effects that are exerted upon agents, means that the base 
and shameful actions which oppression coerces individuals into are not discrete.  
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Oppression can coerce individuals into a continual cycle of base actions which do not 
achieve noble ends and which do radically affect the development and maintenance of 
one’s character.  The continual and on-going pressure exerted by oppression, by coercing 
agents to base actions, can become a form of negative habituation. 
 Let us take, as an example, the debt bondage ring run by Carlos Andres 
Monsalve.  Monsalve orchestrated the immigration of women from Guatemala to the 
United States such that these women entered into debt bondage agreements with 
Monsalve where they agreed to work as housekeepers to pay for their initial illegal 
migration, their eventual legalization and naturalization, and their housing and care.97  
The initial debt was set at $5,000 (USD) but upon arrival in the US they were informed 
that their debt had jumped to upwards of $30,000.  The women were told that their debt 
would now need to be paid-off by working as prostitutes.  Under the escalating fears of 
abandonment, expulsion, and physical torture these women began performing up to 25 
sex-acts a day for $30 an act.  
 These women, who were clearly subject to an oppressive structure of exploitation 
and coercive force, were compelled to commit base and shameful acts.  Yet, unlike the 
scenarios presented by Aristotle, their exploitation was not limited to discrete and 
unconnected actions but rather a life of servitude and sexual exploitation.  The continued 
performance of these base sexual acts has substantial effect upon these women’s 
characters.  Melissa Farley, a researcher and clinical psychologist and founding director 
of Prostitution Research and Education, surveyed and analyzed multiple psychological 
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studies done on prostitutes.98  Here Farley concluded that prostitution, be it forced and 
illegal (as in the case of the women enslaved by Monsalve) or self-chosen and legal, 
results in "dissociation," Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and "other mood 
disorders."99  Farley's work, and the individual studies she cites, substantiates the ways in 
which habitual sexual action in exchange for money or services results in harm.  This 
substantiated psychological harm can be further explained by virtue ethics through 
habituation.  The continual performance of an action, according to Aristotle, can, through 
the process of habituation, have an effect on the moral character of an individual.  
According to Aristotle, “states of character arise out of like activities” (1103b21) and 
thus, “we become just by doing just action, and temperate by doing temperate acts” 
(1105a18).  While this is most often associated with moral development (as seen in 
Aristotle’s examples of justice and temperance), it can also explain moral decay.  If we 
become just by performing just actions, so too we become unjust by performing unjust 
actions.  When one continually commits negative and harmful actions, the actions can 
bring about vice or viciousness.100  The women exploited and oppressed by Monsalve 
were forced to commit harmful and base actions and these actions, via their repetition and 
eventual habituation, curtailed (if not prohibited) their flourishing. 
 While possibly an extreme (although not uncommon) example, human sexual 
trafficking can help illuminate how oppressive structures force the habituation of base 
                                                           
98 Melissa Farley, “Bad for the Body, Bad for the Heart: Prostitution Harms Women Even if Legalized or 
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and shameful actions and how this habituation must curtail the flourishing of these 
oppressed people.  While an example of sexual debt-bondage may illustrate this point, it 
can also leave one with a sense that this moral reality is reserved exclusively for extreme 
scenarios, and this, most certainly, is not the case.  Similar results can be found in the 
way worker safety is commodified and the way workers choose, in a truly Aristotelian 
"mixed" sense, to labor under unsafe working conditions. 
 When looking at unsafe working conditions it is difficult not to begin with the 
commercial meatpacking industry.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
meatpacking industry is one of the most dangerous industries in the United Sates.101  The 
meatpacking industry has one of the highest injury rates of all industries, and injuries in 
this industry occur at roughly three times that of other manufacturing industries.102   
 Most of the physical injuries in the meatpacking industry are a result of the 
extremely high volume of meat processed and the rate at which animals are slaughtered.  
In the United States over 9 billion animals are slaughtered per year.103  In industrialized 
plants, this butchering is done by workers through a series of "cuts."  Animals arrive in-
front of workers on moving conveyer systems and workers are trained to perform specific 
and targeted "cuts" to the carcass.  In many slaughterhouses over 350 animals are 
butchered per hour, and the cutting process moves at break-neck speed.  The speed of the 
process is extremely dangerous and it is a well known fact that slaughterhouse workers 
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toil in some of the most unsafe environments in the industrial sector.  Typical injuries 
range from deep lacerations and amputations to third degree burns (often from a machine 
called the "gut-cooker").  According to Eric Schlosser, "Every year about one out of three 
meatpacking workers in this country - roughly forty-three thousand men and women - 
suffer an injury or work-related illness that requires medical attention beyond first aid."104 
 In addition to the physical danger of slaughterhouse work, meatpackers also face 
a myriad of psychological dangers.  The speed at which slaughterhouses operate means 
that workers are not given time to ensure that animals are killed quickly, humanely, or 
even completely.  In 1958, congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act (HSA) which 
regulates the slaughtering of animals.  The HSA holds that, "It is therefore declared to be 
the policy of the United States that the slaughtering of livestock and the handling of 
livestock in connection with slaughter shall be carried out only by humane methods.”105  
While the HSA purportedly ensures that animals are slaughtered humanely, this law fails 
to ensure the reality of the promise.  From its passage in 1958 until 1978, when the HSA 
was updated, USDA regulators were given no authority to intervene when 
slaughterhouses were found in violation of the law.  Slaughterhouses were given the task 
of self-regulation and no punishments existed for failures to comply.  In 2002, the HSA 
was updated again via a congressional resolution.  This resolution, as part of the Farm 
Bill, resolved that the HSA "should be fully enforced."   Forty-four years after its 
passage, congress was forced to pass a resolution which called expressly for the 
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enforcement of the law which, up until this point, has no real mechanisms for enactment.  
Even following this resolution, the inhumane conditions of slaughterhouses persist, and 
these conditions require workers to treat animal suffering as merely an unavoidable 
aspect of their work. 
 Journalist Ted Conover spent a number of months working as a USDA inspector 
in Nebraska's slaughterhouse industry.  He describes the killing process he witnessed, and 
reports that animals were intentionally left living during the butchering process.106  A 
fellow USDA inspector told him that "the pumping of their hearts will help drain the 
blood from their bodies once their necks are sliced open."107  Conover describes semi-
stunned cattle dangling from chain hoists while their throats are slit open.  The cattle's 
hearts pump the blood out of the living body and onto the killing floor while various 
workers performed their "cuts."  Conover describes animals with dangling eyeballs and 
twitching muscles as he chronicles the deliberately slow death of cattle which, 
paradoxically, occurs on the ultra-fast paced conveyer line.  This inhumane environment 
is not unique to the cattle industry nor is it localized to a specific plant or company.  
Hauntingly similar stories have been shared by whistle-blowers, undercover journalists, 
and activists in the poultry and pig industries.108 
 While the suffering experienced by animals in this horrific industry is, in itself, 
extremely morally troubling for virtue ethicists,109 there are also important ways which 
the moral character of those who inflict this suffering is equally significant.  Without 
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minimizing the severity of the moral wrongs inflicted upon, literally, millions of animals 
a year in the industrialized meat industry, this industry also causes untold moral damage 
to those who work in these factories.  Workers, who in the course of their daily working 
lives, inflict this suffering on the animals being slaughtered are morally harmed by the 
tasks they perform. 
 Workers in this ‘industry of death’ work in pools of blood, enveloped by the 
deafening noise of machinery and animal cries, and "experience, on a daily basis, large-
scale violence and death that most of the American population will never have to 
encounter."110  Exposure to this cruelty has significant impact on the emotional and 
psychological wellbeing of these workers.  It has been reported that slaughterhouse 
workers experience higher than average instances of social withdrawal, drug and alcohol 
abuse, and anxiety.111  Further, slaughterhouse workers are now being diagnosed with 
PTSD.112  In some extreme cases, workers have been known to "kill for fun," 
intentionally maiming living animals, and have even resorted to forgoing the killing 
machinery in order to kill animals by hand.113  In preliminary research, it has also been 
shown that there is a correlation between slaughterhouse workers and instances of violent 
inter-human violence.114  In all of these ways, it is believed that the "nature of the 
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slaughterhouse work may have caused psychological damage to the employees" such that 
"employee's actions certainly rise to the level of abnormal cruelty that would cause 
concern among the general population.115   
 These reports, studies, and diagnoses reveal the moral damage inflicted on these 
workers.  By inflicting suffering on animals, these workers are forced into emotional 
states which inhibit their moral growth and prohibit their flourishing.  Empathy and 
sympathy are not emotions that these workers can properly experience if they are to 
carry-out their work.  A worker who is literally faced with this level of immense suffering 
must learn to quiet their emotional responses and develop a level of emotional 
detachment.  This emotional numbing and detachment is not something that one can turn-
on and turn-off at their discretion and becomes an emotional state carried out of the 
factory and into their wider lives.  For many of these workers this emotional detachment 
is aided by routinely and habitually using and abusing drugs and alcohol.  These 
mechanisms of self-abuse help achieve the emotional goal of lessening the experiences of 
their working lives.  Individuals who cannot quiet their emotional responses are left with 
emotional and psychological disorders, such as PTSD.  These individuals have their 
emotional and psychological states warped into harmful states of excessive fear, 
emotional uncontrollability, anxiety, sleep deprivation, and even uncontrollable and 
unwanted thoughts.  If these psychological, mental, and emotional states of excess, 
marked by PTSD and substance abuse, can be avoided (in what must be both called and 
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bemoaned as a "best case scenario") then this individual achieves emotional 
disconnection.  This strong emotional disconnection (or disassociation) can result in the 
demonstrated instances of anti-social behavior, such as social withdraw, and even the 
deviant behaviors of some workers, found in inter-human violence and "killing for fun."  
It would seem then, workers are left with the options of achieving emotional numbness 
and detachment via various harmful means, suffering at the hands of emotions they 
cannot control, or achieving emotional disconnection and suffering its disastrous 
consequences.  In any case, these are states which are clearly at odds with the Aristotelian 
conception of proper virtue, positive states of character, and human flourishing.  For 
these workers, the continual exposure to violence, the pressure to act in accordance with 
inhumane industry standards, and the emotional distancing that this must induce warps 
these individuals into damaged and vicious states.   
 The connection between the sexual debt-bondage case and the example of 
slaughterhouse workers is that in both cases agents choose to routinely perform actions 
which are base and shameful.  The baseness forced upon the women enslaved by 
Monsalve is the boldest and most robust sense of base as described by Aristotle.  The 
sexual actions they are coerced to perform are, in the first sense, base due to their service 
of the brutish sexual appetites of their johns.  In the third sense of base used by Aristotle, 
the actions performed by these women qualify as base due to the otherwise 
unchoiceworthiness of their actions.  All things being equal, these are not the appropriate 
choices one should make in service to their moral growth, character development, or 
happiness.  The use of slaughterhouse workers, in conjunction with the sexual debt-
bondage case, helps show how similar reasoning can be circumstantially pressed onto 
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agents which results in moral decay, and therein be base, yet not to the same degree.  
While lacking the sexual content of the actions performed in the sexual debt-bondage 
case, the actions performed as work in the meatpacking industry are no less base.  The 
inhumane actions of brutality inflicted by slaughterhouse workers during the slaughtering 
process, in their cruelty, are base in Aristotle's third sense of the word.  These actions are 
unfitting a person with a properly aligned moral compass and are properly called "base" 
and "bad."  In a second way, the impulses behind this institutionalized cruelty must also 
be labeled as "base" in Aristotle's first sense of the word as they lack essential emotional 
sensitivity.  Thirdly, the treatment of the animals by the slaughterhouse workers does not 
"serve noble ends."  The consumer-ready meat produced by this industry is an 
unnecessary commercial good.  It is not the case that meat is the only means for feeding 
people and the cruel and inhumane treatment of animals is the necessary means for 
obtaining this irreplaceable good.  The meat produced and sold to consumers fulfills only 
basic peculiar desires which are fungible goods easily replaced when the moral 
circumstances of their production are known.  In this third way, the 'necessary' actions of 
meatpackers are, in no sense, necessary and do not serve noble ends.  Thus, both the 
sexual debt-bondage example and the example of the actions of meatpackers are similar 
and analogous.  In both are cases agents choose, in a "mixed" sense, that which is base 
and shameful and this choice results moral harm, moral decay, and moral damage. 
 While drawing important connections between the examples of sexual debt-
bondage and slaughterhouse workers in regards to the harm of base and shameful actions, 
it is equally important to note that there are significant disconnections between these two 
groups.  The first, and most important, disconnect between these two cases is the severity 
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of moral harm caused in each case.  The severity of harm inflicted on a sexual slave is 
exponentially higher, more malicious, and more pernicious than the moral harm inflicted 
on slaughterhouse workers and it would be irresponsible to not clearly indicate this 
important difference.  Yet, even with this noted, the moral damage identified in 
slaughterhouse workers as a result of their coerced and base decisions is none the less 
present, real, and harmful.  Thus, these two cases, in reference to severity of harm, differ 
only in degree.  The second way these cases differ is in the level of choice that the agents 
in each case possess.  One may object to the connection being drawn here between sexual 
slavery and meatpacking because agents working in the meatpacking industry begin, and 
continue, their employment voluntarily whereas the women controlled by Monsalve are 
truly enslaved.  While this is, as a point of fact, true it in no way alters the moral 
evaluation of these cases.  As with moral harm, the voluntariness of actions, for Aristotle, 
comes in degrees.  Both the actions of the sexual debt-bondage slaves and the 
meatpackers are coerced and cannot be said to be fully voluntary.  The threats leveled 
against the women enslaved by Monsalve and the economic pressures of employment and 
enforced industry standards in slaughterhouses both act to coerce agents to perform base 
and harmful actions.  In a similar way, the actions of the sexual slaves and the 
meatpackers are not so over-determined by this coercion as to make these actions 
involuntary.  At the moment of action, these unfortunate and coerced agents still possess 
an ability to refuse, even if this refusal comes at an unacceptable cost.  This means that 
the actions in both the sexual debt-bondage case and the case of the slaughterhouse 
workers are truly "mixed" and both involve, to varying degrees, the choice of the agent.  
While important differences exist between the levels of coercion in these two cases (and 
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therefore the level of choice available to the agents) both are mixed actions, varying only 
in degree and not in kind.  It is the moral harm caused to slaughterhouse workers and the 
women enslaved by Monsalve that is similar and it is this similarity that connects these 
cases.  Both are cases where individuals are coerced into the continual performance of 
base and shameful acts and the effect of these continued actions harms, corrupts, and 
damages the acting agents which, in turn, severely limits the availability flourishing.  
 If the differences between these cases are only differences of degree, then it seems 
reasonable to extend this type of moral damage beyond even these two cases.  This type 
of moral harm, typified at the extreme by sexual debt-bondage slaves and to a lesser 
degree by meatpackers, extends, by degree, to other professions and lifestyles.  The 
implications of Dillard and McWilliams research done on slaughterhouse workers seems 
to point to possible similarities in other types of labor.  Members of other high-risk 
professions can and do suffer from the same negative habituation. Police officers, 
firefighters, manual laborers, and even public school teachers all struggle to weigh the 
competing values of personal safety and financial obligations.  Where national and local 
governments weigh economic concerns against safety regulations, and where employers 
treat worker health and safety as negotiable and transmutable budget expenditures, the 
health and safety of all workers is utterly commodified.  It is this commodification of 
worker safety that forces all workers, to varying degrees, to choose courses of actions 
which, all things being equal, they should not choose.  It is precisely because all things 
are not equal that their choices are coerced and, in an Aristotelian sense, "mixed."  All 
workers, who must accept working conditions which they know to be less than safe, 
unsafe, or dangerous, must normalize their decisions and repeatedly working in such 
96 
 
conditions distances workers from the reality of the unchoiceworthiness of their 
decisions.  This continual acceptance (via continued actions) for that which is 
unchoiceworthy is what Aristotle's examples of base actions does not account for.  
Aristotle does not address the abundance and pervasiveness of base (or otherwise 
unchoiceworthy) necessary actions that oppressed people must habitually make, and fails 
to consider how the repetition of these coerced choices has a cumulative effect on 
oppressed individual's wellbeing, happiness, and virtue. 
 Much like Aristotle's examples of the despotic tyrant and the rogue storm while at 
sea, oppression forces (to varying degrees) the performance of base actions.  While 
Aristotle did not expressly consider the possibility of these base actions being performed 
on a routine basis, and he treated base actions as relatively isolated incidents, the moral 
framework of virtue theory can account for the repetitive nature of such actions and the 
damning effect of this repetition.  It is through this account that we can see how 
oppression's coercive force acts as an external influence and curtails flourishing.  In this 
way, to account for and substantiate the harmful effects of oppression we must consider, 
in conjunction with oppression's effects on the acquisition of virtue and its manipulation 
of external goods, the essential and damning ways in which base and shameful actions 
play a vital role. 
 
Section 4 – Conclusion 
 
 The central aim of this chapter has been to move from a prima facie 
understanding of oppression's harms to a substantiated account of these harms as 
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understood by virtue ethics.  It was argued here, in three sections, that the limitation on 
the availability of flourishing can be found in three distinct forms. 
 The first way oppression limits flourishing is by limiting virtue.  It was argued in 
section one that under the conditions of oppression virtues can be made either (a) an 
impossibility (as demonstrated via temperance), (b) radically affected such that the 
development of certain virtues can be made extremely onerous and unrealistic (as 
demonstrated via courage), or, (c) heavily burdened into becoming somehow damaging 
in themselves (as demonstrated via proper-anger).  In each of these ways oppression acts 
as a force which limits the acquisition, development, and maintenance of virtue.  Since 
virtue is needed for the achievement of the good life and flourishing, oppression acts as a 
barrier for this achievement. 
 The second way oppression limits flourishing is through the manipulation of 
external goods.  Arguing against Farwell, and using Farwell's position as a foil, section 
two first establishes that external goods are, in fact, necessary yet not sufficient for the 
achievement of flourishing.  These necessary but not sufficient goods, external to the 
agent, require Aristotle to present a corollary picture of how factors outside the agent's 
control alter the dispersal of these goods.  Deemed "moral luck," it was argued that while 
Aristotle did account for the fortunate/unfortunate allotments of external goods he also 
failed to understand the political, social, and structural ways these goods are intentionally 
manipulated beyond the bounds of mere happenstance.  When manipulated via 
oppressive structures and regimes, the limitation of external goods limits the necessary 
goods for the achievement of flourishing. 
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 The conjunction of sections one (on virtue's limitation) and two (on external 
goods) demonstrate how all of the necessary and sufficient goods needed for the 
achievement of flourishing are skewed by oppression.  In this way, all aspects of the 
moral life fall under oppression's harmful influence such that flourishing, for the 
oppressed, is not only curtailed but possibly prohibited. 
 The third and final way oppression was shown to act as a limitation on the 
achievement of flourishing was through an assessment of base and shameful actions.  
Section three began by accounting for the different ways Aristotle conceived of that 
which is base.  In conjunction with his identification of so-called "mixed" acts, it was 
claimed that oppression can force individuals into base and shameful actions (of varying 
degrees of severity) which, in turn, affect the possibility of achieving flourishing.   Here, 
this section used case studies (and related research) of prisoners of sexual debt-bondage 
and workers in the meatpacking industry to show how mixed actions can negatively 
habituate individuals to varying degrees of moral harm which, in turn, acts as a barrier for 
the achievement of flourishing. 
 The harms presented here, which are done as a way of substantiating oppression's 
damning influence, furthers scholarship on the (im)morality of oppression in two 
important ways.  First, they descriptively present an analysis of oppression's influence 
from within the virtue ethics tradition.  The normative framework of virtue ethics requires 
a uniquely virtue based account of oppression's harm and this chapter has sought to 
provide this detailed analysis.  Secondly, the harms presented here, as understood by 
virtue ethics, take a large and broad look at the human life.  The framework of virtue 
ethics attempts to encompass and engage in all aspects of human life treating human 
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flourishing as the result of a complete life.  Connecting the harmful effects of oppression 
via virtue ethics uses this encompassing framework to trace the harmful effects of 
oppression to our desires, our emotions, our choices, our habits, our interactions with 
others, and our political existence as social beings.  Virtue ethics, and the account of 
oppression given here, attempts to meet these ethical demands in the wide and varied 
arenas in which the ethical life is lived and developed.  The resulting picture of 
oppression and its harms demonstrates the extent and depth of oppression's devastating 
effects on the oppressed.  
 If oppression, in all of these ways, denies flourishing, it is clear that we need to 
accept that oppression must be resisted and once this barrier to flourishing is removed 
such full human potential is made available to all individuals and communities.  This 
resistance is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
ESTABLISHING AN OBLIGATION TO RESIST OPPRESSION 
 
 
 
 Understanding the complex ways that oppression harms agents, as argued for in 
the previous chapter, mandates a moral response from virtuous agents.  This chapter 
argues that Aristotelian virtue ethics generates a strong moral obligation which requires 
agents to resist oppression and obligates individuals to actively engage in liberatory 
struggles against oppressive forces. 
 At first blush, this language of obligation used in conjunction with the 
Aristotelian moral framework might appear to be an unnatural mixing of moral theories 
as if a square peg has been placed into a round hole.  After all, the modern revival of 
virtue ethics traces its roots to Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy,” in which 
Anscombe calls for a return to virtue theory in light of the fact that the moral language of 
“must” and “ought” fails to have any sensible meaning.  Anscombe urges for a return to 
the tradition of virtue ethics as it is here that she believes that the juridical "must" and 
"ought" play no role.  In many ways Anscombe's call has been answered.  Moral theorists 
took up the mantle of virtue theory, jettisoned the juridical language of obligation and 
"must," and began working on expanding, extolling, and exploring virtue's role in modern 
moral discussions. For many, like Christopher Miles Coope, who claims that the very 
idea of 'obligation' is “a problem specific to justice… and [within a virtue ethical 
framework] not readily comprehensible,” the virtue framework cannot nor should not 
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attempt to conceptualize ethics as yielding obligations or asserting moral claims as 
obligatory.116 
 It is my belief that even if we take Coope and Anscombe's criticism seriously, and 
fulfill the demands of ethics from within a uniquely virtue framework, the language of 
obligations still emerges and, more specifically, agents are obligated to engage in moral 
resistance to oppression given oppression's harmful effects. 
 To establish and defend this view, this chapter begins with an analysis of Rosalind 
Hursthouse's conception of "v-rules."  From this conception of v-rules, I will advance a 
picture of the derivative rules which the v-rules entail.  These derivative rules (or "d-
rules"), and the action guidance they provide, obligate agents in circumstances of 
oppression and necessitate that agents act to resist oppression in all its forms. 
 
Section 1 - Hursthouse's V-Rules 
 
 Hursthouse develops her conception of the so-called "v-rules" as a way of 
responding to the critics of virtue ethics who claim that virtue cannot provide anything by 
way of practical action guidance.  For these critics, the reliance on so-called "agent 
centered" ethics leaves individuals unable to determine the appropriate moral actions 
required in specific situations as the broad ethical dictums to "become virtuous" or 
"achieve eudaimonia" do not translate into practical application.  Hursthouse responds to 
these critics and develops a strong conception of virtue based action guidance which 
explains how virtue ethics instructs agents as to their actions. 
                                                           
116 Christopher Miles Coope, “Modern Virtue Ethics,” in Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in 
Contemporary Ethics, ed. Timothy Chappell (Oxford University Press, 2007), 27. 
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 For Hursthouse, the overarching rule for action guidance found within virtue 
ethics is the general principle which holds that right action is defined by the action(s) of 
the virtuous agent.  As a foundational premise, Hursthouse expresses this principle as: 
 
Pve.1.  An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically 
(i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.117    
  
 Hursthouse admits that this first rule concerning the action guidance found in 
virtue ethics may sound like an unhelpful truism, yet is no different than any other 
general rule for action guidance found in any other brand of moral theory.  All moral 
theories begin with broad premises and these basic premises are, by themselves, generally 
unhelpful for determining what, specifically, an agent should or should not do.118  Using 
the framework of Utilitarianism for comparison, Hursthouse shows that the first principle 
of utility is, when taken by itself, equally unhelpful for guiding actions.  This first 
principle of utility can be expressed as: 
 
Pu.1. An action is right iff it tends to maximize total happiness. 
 
 Much like Pve.1., Pu.1. fails, by itself, to provide concrete action guidance.  Pu.1. 
does not clarify or explain how happiness is to be understood or how maximization is to 
be calculated or how the "tendency" requirement is measured and thus further principles 
must be explained.  Similarly, Pve.1. does not, by itself, define the virtuous agent or 
define the virtues or explain action's connection to character, which leaves Pve.1. unable 
                                                           
117 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 28. 
118 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 31. 
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to singularly guide actions.  For Hursthouse, the broad foundational premise of Pve.1. 
must be unpacked and added to other ethical principles contained and entailed with the 
normative framework of virtue ethics.  Action guidance is not provided solely by Pve.1., 
but emerges when Pve.1. is conjoined with additional elaborative principles.  The 
subsequent premises needed, according to Hursthouse, are: 
 
Pve.2.   A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits, 
namely the virtues. 
 
Pve.3.  A virtue is a character trait...119 
  
 The action guidance prescribed in Pve.1. is given content by the subsequent 
premises.  While Hursthouse ends this elaboration with Pve.3., it seems warranted to grant 
at least one additional premise which flushes out this entailed chain.  The additional 
premise would be as follows. 
 
Pve.4. -  Virtues are developed by agents through either teaching/learning (in the 
case of intellectual virtues) or through habituation (in the case of moral virtues).   
 
  It is at this point that the action guidance entailed in Pve.1. becomes clear.  
Certain actions are necessary for the development and maintenance of the virtues, and 
other actions are to be avoided for the same reason. Hursthouse dubs the "large number 
of rules" which Pve.1- Pve.3 (and presumably Pve.4) generate "v-rules."120  It is v-rules 
which specify the content of action guidance in virtue ethics.  For Hursthouse, v-rules are 
                                                           
119 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 29.  Hursthouse defines virtue via the "standard neo-Aristotelian" 
conception of virtue as "a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well" 
(emphasis in original). 
120 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 37. 
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derived directly from the virtues and vices and their normative force is imparted as being 
derivative of Pve.1.121 
  We can see here that, for Hursthouse, v-rules emerge as a component of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics' schema for action guidance.  At this preliminary point, let us 
consider an example as means of clarification.  For this clarification, consider the virtue 
of liberality.  Liberality, the virtue which governs those things regarding wealth, 
necessitates that a virtuous agent be liberal, generous, and charitable.  This virtue 
generates, amongst others, the v-rules "be liberal," and the related vices of liberality 
instruct agents by the v-rules "do not be miserly" and "do not act as a spendthrift."   
 Here, some might object that while the v-rules are entailed by the existence of the 
virtues (and vices) and do instruct agents how they are to act, they still provide little by 
the way of concrete action guidance.  After all, being instructed to "act charitably" does 
not seem particularly helpful when faced with situations where agents are presented with 
complex scenarios of competing demands.  Must an agent part with their money 
whenever asked for spare change?  How should one decide between, on one hand, 
making a charitable donation or, on the other, saving this would-be-donated money for 
potential future circumstances of self-need?  Here, it might seem that being instructed to 
merely "act charitably" does not provide the strong action guidance needed to determine 
the required actions. 
 Objections such as these fail to see how the virtue concepts, as captured by the v-
rules, are "thick" and carry with them more instructive and informative content than these 
critics give them credit for.  For Hursthouse, the v-rules generated by the virtues "connote 
not only doing what the virtuous agent could do, but also doing it 'in the way' she 
                                                           
121 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 39. 
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would."122  This “in the way she would,” points to the complex schema of the virtues 
found in Aristotelian virtue ethics as well as all of the factors involved in determining, 
identifying, and enacting the virtues.  For Aristotle, the virtues are not presented as 
axiomatic goods without conditions or parameters, but are restricted to delineated 
conditions, constraints and boundaries.  These boundaries describe the limits of the 
virtue's the mean as well as the ways in which agents can be said to fail.  These boundary 
conditions are all contained in the specific, and seemingly vague, v-rules as they are "the 
ways the virtuous agents acts." 
 For clarification, let us return to the example of liberality.  Aristotle describes the 
liberal person as one who does not give money to the wrong person (1120a28, 1120b6), 
one who gives without pain (1120a30), one who takes (acquires) money from the right 
sources (1120a33), and one who uses their wealth to confer benefit to others (1120a35).  
Those who error in regards to these conditions find themselves either prodigal (the 
related vice of excess) or "mean" (the related vice of deficiency).  While at the most 
general level, agents are instructed to "be liberal" (as this is the v-rule), this liberality is, 
in part, measured by the ability and willingness of agents to act in ways delineated by the 
conditions and boundaries of the virtue.  To fulfill the v-rule of liberality qua charity is 
to, for example, give money to those in need and to do so unbegrudgingly.   
 For Hursthouse, and Aristotle, the determination of these boundaries and 
conditions, and the specifics of the otherwise broad virtues (and v-rules), are to be 
determined by agents using phronesis.  Through the use of practical wisdom agents can 
determine the practical implementation of the virtues and the fulfillment of the v-rules.  It 
is practical wisdom which yields the derivative content of the virtues and the v-rules, and 
                                                           
122 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 36 (footnote). 
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this derivative content can be deployed by agents in concrete situations where the 
specifics of individual action are needed. 
 Through the schema of the v-rules, and the derivative content yielded by practical 
wisdom, Hursthouse gives us a strong conception of the action guidance found in virtue 
ethics.  To my mind, Hursthouse more than adequately answers the critics of virtue ethics 
who see it as unable to practically instruct agents as to proper action.  Seeing as how 
these critics are the target of her argument, I believe that the scheme that she advances 
succeeds.  Yet, at this point, I want to break from Hursthouse's conception of the v-rules 
and push them further than she intends.   
 
Section 2 - Rules Beyond the V-Rules 
 
 Hursthouse maintains that the v-rules must always remain tied to the virtue 
concepts.  The v-rules operate by iterating the specifics of moral action in direct reference 
to the language, and therefore meaning, of the virtues.  For Hursthouse, this linguistic 
connection is of central importance.  Keeping the v-rules tied, expressly, to the virtue 
concepts keeps them anchored in the eudaimonistic framework.  So while there are many 
obvious moral maxims which most will admit are morally significant in virtue ethics 
(such as "do not murder"), the v-rules, themselves, do not extend to these actions.  This is 
not to say that these actions are therefore not prohibited but rather that the v-rules which 
provide action guidance to agents do not extend to such prohibitions.  The obvious 
prohibition on murder which virtue ethics maintains is to be understood as the practical 
manifestation of v-rules which ask agents to "be gentle" and to "maintain proper anger."  
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For Hursthouse, such practicality is given to agents through the exercise of practical 
wisdom which operates under the direction of the v-rules. 
 The virtue concepts that Hursthouse sees as both central to her conception of the 
v-rules and essential for their implementation extends beyond the enumerated virtues 
listed by Aristotle and includes those virtue concepts which express states of character, 
both positively and negatively, without being, in themselves, virtues or vices.  
Hursthouse, briefly, provides examples of this extensive virtue and vice vocabulary 
which remains available for v-rule analysis.  This list includes irresponsibility, 
fecklessness, laziness, uncooperativeness, and being inconsiderate, to name just a few.123  
These virtue (and vice) concepts help give strong action guidance and can be expressed 
as v-rules.  Thus, we can say that, for example, there is a v-rule which instructs agents to 
not be lazy.  This v-rule (which would read something akin to "do not be lazy" or even 
"do not be slothful") is important in that virtue ethics requires agents to actively and 
rigorously engage in the project of virtues acquisition.  After all, virtue cannot be 
stumbled into blindly nor quickly and requires continuous work by the agent.  While this 
v-rule concerning laziness instructs and guides agents in accordance with virtue ethics, it 
is not derived directly from the existence of a specific virtue.  Aristotle, while describing 
idle laziness as the earmark of the incontinent (1166b11), does not discuss laziness at any 
length and certainly does not identify laziness as a vice with a corresponding virtue.  Yet 
this does not preclude, for Hursthouse, the vice concept of slothfulness from being 
included in both our list of virtue and vice concepts or the v-rules. 
 The boundaries for the v-rules, for Hursthouse, is the virtue (and vice) concepts.  
The v-rules express the virtues and can only do so by remaining tied to the virtue 
                                                           
123 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 42. 
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concepts.  Any further, more specific, action guidance derived from the v-rules which 
falls outside the parameters of the virtue concepts falls, therefore, outside the scope of the 
v-rules.  Any further action guidance derived from the v-rules is to be yielded by practical 
wisdom but cannot be called v-rules as many of these specifics break away, even 
linguistically, from the virtue concepts.  Hursthouse's emphasis is on the v-rules, and her 
belief that the v-rules must remain the sole and central mechanism for action guidance, 
means that she resists moves to identify any derivative content into a further system of  
'rules.'  Systemizing these details into a schema of rules, within the larger picture of the v-
rules, is precisely what I want to do.  In doing this, I do not reject the picture of v-rules 
offered by Hursthouse but rather seek to identify how eudemonistic virtue ethics 
generates rules beyond those identified by the v-rules.  In fact, the action guidance I want 
to identify is meant to lie within, and act in conjunction with, the Hursthousian schema. 
 The rules I wish to identify are those specific actions or circumstances which 
constitute the conditions and parameters entailed by the v-rules and discovered through 
practical wisdom.  These specific charges, which Hursthouse is happy to leave 
unspecified in favor of a continued focus on the v-rules themselves, form a class of rules 
derived from the v-rules, and which I will call “d-rules.”124 
 The relationship between the d-rules and the v-rules can be understood in two 
ways; as a 'nested relationship' or as a 'corollary relationship.'  The nested relationship is 
best seen by looking at the way that d-rules emerge from the v-rules as a way of 
                                                           
124 I have chosen not to extend the label "v-rule" to these derivative rules (or d-rules), preferring to 
identify them by a unique name.  The reason for this is two-fold.  First, the differing nomenclature helps 
keep clear the division between those aspects of Hursthouse's theory which I follow as she explains them 
and those aspects and areas where I break away from Hursthouse's account.  Secondly, the differing 
nomenclature is an attempt to respect the adamancy Hursthouse expresses that the v-rules, properly, 
cannot be extended in the ways I originally hoped.  Thus, by coining a different term for these moral rules 
I can keep the v-rules as Hursthouse intended while adding that which I see as necessary.  
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clarifying the entailed moral content of the virtue concepts.  To see this relationship it is 
helpful to return to the example of liberality.  Beginning with the virtue of liberality, we 
can derive the v-rules "be liberal" and "be generous."  As Aristotle explains, liberality is, 
in part, marked by gaining (or attempting to gain) money from the proper sources and the 
illiberal person seeks money through nefarious sources.  Thus, practical wisdom tells us 
that "one should earn money only through the right sources."  Here, this entailed claim, 
which instructs agents as to what they should (or should not) do, is a general instance of a 
d-rule.  "Earn money only through the right sources," as a rule, has no (literal) connection 
to the virtue of liberality and does not express the moral rule in purely virtue concepts, 
and therefore cannot be a v-rule.  Yet the importance of such a dictum is necessary, and is 
necessarily entailed, by the Aristotelian concept of liberality.  Getting more specific, we 
can clarify what "right sources" mean.  Using Aristotle's assertion that money is to be 
given in order to benefit others we can conclude that wealth generating schemes which 
necessarily cause harm to others are wrong and run afoul of the virtue of liberality.  Thus, 
we can iterate the derivative content of the v-rules and, as obvious as this sounds, 
practical wisdom presents d-rules to agents which forbids the trafficking of heroin and 
the use of ponzi schemes.  Both the trafficking of heroin and the earning of money via 
pyramid schemes must result in harm being inflicted on the other person in this financial 
interaction.  Here, we can see that v-rule(s) which the virtue of liberality generates, in 
conjunction with the practical wisdom of the agent, generates further forms of action 
guidance.  In this way the d-rules can be said to be nested within the normative content of 
the v-rules and the virtues (and virtue concepts), and they express this moral content as a 
rule. 
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 The other way d-rules can be expressed is as being in a corollary relationship with 
the v-rules.  The existence of wit as a virtue (1128a1) yields the v-rule to (in Aristotle's 
words) "be a ready-witted person" and the vice of buffoonery yields the v-rule "do not act 
a fool."  These v-rules, which remain tied directly to the virtue concepts of ready-
wittedness and foolishness, entail a corollary proposition (and therein a d-rule) that "one 
must cultivate a proper sense of humor."  There is an important distinction between 
"develop a sense of humor" and "be ready-witted" in that the latter expresses a moral 
claim in reference to direct virtue concepts while the former does not.  Here, the v-rule 
which is tied to the virtue concept of wit has a non-virtue concept corollary about one's 
sense of humor.  This example helps show how the v-rules' express connection to the 
virtue concepts give rise to moral claims that extend beyond these virtue concepts yet, 
through derivation, remain intimately tied to the virtues themselves.  Here, d-rules can 
emerge as conjuncts with the v-rules and can direct agents to the moral necessities 
entailed by the virtues, virtue concepts, and the v-rules.125   
 In these two ways, both as nested and corollary relationships, the d-rules emerge 
as a source of action guidance which works in conjunction with v-rules.  This 
identification of d-rules, or at least something akin to the d-rules, as operating within the 
schema of v-rules is not a foreign idea to Hursthouse.  Hursthouse expressly notes the 
significance of what she calls "mother's-knee rules."126  These mother's-knee rules, such 
as 'do not lie' and 'keep promises,' provide concrete action guidance for children and are 
                                                           
125 This corollary relationship between wit, on one hand, and one's sense of humor, on the other, can be 
further explored by seeing the additional nested relationships of further d-rules that can be employed to 
not only clarify what qualifies as "a proper sense of humor" but also why one is, obviously, forbidden from 
telling racist jokes.  The corollary relation between wit and humor exists alongside the nested relationship 
of proper humor and a prohibition on racist jokes. 
126 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 39. 
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given to children as a simplistic moral measure in the early stages of moral education.127  
Hursthouse restricts these knee rules to children as their cognitive ability to "grasp 'act 
charitably, honestly, and kindly, don't act unjustly,' and so on" seems quite impossible.  
For these children, these indispensible rules cannot stand alone and their moral 
explanatory power must be tied to moral education built on the virtue concepts.  For 
Hursthouse, "virtue ethicists want to emphasize the fact that, if children are to be taught 
to be honest, they must be taught to love and prize truth, and that merely teaching them 
not to lie will not achieve this end."128  Thus, Hursthouse claims "it is a mistake to define 
a virtuous agent (and therein virtuous action) as simply one disposed to act in accordance 
with deontologist's moral rules.”129 
 While accepting Hursthouse's point about the moral education of children, I 
believe that these so-called knee rules can be expanded beyond the education of children 
and can apply generally to all those actions which agents are instructed regardless of age 
or mental abilities.  It seems that Hursthouse's worry with these knee rules is that, in their 
seemingly deontological form, that they will, by themselves, be used to define right 
action, goodness, and virtuousness.  But this need not be the case.  The d-rules, which 
seem, in form, to be quite similar to the mother's-knee rules, are only given moral 
importance as being derived from the v-rules (and therein the virtues and virtues) or 
acting in conjunction with the v-rules and the virtue concepts.  Agents are not made 
virtuous by merely acting in accord with the d-rules, but the d-rules are adhered to by the 
virtuous agent.  The "indispensability" that Hursthouse identifies in the knee rules is that 
they are connected to the virtue concepts through moral education.  In the same way, the 
                                                           
127 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 38. 
128 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 39 (emphasis in original). 
129 Ibid. 
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d-rules are inherently connected to the virtue concepts through the practical wisdom of 
the virtuous agent.  This is why the d-rules cannot exist outside the moral framework of 
the v-rules and all that this framework entails.  I want to be clear here; I do not believe 
that the d-rules can be removed from the schema of the v-rules and maintain any sensible 
moral content for the virtue ethicist.  This is why the Hursthousian framework which 
begins this chapter is essential.  Were one to simply or merely, to borrow terms from 
Hursthouse, identify d-rules as consistent with the action guidance found in virtue ethics 
and then place them center-stage, they would be removing the moral framework of the 
virtue concepts which act to give these d-rules moral grounding. 
  
Section 3 - Hard and Soft D-Rules 
 
 As of this point, I have argued that the action guidance which v-rules provide 
must be extended to those actions which can, and must, be derived from the virtue 
concepts yet remain unteathered to the virtue concepts embodied in the v-rules.  These 
derived rules, or d-rules, which the v-rules make possible operate in differing ways and 
thus d-rules can be further subdivided into two classes: hard d-rules and soft d-rules. 
 Definitionally, hard d-rules are those d-rules which guide actions without 
flexibility and specifically note what agents are, or are not, to do.   Soft d-rules on the 
other hand are those d-rules which, while providing action guidance, are flexible in their 
implementation and execution and require agents to exercise practical wisdom to 
determine how and when to act.   
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 A parallel can be drawn between hard and soft d-rules and the perfect and 
imperfect duties outlined by Kant.  Kant, following the first formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative (which holds that agents are to "act only according to that maxim 
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law") 
distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties.  Perfect duties are those duties that 
admit no exception and are therefore to be followed in any and all situations.  Imperfect 
duties, while also categorical in nature (as compared to hypothetical), are those duties 
which allow for exceptions and are to be fulfilled by agents to the best of their ability.  To 
see this difference at work, we can look to Kant's four examples.  Kant claims that the 
action of suicide to avoid the unpleasantness of life violates a perfect duty to oneself and 
the perfect nature of this duty means that agents are to, without exception, refrain from 
acts of suicide.130  Charity, or the helping of others, is, on the other hand, an imperfect 
duty such that there are a vast number of exceptions which agents must juggle when 
deciding how and when to help others in need.  The imperfect nature of this duty means 
that agents can, and should, exercise judgment in determining the appropriateness of 
appeals for aid from friends and strangers and agents need not universally capitulate to all 
                                                           
130 Kant does return to the example of suicide in the Metaphysics of Morals (6:422-6:424) and his account 
here seems to muddy this water.  Here, he raises three "casuistical questions."  These questions ask if 
suicide is permissible in the cases of (1) saving one's country, (2) avoiding an impending death sentence 
(as Seneca did), and (3) when one is bit by a rabid dog and contracts hydrophobia (as hydrophobia is an 
incurable disease which erodes one's rationality).   In these cases he leaves open the possibility of taking 
one's life.  On the surface, this appears to contradict his identification of suicide as categorically 
forbidden.  Yet, these cases are, in fact, not cases of suicide.  Actions in which agents take their own life 
can be said to be a genus of action, and suicide is a specific species.  Suicide, for Kant, is (by definition) the 
taking of one's own life for a specific reason; namely to avoid perceived unpleasantness.  Thus, these 
other actions of the voluntary taking one's own life are different in analytical form, and the prohibition on 
suicide does not answer these cases.  Thus, according to John Atwell, Kant's casuistical questions in no 
way undermine the categorical nature of the duty to refrain from suicide as "the respective actions are 
not to be labeled ‘suicides.’”  John E. Atwell, Ends and Principles in Kant’s Moral Thought (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1986), 79.  While Kant's explanation here, or rather the noticeable lack of explanation given by 
Kant, may be unsatisfactory, it does show that Kant's perfect duty concerning suicide is, to his mind, 
exceptionless. 
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cries for assistance.  Agents, in these imperfect cases, are commanded to "help others" (or 
"provide charity"), and therefore cannot universally reject this obligation yet it need not 
be discharged whenever one is approached for aid.  Agents are to use their discretion to 
determine the best way to effect and implement their charity. 
 This difference between perfect and imperfect duties is similar to the distinction 
being introduced here between hard and soft d-rules.  Hard d-rules are those rules which 
obligate agents in a strong sense and admit no exception.  Soft d-rules are those rules 
which must admit exceptions, and it is the practical wisdom of the agent plays a 
significant role in helping determine when and how the agent is to act in accordance with 
the v-rules.   
 Soft d-rules capture many of the ways that the practical path to virtue is, in the 
Aristotelian sense, meant to unfold.  The flexibility, and the latitude to which agents are 
given for implementation, of soft d-rules fulfill the goals of two of Aristotle's most 
important examples in Book II.  The first is the relative nature of the mean as explained 
by the example of Milo the wrestler (1106a5), and the second is the analogy of the bent 
wood in relation to individuals' natural tendencies (1109a30-1109b7).  The practical 
action guidance given to agents concerning temperance, as shown through Milo the 
wrestler, helps show that the quantities of food which one should consume cannot be 
mathematically determined.  Milo must consume more food (or, to update the example 
based on contemporary dietary understandings, more calories) than the novice gymnast 
because his work and life as a wrestler requires this amount of food for the healthy 
functioning of his body in accordance with his life as a wrestler.  Agents, acting under the 
d-rule to "eat properly," (derived from the v-rules to "remain temperate") are all 
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instructed in a similar manner and to the same end but the details of this charge are 
specific to the agent and their particular lifestyles and situations.  In conjunction with the 
example of Milo the wrestler, Aristotle uses the example of straightening bent wood to 
explain how the natural tendencies of individuals vary from person to person and must be 
accounted for in different ways amongst individuals seeking virtue.  For every individual, 
there are natural tendencies which pull them towards different vices and these tendencies 
need to be accounted for when establishing habits for the acquisition of virtue.  Keeping 
with the example of temperance, one individual may see that they are naturally drawn 
towards eating excessive amounts of junk foods or eating in excess for pleasure while 
another individual may not suffer from the same tendency towards over-indulgence and 
may find little to no pleasure at all in eating.  For these two individuals, each must come 
to know their own tendencies.  When establishing proper eating habits each must initially 
err in their consumption past the mean towards that vice which does not come naturally 
to them.  Much like how carpenters must bend wet wood beyond the point of straightness 
for a period of time in order to overcome the warped and bowed nature of the lumber, 
individuals must attune themselves to the naturally bent nature of their individuated 
desires in order to arrive, in the end, at the relative mean.131  Both the bent wood analogy 
and the example of Milo the wrestler indicate the important ways that the practical paths 
to virtue must be, to a degree, individuated and relative to individual pursuits.  It is the 
                                                           
131 Aristotle's example of the bent wood also carries with it a second point.  For Aristotle, natural 
tendencies are both individuated and universal.  This means that there are some natural tendencies 
unique to individuals and other natural tendencies which all people, in virtue of their humanity, possess.  
This second sort of natural tendency, which I have not explained here, simply holds that between the two 
vices related to a specific virtue one is more erroneous.  The more erroneous vice between the two is that 
vice which all people are naturally drawn to and which is harder to escape.  While I only focus on the way 
this example is applied in individual cases, it should be noted that this example has this equally important 
second aspect. 
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flexibility in implementation that guides agents in accordance with soft d-rules.  The soft 
d-rule which guides agents in their eating habits for the acquisition of temperance is 
intentionally flexible.  This flexibility in the d-rule(s) allows agents latitude to encompass 
and accommodate their natural tendencies such that they can act in accordance with the 
v-rule(s) under the specifics of individuated and personal details. 
 Hard d-rules, on the other hand, lack flexibility and the action guidance provided 
by these rules leaves no room for variation between individuals.  In the most obvious 
cases, hard d-rules come in the form of universal prohibitions.  Most will agree that, 
regardless of the moral framework in which one is working, there are many actions (or 
courses of actions) which must be categorically prohibited.  These categorical 
prohibitions, while most often associated with certain juridical moral theories such as 
deontology and divine command theory, are also found in virtue ethics.  Aristotle 
expressly notes the existence of these sort of universal prohibitions.  In the NE, 
immediately after defining moral virtue as operating by the doctrine of the mean and 
elaborating what constitutes the conditions and parameters of 'the mean,' Aristotle notes 
that there are some actions which do not, nor cannot, admit of a mean.  He characterizes 
these actions as morally wrong "however they are done" (1107a24), and notes that it "is 
not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to [these actions]... [as they] must always 
be wrong" (1107a13-14).  For Aristotle, these actions are universally forbidden and, to 
return and borrow the language of Kant, are prohibited without exception.  The specific 
actions listed here by Aristotle are "adultery, theft, [and] murder" (1107a11). Aristotle 
returns to this idea later in the text and reiterates his claims that adultery, theft and 
murder are all categorically prohibited actions and expands this list to include the actions 
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of "poisoning, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness... robbery with violence, 
[and] mutilation" (1131a6-9).  It would seem that this expanding list of universally 
prohibited actions is not presented as an exhaustive or definitive list.  There are many 
actions which virtue ethics must prohibit without exception.   
  To help explain these lists of categorically prohibited actions, Aristotle 
specifically elaborates on the example of adultery.  When one evaluates the act of 
adultery they need not consider whether the act was committed "at the right times, with 
reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the 
right way" (1106b21) as the act itself admits none of these conditions.132   This means 
that the moral wrong found in adultery is not due to choosing the wrong person with 
which to engage in an adulterous affair (such as choosing one married person over 
another to sleep with because one lives closer to you and therefore will require you to 
drive less and therefore contribute less harmful carbon emissions during the course of the 
affair), or engaging in adultery in inappropriate locations (such as in a marital bed as 
compared to a cheap motel), or performing adulterous acts for the sake of nefarious 
motives beyond lust (such as out of spite).  None of these considerations contribute or 
explain the badness of the act of adultery.  The baseness of adultery is in the action itself.  
In this way, Aristotle proclaims adulterous acts to be intrinsically wrong. 
 Corresponding to this account of adultery's intrinsic badness, virtue ethics can be 
said to generate a strong prohibitive d-rule, namely "do not commit adultery," which 
instructs agents how they are to act.  This strong d-rule, as it instructs agents without 
                                                           
132 Aristotle reiterates these criteria for the mean, in various formulations, on a number of occasions (see 
1109a27-28, 1115b16, 1126a6 to name a few).  By the end of Book II, Chapter 5, this list is, to Aristotle's 
mind, adequately repeated enough to warrant a "and so on" after again identifying the "right things [and] 
in the right way" (1126b7).  What this shows is that it should be, by this point in the NE, obvious what 
constitutes the varied conditions of the mean and continued repetition is unnecessary. 
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exception or flexibility, is a hard d-rule.  For each of the acts Aristotle lists as 
categorically prohibited, agents are presented with hard d-rules which demand strict 
exceptionless compliance.  Given Aristotle's list of universally prohibited actions, agents 
are presented with a myriad of hard d-rules which include "do not murder," "do not plot 
or carry-out assassinations," "do not bear false witness," and, "do not engage in acts of 
mutilation."   
 What is noticeably missing from Aristotle's account of universally prohibited 
actions, and therein the source of many of the hard v-rules, is an explanation of why these 
actions must be categorically prohibited.  Aristotle's proclamation that certain actions do 
not admit a mean, and his subsequent analysis of the example of adultery, may sound 
convincing but it, by itself, does not explain why these actions must be categorically 
forbidden.  The examples listed by Aristotle coincide with commonly held beliefs 
regarding the badness of murder, adultery, theft, and assassination but, our willingness to 
acquiesce to these obvious moral maxims does not explain why, for Aristotle, these 
actions are intrinsically wrong. 
 It might appear that Aristotle's claim that these actions "do not admit of a mean" 
is why they cannot be schematized (and therefore evaluated) as part of virtue, but surely 
this cannot be the source of their badness.  Some of the listed actions and feelings given 
here by Aristotle could be said to admit a mean.  A severely egoistic account of virtue 
might justify theft on the grounds that individuals ought to secure goods for themselves at 
all costs, and a system of virtue constructed on notions of the total depravity of human 
beings (as derived from most stringent strands of Calvinist theology) might cast shame as 
a desirable state when moderated with constant atonement.  Accounts of virtue such as 
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these should, I hope, sound unappealing, but their possibility shows that the intrinsic 
badness of these actions and feeling are not a priori and the normative force behind the 
associated hard v-rule requires theoretical structures to motivate our understanding of 
their universal prohibition. 
 Returning, briefly, to Kant, we can see how other moral theories can give 
normative force to similar categorical prohibitions.  Kant's proceduralist structure allows 
for the grounding of differing types of duties and gives normative force to both imperfect 
and perfect duties as different, yet related, failures of law.  For Kant, the failure of 
maxims to conform to "law as such" denies their inclusion within the sphere of 
acceptable actions since voluntary human action must conform to the "form of law itself" 
to be a candidate for human moral decision making (4:402).133  When maxims fail to 
conform to law-like structure, by failing the test outlined in the Universal Law 
Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the actions are normatively prohibited.  
Potential actions, expressed as maxims, can fail this "test" (i.e.: generate contradictions) 
in a multitude of ways and the differences in failures creates differences in types of 
duties.  Kant briefly notes this important distinction after explicitly working through the 
cases of suicide, selfishness, sloth, and lying.  While each of these cases admits a 
contradiction, the nature of their contradictions differ.  In the cases of lying and suicide, 
"[the actions] are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without 
contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become 
such" (4:424, emphasis in original).134  In the cases of sloth and selfishness, the maxims 
can be conceptualized as universal laws but "it is still impossible to will that their maxim 
                                                           
133 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, edited and 
translated by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
134 Ibid. 
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be raised to the universality of a law of nature” (4:424, emphasis in original).135  These 
two types of contractions, being contradictions in the maxim and contradictions in the 
will, generate the two types of duties, perfect and imperfect.136  Contradictions in the 
maxim generate perfect duties and contradictions in the will generate imperfect duties.  
Kant can, using this schema, provide an account of categorical prohibitions which come 
in the form of perfect duties and can do so by employing his procedural account of 
logical consistency.  It is the inability of the maxims to even sensibly be conceptualized 
as universal law which makes them bad and allows for their prohibition in a system 
which demands law-like form. 
 While fine and well for those who are inclined to deontology, such an analysis is 
unavailable to Aristotle and virtue ethicists.  Aristotle cannot rely on a logical testing 
mechanism to motivate his categorical prohibitions as his moral theory is free of such 
proceduralist underpinnings and does not rely on analytic conceptions of law-as-such.  So 
how does Aristotle ground such claims? 
 In Book II, where Aristotle initially discusses these intrinsically bad actions, he 
does not see the need to explain why these actions in particular, or even in general, must 
be forbidden.  These actions are simply decried and it appears that Aristotle believed that 
their intrinsic badness was simply obvious.  This alone does not explain why it is that 
these actions must be categorically prohibited (and therein governed by unwavering hard 
                                                           
135 Ibid. 
136 For a full explanation and schematization of these contradictions see Onora O'Neill's "Consistency in 
Action,” in Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
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d-rules).137  Thus we must look beyond this preliminary account presented in Book II in 
order to find the foundations for the intrinsic badness of these actions. 
 Turning to Book V, Chapter 2, where Aristotle returns to this discussion of 
categorically prohibited action, we can begin to see the roots of his argument.  Here in 
Book V, Aristotle restructures the discussion of these prohibited actions around the 
nature of injustice.  Here Aristotle explores two different ways people can be said to be 
unjust.  In one sense, a person can be said to be unjust when they lack the specific virtue 
of justice.  In this sense, an individual's actions can be called unjust when they are the 
actions which embody the specific vice of injustice qua that which is "contrary to the 
law" (1130a23).  In a second sense, individuals are called unjust when their actions (and 
presumably their character) exhibit "other forms of wickedness" beyond the specific 
virtue of justice (1130a18).  Here, we can call someone unjust in a general sense meaning 
that they are one who lacks virtues of various kinds (beyond merely the virtue of justice) 
and is not, therefore, the virtuous agent.  To illustrate this point, Aristotle (re)turns to 
                                                           
137 While most everyone agrees that adultery is an obvious case of an intrinsic wrong it should be noted 
that there are dissenters from this view.  The most notable is Joseph Fletcher.  See his Situation Ethics: 
The New Morality (Westminster Press, 1966).  Fletcher, as a situation ethicist, argues that there can be no 
universal prohibitions in ethics as all ethical rules have exceptions.  Specifically in reference to adultery, 
Fletcher presents a real-life case of so-called "sacrificial adultery" (p. 164).  The case relates the 
supposedly true story of an imprisoned civilian during World War II named Mrs. Bergmeier.  Bergmeier 
was captured by the Russian Army and, before being able to get word to her family, taken to a prison 
camp in the Ukraine.  Her husband, after being released from a POW camp in Wales, returned to Germany 
and was reunited with his three children.  Mrs. Bergmeier's whereabouts were unknown to her family and 
the family searched in vain to locate her.  Meanwhile, Mrs. Bergmeier learned through a sympathetic 
commandant that her family had been reunited in Berlin but did not know her whereabouts and were in a 
"dire situation of hunger, chaos, and fear" (p. 165).  As per camp rules, prisoners would only be released 
from the camp under two conditions.  The first was in the event of an illness which required medical 
attention beyond the camp's facilities (in which case the prisoner would be transferred to a hospital in 
Russia).  The second case was in the event of pregnancy (in which case the prisoner would be released 
and sent back to Germany as pregnancy was labeled "a liability").  Mrs. Bergmeier convinced a "friendly" 
camp guard to impregnate her, and through the pregnancy was able to secure release from the camp, 
travel back to Germany, and be reunited with her family.  Fletcher concludes this case with two rhetorical 
questions: "Should they [the Bergmeiers] be grateful to the Volga German?" and "Had Mrs. Bergmeier 
done a good and right thing?" (ibid).  For Fletcher, the obvious answer to these questions in an 
unequivocal "yes" and therefore, for Fletcher, this case shows that even adultery has exceptions. 
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adultery.  He claims, "If one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money 
by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses money and is 
penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the 
former is unjust, but not self-indulgent" (1130a24-28).  In this example the adulterous 
acts of the two men relate to different virtues.  The first case of adultery is, as odd as it 
sounds, a failure of liberality.  This man, in his adultery, exhibits unjust "graspy-ness" as 
he is using the adulterous acts (somehow) as an avenue for unjust financial gain.  Clearly 
such attempts violate the "right source" criteria detailed in Aristotle's discussion of 
liberality (1120a32).  The second man's adulterous actions are motivated by self-
indulgence and are not a failure of liberality but a failure of temperance.  It is this second 
case that captures the archetype of the cheating partner as one who is driven by 
uncontrollable lust and sexual desire into seeking sexual gratification beyond the confines 
of their avowed monogamous relationship.  While both men are adulterous, and both are 
unjust, they differ in their moral failures.   
 Drawing from this discussion, we can see that Aristotle's account of adulterous 
actions, while possibly running afoul of many different virtues based upon the feelings, 
desires, and aims of the adulterous agent, will always be base.  The intrinsically bad 
nature of the action of adultery stems from the fact that it will always, and in every 
instance, exhibit a vice and demonstrate the viciousness of the acting agent.  While the 
vice exhibited may vary between agents, the action will always indicate the presence of 
some sort of viciousness.  Moving beyond adultery, similar examples can be found 
surrounding each of the actions Aristotle lists as categorically prohibited.  One many 
murder another for financial gain (and fail miserably and horribly in respect to their 
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liberality) or out of rage (and therefore fail miserably in respect to good-temperedness), 
but both are necessarily vicious.  For each of the actions Aristotle identifies as 
"intrinsically bad," utter and inescapable moral failure must be the result of their 
performance. 
 It is here that we can understand Aristotle's argument for the categorically 
prohibited nature of these actions.  It is not the case that these actions, whose badness 
Aristotle initially claims is indicated by their name alone, are morally condemned by 
either (a) an axiomatic a priori claim, or, (b) by the near universal agreement people 
share that these actions must be obviously immoral.  These actions are prohibited because 
they are, whenever they are performed and under all circumstances, indications of severe 
moral failure (i.e.: viciousness) and must be actions which when undertaken necessarily 
prohibit agents from achieving virtue.  
 This understanding provides not only the necessary moral argumentation to 
support Aristotle's assertions that there are universally prohibited actions, but provides 
the normative force for hard v-rules.  Hard v-rules provide strict action guidance in 
situations where the performance of an act (or a course of action) necessarily results in 
either the inability to acquire virtue or a loss of virtue.  In conjunction with virtue as 
necessary for the achievement of flourishing, we can say that hard d-rules govern those 
things which necessarily act as barriers for the achievement of flourishing. 
 Since hard d-rules govern those things which necessarily prohibit virtue and 
flourishing, we can see how Aristotle's enumerated list of exceptionless actions (or 
inactions) is not exhaustive.  In addition to murder, adultery, et al. it is possible to expand 
this quite minimal list to other actions which, like those listed by Aristotle, are 
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government by hard d-rules.  To Aristotle's list we can add, for example, further 
prohibitions on the sexual abuse of children (expressed in the, obvious, hard d-rule "do 
not interact sexually with children") and use of human slaves ("do not traffic human 
beings").  Like adultery and murder, both the trafficking of humans and the performance 
of sexual acts with children admit no mean, always violates the specific criteria of virtue, 
and always indicates wickedly evil states of character which necessarily prohibits 
flourishing. 
 At this point, it seems wise to pause take stock of what we have and look at how 
the general argument presented here has proceeded.  V-rules, writ large, provide the 
necessary action guidance needed in virtue ethics.  The v-rules are understood and 
clarified though the use of practical wisdom.  While Hursthouse leaves these specifics 
unsystematized (relying on the mechanism of practical wisdom to yield further needed 
details), I have introduced the concept of d-rules to help explain and systematize this 
derivative content.  The d-rules, which are given by the v-rules, range quite widely in 
their flexibility and specificity and can be said to emerge from all aspects of virtue 
theory.  It is into this conception of d-rules that I have introduced the categories of hard 
and soft.  Soft d-rules are those rules which instruct agents with flexibility and latitude 
and which can only find implementation through an agent’s use of practical wisdom to 
determine the details of their dischargement.  Hard d-rules, on the other hand, are those 
rules which guide agents without flexibility and strongly obligate agents to specific 
courses of action without latitude. 
 Of specific interest here is the workings of hard d-rules.  To explain hard d-rules, 
and see how and when they obtain, one can look to the categorically prohibited actions 
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enumerated by Aristotle.  The paradigmatic examples of hard d-rules then become those 
actions which virtue ethics sees as categorically prohibited.  When looking at these 
actions, and understanding why it is that they must be categorically prohibited, we see 
that the performance of these actions (in any and all circumstances) must necessarily 
indicate a vicious character.  Beyond indicating the state of one's character, the presence 
of these actions in one's life denies the possibility of virtuous development.  One cannot 
develop virtue, or be said to be working towards flourishing, with these actions in their 
life.  In this way, virtue ethics differs from other moral theories (such as deontology) in 
its assessment of these sort of actions in that the moral failure found here is a direct result 
of the way these actions necessarily limit the availability of flourishing. It is here that the 
core of the argument is found: virtue ethics must categorically prohibit that which denies 
flourishing.  This categorical prohibition is then expressed as a hard d-rule. 
 While these hard d-rules are easiest to understand in reference to Aristotle's list of 
intrinsically bad acts, they apply more broadly to this moral core of that which 
necessarily prohibits flourishing.  It is here that the discussion of oppression reemerges.  
As shown in chapter two, when the reality of oppression is taken seriously within the 
virtue ethical framework one comes to see oppression as uniquely crippling and harmful 
as it necessarily limits the availability of flourishing for the oppressed.  If hard d-rules 
generate strong prohibitions on those things which limit the availability of virtue or 
flourishing, and oppression acts to limit, if not eliminate, the possibility of flourishing 
and virtue for the oppressed, then virtue ethics must advance strong prohibitions, in the 
form of d-rules, concerning oppression.   
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Section 4 - V-rules, D-rules, Oppression, and Resistance 
 
 The strong rules which virtue ethics generates regarding oppression can be seen as 
emerging in three distinct ways; the first concerns one's ability to oppress others, the 
second concerns the oppression that an individual experiences directly as an oppressed 
person, and the third concerns oppression that is leveled against others where the agent 
experiences no direct first-hand effect of the oppression.  In each of these three ways, the 
d-rule concerning oppression levels strong condemnation against the oppressive force(s) 
and advances a definite schema of action guidance in the face of oppression.  In what 
follows I would like to explore each of the three ways the d-rule concerning oppression 
manifests and chronicle the action guidance that the d-rule prescribes. 
 
A. The Oppression of Others 
 
 Turning first to the most obvious case, we can see that the hard d-rule concerning 
oppression manifests, in the most simple way, as a strong prohibition on the oppression 
others.  As obvious as this sounds, virtue ethics must prohibit the oppression of others as 
actively oppressing others violates, in egregious ways, the ways that we are required to 
treat others.  In short, the hard d-rule concerning the oppression of others manifests as the 
simple dictum, "do not oppress others." 
 While obvious, what is of interest here is the limited scope of this prohibition.  
This hard d-rule concerning the oppression of others cannot be understood as prohibiting 
any and all participation in oppressive systems and structures, as participation in 
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oppression, as either the oppressor or the oppressed, is, for the most part, unchosen.  As 
argued for in chapter one, agents do not choose to be oppressed, and all those who benefit 
from oppression's existence are not voluntary beneficiaries.  The involuntary and 
unearned social and economic benefits of privilege, which manifests through the 
oppression of others, cannot be merely shaken off or denied by the privileged.   Peggy 
McIntosh, in her work on white privilege and male privilege, describes privilege as: 
... an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each 
day, but about which I was "meant" to remain oblivious.  White privilege is like 
an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, 
guides, code-books, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank 
checks.138 
 
 This imagery of the invisible weightless knapsack seems particularly apropos 
here.  Even when one comes to see the privilege they have (be it white privilege, 
heteronormative privilege, class privilege, or male privilege), this knapsack of assets is 
still carried and "cashed in."  Individuals of privileged classes or groups, through their 
actions reinforce the privileges they have been granted.   
 Thus, this first instantiation of the hard d-rule concerning oppression, which 
unwaveringly and steadfastly prohibits the oppression of others, is, in reality, limited in 
its application to those who actively promote, champion, and consciously advance 
oppressive structures and systems, and herein lies the irony.  Those whose actions and 
beliefs violate this moral dictum are precisely those individuals who are unresponsive to 
moral arguments of this nature.  White nationalists, defenders of capitalist exploitation, 
avowed misogynists, and anti-queer activists and politicians all run afoul of this obvious 
                                                           
138 Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See 
Correspondences Through Working In Women’s Studies,” in Race, Class and Gender: an Anthology (Third 
Edition), eds. Margaret L. Andersen and Patricia Hill Collins (Wadsworth Publishing, 1998), 94-95. 
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moral rule yet are exactly the people who are unswayed by moral arguments condemning 
oppression.  Thus, on this first level, the hard d-rule which categorically prohibits one 
from oppressing others is quite limited, as is my treatment of this topic.  The focus of this 
project, and that which is worthy of any time or consideration, is not the actions of the 
unrepentant oppressor, but rather the oppressed who, by this same hard d-rule, are 
instructed and guided towards resistance and liberation. 
  
B.  Resisting Oppression in One's Own Life 
 
 The d-rule concerning oppression manifests as a need for resistance when 
individuals find themselves the victim of oppression and oppressive structures.  
Oppressed individuals, who have their avenues to flourishing limited by oppression, face 
no other viable options than resistance when confronted with their enslavement.  For the 
oppressed not to resist and struggle against the oppression they face, or to acquiesce to 
oppressive forces, is to accept that the highest human good of flourishing and happiness 
are goals that ought not be made available to oneself.  In this way, the oppressed agent 
who simply accepts and submits to their oppression also accepts a withered and 
emaciated view of their personhood.   
 It is in this arena, where one is the direct victim of oppression, that the demands 
of resistance are experienced the strongest.  Virtue ethics instructs agents to engage in 
active struggle against oppression when their flourishing is hindered or prohibited under 
the weight of oppressive structures and forces.  It is the direct experience of oppression 
that makes the need for resistance necessary, and the normative force of the moral 
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imperative for resistance is most clearly experienced by those who are oppressed.  While 
the moral obligation to engage in resistance is most tangible in the experience of the 
oppressed we must be careful not to describe this palpability in the language of "wanting" 
or "desire."  It is all too easy to describe the necessity of resistance as what oppressed 
agents should necessary "want to do" and here we need to be warned against such 
attempts.  Tessman has, excellently, chronicled the heavy costs that accompany a 
commitment to resisting oppression, and these burdens show why the oppressed should 
not see the need for resistance as something they would want to do, all things being 
equal, but rather the appropriate and often regrettable necessity given their experience of 
oppression. 
 Committing one's self to resistance carries with it heavy burdens which cannot be 
brushed aside quickly or accepted without understanding the harmful effects of resisting 
oppression.  One obvious burden that resistance bears is a threat to one's health and, in 
many cases, one's very life.  A commitment to combating oppression will be met with 
vehement opposition and the lengths to which the oppressing class will go to ensure the 
continued existence of the status quo cannot be understated.  Many (like Judi Bari139 and 
Frank Little140) have become the victims of the overt violence used in service of 
                                                           
139 Judi Bari was an American radical who devoted much of her life to labor organizing, feminist 
consciousness raising, and environmental activism.  Bari is most well-known for her work organizing 
direct-action campaigns against timber companies logging the redwood forests of Northern California.  In 
1990, Bari and her Earth First! compatriot Darryl Cherney were victims of a car bomb in Oakland, CA.  
While luckily escaping with their lives, the car bomb planted in their vehicle left Bari in critical condition 
with a shattered pelvis and numerous serious internal injuries.   Bari had long been the source of death 
threats relating to her activism. 
140 Frank Little was a anti-war activist and union organizer who was, during an organizing campaign at a 
copper mine in Butte, Montana in 1917, lynched by Pinkerton agents on behalf of the mine's owners.  
Little was beaten and then dragged from his hotel room to a railroad trestle outside town where he was 
hung.  Pinned to his jacket were the numbers '3-7-77,' which was a common warning sign used by 
vigilante lynch mobs of the period to warn other would-be agitators that similar actions of resistance 
would be met with similar deadly results.  In a disgusting and lasting display of the oppressive violence 
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oppression's defense.  For the oppressed, the need to struggle against oppression can 
carry with it a physical cost which one should not accept lightly. 
 In addition to the threats to one's health and existence that the resistance fighter 
will likey face, the decision to address, head-on, the oppressive structures and forces that 
limits one's flourishing may create prolonged circumstances of emotional and 
psychological harm.  In her treatment of resistance, Tessman pays special attention to the 
emotional burden that resistance carries with it.  The development of, in Tessman's 
words, the "politically resistant self" requires the development of certain otherwise 
harmful and unwanted emotional states.  Tessman recounts, 
I remember discovering how difficult it can be to harden oneself against 
sympathetic responses to an oppressor, a discovery that was tied to my reading for 
the first time Alexander Berkman's account of his attempt to assassinate Henry 
Frick during the Homestead strike against Carnegie Steel in 1892.141  Upon 
reading the details of the attempted assassination, I chastised myself for 
involuntarily cringing in pain - as a sympathetic response on behalf of Frick, who 
was injured but not killed and whose fear, as described by Berkman, made me 
want to comfort rather than attack him - a response that, at the time, I believed 
diminished my capacity to act as a true resister, for Frick was clearly one of the 
"bad guys."142 
 
 For many, including Tessman at this time, the revolutionary attitude developed by 
those committed to resisting oppression may call for the abandonment of certain 
emotional disposition that many might be rightly reluctant to jettison.  The resistance 
fighter must cultivate a level of emotional detachment towards their oppressors and this 
seems to undercut the otherwise moral goods of sympathy, empathy, and kindness.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
used against Little and other union organizers of the time, these numbers, as a signal of the quite real 
threat of continued lynchings, are, to this day, proudly emblazoned on the uniforms of all Montana State 
Troopers.   
141 Henry Frick was an American industrialist and the chairman of Carnegie Steel.  Frick, well-known for 
this anti-union actions and his belief that unionists ought to be outright killed, orchestrated the murder of 
nine striking steel workers during the Homestead Strike of 1892.   
142 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 116. 
131 
 
Resistance, and the fortitude and commitment that active resistance requires, seems to 
stand at odds with the emotional and psychological development which virtue ethics 
insists are central to the moral project of life.  For Tessman, the resistance fighter might 
come to resent the person that they become once they embrace a commitment to combat 
oppression. 
 Worries about this emotional and psychological burden are perfectly natural and 
the moral worries here are especially troublesome to the virtue ethicist.  The costs that 
Tessman chronicles which the resisting agent must bear are quite real, but I do believe 
these burdens need to be contextualized.  First, it is essential to see that the moral harms 
of becoming a "politically resistant self" cannot be weighed against a fictionalized self 
where emotional and psychological are otherwise nonexistent.  It is not the case that the 
burdens of resistance can be considered against the possibility of a state where one can 
avoid emotional and psychological burdens.  For the oppressed agent who embraces the 
need engage in resistance, and understands that this commitment may carry with it 
significant moral baggage, does so under the already existent burdens of oppression.  The 
oppressed agent is obligated to resistance by the harmful effects of oppression and 
therefore is not being asked to accept the harmful effects of resistance over a possible 
state in which these harms fails to exist.  Secondly, it might seem that the emotional and 
psychological burdens of resistance would lead to a cascading effect where the 
cultivation of the politically resistant self leads an agent to experience a lack of 
sympathy, empathy, or kindness to those they should love.  While a very legitimate 
worry, and a potential harm that the resisting agent must understand, I see no reason that 
this slippery slope argument necessarily ends in complete moral ruin.  The resisting 
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agent, like all agents, must properly cultivate their emotional responses and in no way 
does becoming the politically resistant self demand that agents dive headlong into 
emotional commitments without concern for their effects on others.  In fact, becoming 
the politically resistant self demands that the resistor be constantly mindful of these 
potential harms and work to keep these harms at bay.   
 In the end, Tessman's strong worries about the burdens of resistance remain, 
although these worries must be understood against the backdrop of oppression's harms.  
This then returns us back to the warning of expressing the normative force of the d-rule 
regarding resistance as a form of "wanting."  To describe this impulse as a "desire" or a 
"want" runs the risk of white-washing the tremendous harms and costs that becoming a 
political resister carries with it.  Failing to see the heavy moral burdens that resistance 
entails means that the gleeful activist, or the person who enters the life of political 
resistance with reckless abandon and a willful spirit, must be either acting in ignorance, 
or merely play-acting the revolutionary spirit.  For Tessman, these weighty moral burdens 
ought to yield a politically resisting agent that sees that "there is no glory in resistance to 
injustice, just a sad and regretful recognition of its necessity."143 
 
C.  Resisting the Oppression of Others 
 
 On what ground can we be said to have an obligation to engage in active 
resistance when it is not ourselves who are oppressed but others?  While the need to resist 
oppression in our own lives can be grounded in the need to struggle against those barriers 
which deny our ability to flourish, the need to engage in active resistance struggles on 
                                                           
143 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 131. 
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behalf of others who are oppressed is not so clear.  While doing so seems quite noble, 
engaging in such actions might seem to verge on the supererogatory as the harms being 
perpetrated in the lives of others do not, in principle, limit our ability to flourish.  After 
all, the achievement of virtue is a demanding task and requiring one to struggle on behalf 
of others and their attempts to flourish only increases the demandingness of the moral 
life. 
 This query takes us headlong into the question of virtue ethics' perceived self-
centeredness.  Thomas Nagel charges that Aristotelian virtue ethics "is wrong" because it 
fails to account for the way that "moral requirements have their source in the claims of 
other persons" and these "moral claims cannot be strictly limited by their capacity to be 
accommodated within a good individual life."144  In a similar vein, David Solomon 
summarizes the self-centeredness objection when he writes: 
The thought behind such claims seems to be that for classical virtue theorists, it is 
rational for an agent to acquire the virtues only insofar as it is a good for that 
agent that he or she acquire them. But if the rationality of virtue acquisition is thus 
grounded in the needs of the agent, so the argument goes, the needs, wants, and 
desires of others have, from the point of view of morality, an insufficiently 
prominent status.145 
 
 Such arguments will not sound unfamiliar to defenders of virtue ethics.  While the 
claim that Aristotelian virtue ethics is egoistic is patently false (and overtly dismissed by 
Aristotle), Aristotelian virtue ethics does rely upon on the properly understood concept of 
'self-love.'  It is this reliance on self-love, as the love of the virtue that one possesses, that 
might lead some to believe that resisting on behalf of others must take a backseat to an 
individual's pursuit of the virtuous life.  According to this view, while agents must resist 
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oppression in their lives as it limits their flourishing, the oppression of others becomes 
only a secondary moral possibility and only rises to the level of moral concern when the 
oppression of others effects oneself.  It is this view I reject, and it will be argued that our 
obligation to engage in resistance struggles against oppression ought to occur whenever 
oppression is present; be that in our own lives or in the lives of others. 
 Let us turn first to Aristotle's rejection of radical self-centeredness, as it is through 
this argument that one can see how the ethical demands of resistance obligate agents 
when others are oppressed.  Aristotle's conception of self-love, and therein his rejection 
of egoism, is developed in his account of friendship in Book IX.  Here, Aristotle 
distinguishes between two types of self-lovers.  The first is the self-lover as understood 
colloquially.  This self-loving agent is one who "assign[s] to themselves the greater share 
of wealth, honor, and bodily pleasures" and does so because money, social esteem, and 
pleasure are what they "desire most" and what they consider to be "the best of all things" 
(1168b15-19).  While called commonly called a self-lover, Aristotle openly criticizes this 
ultimately self-serving person as viciously graspy.  For Aristotle, these people are those 
"who are grasping with regard to these things [in order to] gratify their appetites and in 
general their feelings and the irrational element of the soul" (1168b19-22).  For Aristotle, 
these self-seeking agents are lovers of self in a way that is reproachful and blameworthy.  
While Aristotle criticizes this common-place understanding of self-love, he certainly 
maintains that proper self-love is central to an understanding of virtue.  The second type 
of self-lover described by Aristotle is "most truly a lover of self, of another type" 
(1169a4-5).  This self-lover acts for the sake of her friends and her country, even going so 
far as sacrificing her life if necessary (1169a19).  Further, this self-lover willingly 
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jettisons wealth, goods, and even social standing in order to gain nobility and do what is 
fine (1169a21).  Here, the self-lover is not wedded to merely accumulating these goods as 
perceived ends in themselves but rather understands that these goods can be won and lost 
in service of true happiness and moral goodness.  Here, the self-lover seeks that which is 
truly good and it is this agent, motivated by virtue, that we must see as a true self-lover as 
they work, sometimes even to their temporary detriment, in service of virtue.  Aristotle 
concludes this picture of 'proper self-love' by saying "In this sense, then, as has been said, 
a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men are so, he ought not" 
(1169a1-2).   
 While Aristotle's outright rejection of egoism denies that the self-love found in 
the virtuous life must be seem as some form of "other-disregarding" (as advanced by 
certain noxious strands of neo-Randian "virtue" ethics), it also seems that it might 
advance a picture of virtue which ultimately privileges one's own pursuits over the 
pursuits of others.  Christopher Toner summarizes this view as the belief that "concern 
for others can seen secondary to or conditional upon achieving one's own central goals 
[for virtue and flourishing]."146  Here it might be tempting to advance an argument 
regarding oppression along the following lines: when others are oppressed the damage 
done to their character comes to effect non-oppressed individuals such that the oppression 
indirectly affects the availability to flourish even when one is not the direct victim of 
oppression.  An argument such as this makes the oppression of others the indirect 
problem of the non-oppressed.  Their oppression comes to affect me, and therefore their 
oppression is of direct moral concern to me and my purist of flourishing.  While 
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capturing Aristotle's claims that others, like goods, are instrumentally necessary for the 
achievement of the good life (1155a5-30), an argument such as this cannot ultimately 
cannot ground our obligation to resist oppression when the oppression is found in the 
lives of others as it too fails to properly account for the Aristotelian conception of self-
love. 
 To see the full scope of Aristotle's account of self-love one must see that this 
specific argument defending self-love comes as a lynch-pin of sorts in a longer protracted 
argument presented in his account of friendship.  To trace the roots of Aristotle's 
argument for self-love, we must turn back to the outset of Book VIII.  Here, Aristotle 
identifies "the objects of love."  It is from the objects of love that Aristotle's schema for 
friendship emerges, and it is from his views on friendship that self-love emerges and does 
so as a paradoxical form of friendship.  It is only by taking stock of this entire 
argumentative chain, that we can see how and why the virtuous self-lover cannot 
compartmentalize their response to oppression into delineated categories of 'self' and 
'other.' 
 Aristotle identifies three rough categories of loved objects; the useful, the 
pleasant, and the good (1155b18).   Agents may love something do to its ability to 
achieve goals (and are therefore loved due to their relative utility), or due to the way an 
object causes pleasure for the agent, or because something is, itself, good.  When we love 
others, and find these object of love in persons, we delineate these relationships as 
corresponding types of friendships.  Thus, when agents love the usefulness of another 
they engage in a friendship of utility, when agents take pleasure from another they 
engage in friendships of pleasure, and when agents find goodness in another they partake 
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in the complete friendship.  In this way, friendships identify the domain where the object 
of love relates to persons. 
 After denying that friendship is merely manifest goodwill (Book IX, Chapter 5) or 
simple concord/unanimity (Book IX, Chapter 6), Aristotle raises a seeming paradox that 
emerges from his account of the complete friendship (Book IX, Chapter 8).  Here, it 
appears that his conception of the friendship between two virtuous persons (i.e. the 
complete friendship) oddly necessitates that virtuous agents to forsake their friendships 
for the sake of their own self-love.  This odd argumentative consequence can be called 
"the paradox of the complete friendship."  The paradox is as follows.  
1. A complete friendship requires motivational displacement.  (In a complete 
friendship, the individuals in the friendship love each other for reasons beyond 
usefulness or pleasure.) 
2. Between all the friendships that one has, the one that should be most loved is the 
best friendship with the best friend.  ("One ought to love best one's best friend" 
(1168b1).) 
3. What marks a friend as a best friend is "one who wishes well to the object of his 
wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it" (1168b2).  (A best friend is, in 
Irwin's words, the "friend who is most a friend.") 
4. Oddly enough, "all of these marks [of a best friendship] will be found most in a 
[person's] relation to [themselves]" (1168b8). 
5. Therefore, "[one] is [their] own best friend and therefore ought to love [them]self 
the most" (1168b9). 
 It is the conclusion (5) which generates the paradox and the contradiction.  It is 
only through truly loving the goodness of another that virtuous friendship can be 
described, yet this same mechanism leaves the virtuous agent ultimately loving herself 
above all else.  The paradox rests upon premise (1) (requiring motivational displacement 
in complete friendships) being in contradiction with the conclusion drawn in premise (5).  
One cannot, after all, be motivationally displaced for themselves.   
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 It is in response to this apparent paradox that Aristotle's discussion of self-love 
emerges.  Aristotle's answer to this seemingly difficult problem accepts the principle of 
self-love yet reinterprets self-love in a way which is compatible with motivational 
displacement.  The properly self-loving agent does not love themselves as virtuous, but 
rather loves the virtue they possess.  The only type of self-love that yields a contradiction 
in such an argument is that of the egoist, and thus, as noted above, Aristotle dismisses 
and chides the egoist as being wedded to a conception of self-love which "is a bad one" 
(1168b23).  The self-love of the virtuous agent, when understood in the above mentioned 
way, allows agents to maintain motivational displacement in that they are motivated not 
by self gain but for goodness itself.  The virtuous agent is motivated by goodness itself, 
whether it be found in herself or in the person of another.  This conclusion harks back to 
the beginning of Book VIII where Aristotle identifies the objects of love.  That which is 
loved by the virtuous agent is goodness itself.   
 Aside from clarifying the role of self-love in Aristotle's ethics, this allows us to 
grasp the nature of the obligation to resist oppression when oppression is found in the 
lives of others.  If oppression is a barrier to flourishing, virtue, and goodness, and the 
virtuous person loves the good itself (and draws motivation from this love), then the good 
person must detest prohibitions of goodness qua goodness itself.  The virtuous agent's 
love of goodness does not distinguish between the goodness of one's self and the 
goodness of others, and further draws no sharp divide between restrictions on goodness 
whether in their own life or in the lives of others.  When one properly experiences self-
love, as the virtuous agent does, they do not love their virtue, but rather virtue.  The 
virtuous agent does not covet their flourishing, but loves flourishing.  Thus, oppression's 
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harms, as barriers to flourishing, are targeted by the virtuous agent as an obstacle to the 
good in itself.  For one to accept the oppression of others, or sharply delineate this as 
distinct from their love of the good, is to fail in the love of goodness itself.  In the face of 
oppression, the virtuous agent's love of goodness, as achieved in flourishing, cannot be 
restrained or compartmentalized without leaving said agent loving only some goodness; 
namely the goodness fortunately available to them.  Thus, the virtuous agent must 
respond to all oppression with acts resistance and must develop a continued commitment 
to combating oppression and its harmful effects regardless of who is directly affected by 
these harms. 
 
Section 5 - Conclusion 
 
This chapter works to establish the obligatory nature of resistance to oppression as 
understood by virtue ethics.  To this end, the chapter began with Hursthouse’s conception 
of the v-rules, as it is in the v-rules that one can find the groundwork for virtue’s schema 
for action guidance.  While the v-rules work to outline the general course of action agents 
must follow in order to acquire the virtues, they actively leave much of the actual 
concrete action determination up to the practical wisdom of the agent.  It was argued here 
that the v-rules entail a vast set of entailed claims, which diverge from the virtue concepts 
of the v-rules, and these claims can be further schematized into a system of d-rules.  The 
d-rules further guide agents in the process of action determination and can be subdivided 
into the categories of hard and soft.  The soft d-rules, mirroring Kant’s imperfect duties, 
guide agents with flexibility and latitude, while the hard d-rules guide agents in 
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exceptionless cases which relate to those things which necessarily prohibit flourishing.  
Drawing from Aristotle’s understanding of categorically prohibited actions, the hard d-
rules present as strong obligations.   
 With an understanding of the v-rules and d-rules in place, an understanding of our 
response to oppression begins to emerge.  As shown in chapter two, oppression acts as a 
barrier to flourishing and the existence of the d-rules helps ground the obligations one is 
under to engage in resistance struggles.  In the most obvious case, these d-rules obligate 
agents to resistance action when they are the direct victims of oppression.  But drawing 
from Aristotle’s understanding of self-love and friendship, one sees that agents are 
equally under the demand of resistance when they are not the direct victim of oppression. 
In general it was argued here that the existence of oppression (and the reality of 
oppression’s influence), in conjunction with the d-rules that emerge from virtue ethics’ 
schema for action guidance, demands that agents become what Tessman calls “the 
politically resistant self” and actively engage in resistance struggles. 
 The resistance which this chapter establishes as morally necessary still, to this 
point, lacks refined definition and has only been established in broad and general terms.  
The next chapter seeks to deepen this understanding, and works to give content and 
direction to the practicality of resistance actions, struggles, and movements. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
GIVING CONTENT TO RESISTANCE 
 
 
 
 To this point we have shown that oppression harms agents in that it acts to limit, 
or even eliminate, possible avenues to flourishing.  Virtue ethics requires agents to resist 
these harms and work towards combating oppression by engaging in liberatory struggles 
against oppressive forces.  While it has been established that agents are called to engage 
in resistance to oppression, the content of resistance and the determination of the 
specifics of resistance such that our obligations can be discharged has been, to this point, 
left largely unspecified.  It is the stated aim of this chapter to provide a framework for the 
practical determination of resistance. 
 It will be argued here that we cannot reduce the moral demands of resistance to 
merely the formulation and cultivation of an attitude (or disposition) of resistance.  While 
the cultivation of the revolutionary attitude is necessary for engaging in resistance 
movements, the obligations placed on agents in light of oppression mandates that agents 
move beyond dispositional states and into engaging in resistance actions.   
 To understand what, specifically, agents are called to do as part of our 
revolutionary obligations an organizing model will be deployed to help aide in 
determining the specifics of action guidance.  The model of action determination used 
here, drawn from the practical world of activism and organizing, provides the necessary 
tools for determining what we must do, and this discussion leads directly to questions 
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about the value of efficacy in resistance actions, the role of violence in political and 
social movements, and the seemingly high demands placed on agents.  
 
Section 1 - The Revolutionary Attitude  
 
 The resistance actions and movements which virtue ethics requires cannot be 
limited to the development of contrarian attitudes or dispositional states.  Critics of virtue 
ethics might assume that the only guidance that virtue theory can mount in response to 
systematic oppression is a series of vague requirements which ask agents to develop 
certain intellectual or emotional capacities which would allow them to understand and 
then judge (properly) their experience of oppression with moral outrage.  Here, one might 
assume that virtue ethics would emphasize the cultivation of a disposition over required 
actions.  Yet, this is not the case.  While it is essential that individuals develop a 
revolutionary attitude and habituate themselves to not only understand but also abhor the 
oppression manifest in the world, this attitudinal development cannot, in-and-of-itself, be 
said to discharge our moral responsibilities.  The reason for this is that the cultivation of 
such an attitude does nothing, by itself, towards elevating the harmful effects of 
oppression or making available avenues to flourishing which were previously unavailable 
to the oppressed. 
 This is not to say that the development of such an attitude or disposition is not 
important.  In fact, the development of a revolutionary consciousness seems indispensible 
as a precondition for revolutionary struggle.  For individuals to begin, either individually 
or collectively, to mount a movement of resistance to oppression agents must first 
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cultivate the necessary emotional and intellectual capacities of a revolutionary attitude.  
This revolutionary attitude includes both the development of reflective willingness and an 
important shift in epistemic positioning. 
 On the first front, agents must develop a sense of reflective willingness.  The 
oppressed must cultivate the ability to reflect on their experiences of oppression and 
come to understand the oppressive forces that operate in their lives.  The immediate 
response to instances of oppression might be either momentary, and often emotional, 
outbursts of lashing out, or the assumption that such incidents are merely a matter of 
unlucky circumstances or disconnected events.  The unreflective agent, or the agent who 
has not cultivated a sense of reflection and thoughtful awareness, would lack the 
necessary tools for adequately understanding that which acts to oppress them.  Take for 
example the countless individuals who have been the victims of Sheriff Joe Arpaio's 
unjust racial profiling in Arizona.147  Victims of Arpaio's systematic racial abuses, who 
lack critical reflection, could perceive these actions either (a) just the isolated actions of a 
rouge police officer (rather than the manifestation of racists policies and a pattern of 
racial injustice), or, (b) an offence which must be met head-on, in the moment, with a 
direct outburst of emotion.  The reflective agent, or the agent who has cultivated an 
ability and willingness to reflect on instances of oppression’s manifestation, can come to 
understand their experience(s) as both part of an overlapping pattern of racism and also a 
systematic offence that cannot be combated in singular outbursts.  The revolutionary 
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disposition is able to understand such instances and is also disposed to accurately judge 
these infractions as unjust, unfair, and wrong while at the same time gauge what 
response(s) is warranted.  The cultivation of such an attitudinal disposition, in both its 
emotional and intellectual capacities, must be developed by the oppressed and the classic 
framework of virtue ethics explains how such a cultivation of character is possible. 
 In addition to reflective willingness, the revolutionary attitude which must be 
developed in the oppressed also requires the cultivation a certain type of epistemic 
positioning.  Oppressed agents must learn to come to see the oppression they experience 
as interconnected to the oppression experienced in the lives of others.  The oppressed are 
uniquely able to understand the oppression leveled against them as a matter of direct 
perception, yet coming to understand the way oppression manifests in the lives and 
experiences of others is a different matter all together.  Here, agents must come to 
position themselves as willing to learn from the experiences of others and must be willing 
to take accounts of these experiences as epistemically privileged.   Here, the 
revolutionary spirit called for by virtue ethics must accept the insights of feminism on 
epistemically privileged positions.148  The revolutionary man cannot directly experience 
the ways oppression manifests, as sexism and patriarchy, in the lives of oppressed 
women.  And women cannot directly experience how sexist gender norms manifest in the 
lives of transgendered women.  In each case, the oppressed must cultivate a receptive 
willingness to hear the voices of other oppressed people and take these experiences as 
privileged experiences of oppression.  Here I am reminded of the countess accounts of 
activists and revolutionaries who have failed to cultivate such an epistemic disposition.  
During the rise, and subsequent decline, of the so-called New Left, many American 
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radicals, influenced by Marx, Lenin, and Mao, failed to incorporate the experiences of 
women in the movement, often choosing to dismiss their experiences of sexism and 
sexual oppression (coming both from outside and within, the movement) as either 
unimportant or merely secondary to the primary struggle against the oppressive nature of 
capitalism.  Women's experiences of oppression were subdued under the interest of the 
oppressed worker and the oppression of women was "explained away" as merely a 
subordinate form of capitalist exploitation.  Here, movement leaders and organizers (most 
often men) failed to epistemically position themselves in such a way as to make their 
female comrades legitimate and equal partners in the struggle to both understand and also 
combat oppression.  In a way similar to the development of reflective willingness, the 
framework of continual habituation and constant cultivation found in virtue ethics 
instructs agents as to the practical path(s) to such an attitudinal cultivation. 
 While the cultivation of such a revolutionary attitude or disposition, with which 
one can both experience and judge oppression correctly, is of the utmost importance, it 
alone cannot be said to discharge our responsibilities in the face of oppression.  Agents 
who are able to develop such an attitudinal disposition (or at least undertake the project 
of the development of such a revolutionary disposition), yet fail to employ this 
disposition of character in resistance movements or actions cannot be said to be engaging 
in the required project of resistance.  The harms that oppression levels against the 
oppressed, as chronicled in chapter two, are not merely intellectual or dispositional harms 
and thus the cultivation of a revolutionary spirit alone cannot be said to combat the harms 
that make resistance necessary.   This revolutionary disposition must be put into action, 
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and must actively engage in a revolutionary movement which, though it's collective 
effort, dismantles the existing apparatuses of oppression. 
 Claims such as these, that the cultivation of the proper attitudes is insufficient to 
discharge our moral responsibilities when facing oppression, stand in stark contrast to the 
beliefs of empowerment theorists.  To the empowerment theorist, disaffected agents 
commit themselves to transforming themselves (or others) from a psychological state of 
disempowerment to "a cognitive sate characterized by a sense of perceived control, 
competence, and goal internalization."149  The goal of empowerment theories is the 
"transformation of attitudes and beliefs."150  While most academic empowerment 
theorists work in sectors relating to business/employee management (where they seek 
"empowered" employees for optimal business performance), ideas akin to empowerment 
theory are also found in some so-called activist circles.  Here, well-intentioned activists 
see empowerment (as marked by positive psychological states or attitudes) as the goal of 
social and political action.  For these activists, consciousness-raising actions are 
undertaken for the purpose of cultivating empowered attitudes and this experience of 
psychological transformation stands as the final goal of social justice action.  To 
individuals such as these the claims being made here, that attitudinal transformation (or 
the development of certain positive dispositional states) cannot be said to satisfy our 
obligations in a world of oppression, will sound backwards and wrongheaded.  For such 
individuals, the goal of consciousness-raising actions is to, literally, raise consciousness 
(or empower the previously disempowered).    
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 The claim that attitudinal shifts and the development of a revolutionary attitude 
alone cannot satisfy the demands placed on agents should be welcomed by both Marxists 
and existentialists as both Marx and Sartre forwarded important conceptions of shifting 
consciousnesses in the face of oppression.  Marx spoke of this important attitudinal shift 
as the development of class consciousness and Sartre extolled the importance of 
authenticity and the struggle against bad faith.  While Marx and Sartre differed widely in 
their conceptions of attitudinal transformation, both held that shifting psychological and 
emotional states served as necessary means for the larger struggle to combat and, 
ultimately, destroy oppressive structures.  And this is the conception of the revolutionary 
spirit being advanced here; attitudinal transformation acts not as an end-in-itself but 
rather the necessary catalyst for the moral work of resistance.   
 If it is oppression's inherent harms that make flourishing impossible for the 
oppressed (and therefore creates the moral mandate for resistance), then it is at these 
harms, along with the practical mechanisms which level these harms, that resistance must 
be directed.  While some of the harms inflicted by oppression are emotional and 
psychological in nature, these harms cannot be reduced to merely "internal" states which 
can be solved merely by transforming an agent's dispositions.  Thus, virtue ethics, in its 
demands that we meet oppression head-on, cannot be reduced to an obligation to cultivate 
a disposition and must focus upon action determination.  The resistance necessitated by 
virtue ethics must function to directly and purposefully attack and dismantle the 
apparatuses of oppression which make avenues to flourishing impossible for the 
oppressed.  It is only though acting to dismantle oppression's mechanisms that oppressed 
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people are able to pursue the human good of flourishing and the moral life described by 
virtue ethics.   
 While the v-rules, and the subsequent d-rules, of virtue ethics provides an avenue 
for action determination, the determination of revolutionary action in service of 
revolutionary ends seems quite difficult to ascertain.   While the v-rules can imbue us 
with moral rules rooted in, and focused on, the development (and maintenance) of the 
virtues, and while the d-rules can be derived and deployed to help us understand the 
actions needed to fulfill the v-rules, the path to moral resistance remains somewhat 
unclear and abstract.  Fortunately, paths to revolutionary action have been explored and 
schemas exist which can aid us in this effort.  Interestingly, these schemas for specific 
action determination have been developed and deployed from sources outside academic 
circles, outside the confines of academic writing and journals, and outside the 
frameworks of virtue ethics.  These sources for strategic revolutionary action, founded 
and developed by activists, unionists, and revolutionaries, need to be brought into 
philosophical and academic discussions of moral resistance.  Bringing these methods into 
conversation with the academic discourse of oppression can help transform often highly 
theoretical and abstract calls for "moral resistance" into measured and practical resistance 
movements. 
  
Section 2 - A Practical Understanding of Resistance Actions 
 
But what specific actions fulfill the demands of resistance as mandated by virtue 
ethics?  If the picture of resistance advanced by virtue ethics requires agents to act in 
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ways beyond attitudinal and dispositional development, and requires agents to actively 
engage in resistance struggles, we are left having specify what exactly agents are required 
to do.  To begin to understand what agents are obligated to do in becoming resisters we 
must see that our resistance to oppression must be as varied and diverse as the oppression 
which it fights.  Because oppression manifests in widely different, and overlapping, ways 
it seems impossible to enumerate a fixed and static list of moral responses.  The dynamic 
nature of oppression means that we cannot simply enumerate such a list of resistance 
actions but rather we need specific and elaborated tools which can be used by the 
resistance fighter in specific circumstances to generate the required actions which can 
combat dynamic oppression.   As activists and revolutionaries, who resist the existence 
and effects of oppression in all its varied forms, we must not rely on a prefabricated 
inventory of resistance actions but rather understand resistance as dynamic, and be 
prepared to provide appropriate and individuated responses to pressing evils.  What is 
called for here is a mechanism for understanding and generating practical and 
implementable actions to be used by the moral resistance fighter.  Fortunately, such 
mechanisms already exist. 
The practical mechanism for understanding and generating revolutionary action 
beings with important terminological and taxological distinctions.  Of central importance 
are the terms "issue," "goal," "strategy," and "tactic."  These terms carry a wide array of 
meanings and are often used in a myriad of ways, yet, to the resister, they are technical 
terms and need to be understood as such.  The interconnected nature of these technical 
terms, when understood schematically, provides the minimal tools needed for 
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determining the reality of resistance actions.  Here, these terms will be outlined and 
defined. 
All revolutionary movements begin with an issue.  An issue is, simply, that 
problem or obstacle which needs to be changed, altered, or addressed.  Issues are 
presented to activists and revolutionaries as being vague and broad.  In many ways, the 
issue is the large-scale obstacle which revolutionary attention is to be paid.  When an 
issue is clarified through investigation, conversation, and explanation it becomes a 'goal.'  
This clarification of an issue into a goal is constrained and elucidated by the use of a set 
of five criteria, captured by the acronym SMART.151  Here, SMART stands for: 
'Specific' - Something is 'specific' when it is understood without ambiguity and 
with clear delineation. 
 
'Measurable' - Something is 'measurable' when it contains enumerated conditions 
for calculating success criteria in specific amounts of quantity and/or quality. 
 
'Activating' - Something is 'activating' when the undertaken 
activity/campaign/action will energize current participants as well as motivate 
other individuals to becoming actively involved. 
 
'Realistic' - Something is 'realistic' when the outcome sought can feasibly be 
achieved by the people currently involved with the action/campaign/activity.   
 
'Tangible' - Something is 'tangible' when the change sought will make a marked 
and real difference in the lives of those affected. 
 
 When the SMART criteria are applied to an issue, a goal emerges.  A goal, which 
is derived directly from an issue, is the clearly defined change that activists and 
revolutionaries will accomplish.  What distinguishes a goal from an issue is that an issue 
can be vague and unclear while goals are strictly delineated, measured, and have 
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achievable outcomes (ensured by the satisfaction of the SMART criteria).  For example, 
while "ending environmental destruction" is a noble end and a wishful dream it fails in all 
conceivable ways to be a goal as it is unrealistic, there are no defined measurable criteria 
for determining the success of such a campaign, and is utterly unspecific.  On the other 
hand, "stopping the Pacific Lumber Company from clear-cutting any of the old-growth 
trees in Humboldt County" represents a SMART goal.  Here, the goal has gained 
specificity, will have a tangible results, and the involved activists can measure the 
success of the campaign (as, in this overly simplified example, the loss of "not any" old-
growth tree can be measured). 
 A SMART goal connects directly to 'strategy.'  Strategy defines the form of 
campaign or struggle that will be waged to achieve the goal.  To achieve SMART goals 
agents may wage legal campaigns (where the legal system is used as a weapon), publicity 
campaigns (where public perception is used as a weapon), or commercial campaigns 
(where the buying, or not buying, of products is used as a weapon), to name just a few.  A 
campaign's strategy, which too is subject to SMART evaluation, will justify the form of 
struggle that will be embarked upon.  The determination of strategy must be specifically 
determined in light of the most effective and realistic way to achieve the goal.   
 Strategy connects, in the end, to 'tactics.'  Tactics are the specific actions agents 
will perform as part of a strategy (or strategic plan) in order to achieve the goal.  Tactics 
can range from tree-spiking to the production and distribution of literature.  It is the 
strategy which determines and informs which tactics agents must perform.  If, for 
example, activists are engaged in a legal campaign then civil-disobedience (and 
subsequent legal entanglement) might be a tactic employed whereas a protest, as a tactic, 
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would be dismissed as the strategic plan is not one which hinges upon publicity or public 
perceptions.  Just as in the determination of goals and strategy, tactics are subject to the 
SMART criteria.152   
 To help illustrate the interplay between these concepts I believe that it is useful to 
consider an example.  Thus, let us consider the following fictitious scenario:    
 LGBTQ students and faculty at a liberal arts college see that their community is 
marginalized within the university community as a whole and there exists an alarming 
lack of resources at their university to be used for combating this marginalization and 
supporting members of the LGBTQ community.  First and foremost, these activists are 
struck with the issue: their marginalized status and the harm that comes from this 
marginalization.  Though interactions with each other they come to the realization that 
something needs to be done and thus formulate a goal.  Their goal cannot be "to stop 
homophobia" or to "make the university more queer friendly" as these vague, idealistic, 
and unmeasurable goals lack SMART criteria.   So the students and faculty determine a 
specific goal; the establishment of an LGBT resource center on their campus by the end 
of the upcoming academic year.  With this SMART goal in mind, they then can formulate 
a strategy and determine how best to achieve this goal.  These activists determine that the 
university has available funds for the establishment of such a resource center and need to 
be convinced of its importance and viability.  Thus, these activists opt choose 
strategically to wage a corporate campaign.  Here, activists reach out to other universities 
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where LGBT resource centers exist and, with their help, draft a proposed budget for the 
center to be delivered to the university.  Activists create a "target map" to determine 
which individual, or individuals, in the university administration are able to approve such 
a resource center.  It serves these organizers no good to petition someone who cannot 
deliver the goods, and these activists learn who, specifically, can approve their request.  
Activists attend board meetings, or meetings where decisions such as this would originate 
or be approved, where they present their proposal.  Activists also gather narratives of 
students and faculty describing how the center would positively impact their lives on 
campus and deliver these proposals to the proper university.   
 In this example, we can see that any specific tactic which is used is derived from 
strategically analyzing the goal in light of the issue at hand.  These activists, using this 
organizing model, are able to set achievable goals, employ useful and strategic tactics, 
and continually act to strategically achieve their goal.    
 There are three important strengths to understanding this model of resistance 
determination.  The first is that it this structure, of the interplay between issues, goals, 
strategy, and tactics in a cohesive and dynamic system, allows us to see how resistance, 
as the morally mandated response to oppression, can begin to be realistically formulated.  
The importance of the ability to formulate real and practical resistance actions cannot be 
overstated.  Drawing insights from the practical world of organizing can help direct 
academic projects, such as this, to give substance to the otherwise general and unfulfilled 
calls for political action. 
 The second strength of such a system is that it emphasizes and necessitates 
effective results.  By demanding specificity and elaborating, clearly, the measurability 
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and tangibility of our goals, strategies, and tactics, this model of resistance organizing (if 
applied correctly) yields actions which directly combat oppression and the harms that 
oppression causes.  In this way, the campaigns and actions that revolutionaries and 
radicals embark upon, when employing this organizing schema, avoid the problem that 
empowerment theories fall prey to.  Since it is oppression's harms that create the need for 
active resistance, it is these specific harms that must be directly contested.  While 
empowerment theory may give agents an indirect avenue for coping with said harms, the 
organizing model of deployable action seeks to directly rectify these injustices and 
therefore can be said to provide the framework for the d-rules concerning oppression. 
 Finally, and most importantly, this organizing structure is free from an overt 
moral framework.  This, at first glance, might sound like an odd strength seeing as the 
organizing model being advanced here is being used to frame and explain how agents are 
to act in order to discharge the moral obligations which arise in the face of oppression.  
The moral neutrality of this method means that it is both free from any inherent or 
axiomatic moral judgments which would render it incompatible with the framework of 
virtue ethics and also free to work in conjunction with the demand to engage in active 
resistance to oppression as mandated by virtue ethics.  In the first sense, this method does 
not contain any moral claims, such as (for example) a demand that the goals of resistance 
action be only constructed from theological and eschatological revelations, which would 
render its compatibility with virtue ethics impossible.  In the second sense, this model can 
be deployed to determine, practically, the measures needed for agents to engage in 
practical and implementable forms of resistance while the moral demands of virtue 
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ethics, as expressed as v/d-rules, can likewise be equally deployed to constrain the 
considered actions of resistance to that which the morally virtuous agent would accept.   
 The question thus becomes how the interplay between a practical organizing 
model such as this and the moral requirements of virtue ethics works to guide our 
resistance.  The moral neutrality of this organizing model asks for all options to be 
considered, regardless of moral standing, and places central emphasis on the efficacy of 
actions to combat oppression without considerations of their moral permissibility.  It is 
here that the framework of virtue ethics can act to constrain actions available to activists 
and revolutionaries. 
 One of the central moral concerns which is often raised during discussions of 
resistance action is the question of the permissibility of violence.  Tessman, when 
discussing the costs beared by the resisting agent approaches the question of violence in 
liberatory struggles but, in the end, fails to engage directly in the question of the role of 
violence in revolutionary struggles.  She says, "is not my intent here to enter into - and 
certainly not to settle - the question of whether liberatory goals are best achieved through 
a commitment to nonviolence... or through a readiness for violence."153 While Tessman 
works to avoid this question, it seems essential to address this important issue head-on as 
it is one of the most central questions encountered when discussing morally available 
resistance actions and movements.  So it is to this question that the next section turns. 
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Section 3 - The Role of Violence in Resistance Struggles 
 
 When considering the permissibility of violence in revolutionary action it is hard 
to escape the overt moral language of those who espouse doctrines of nonviolence.  The 
position of nonviolence dominates the landscape of 'moral activism' and the pacifist 
position often carries with it the belief that any set of revolutionary actions which remain 
bound by any sensible moral principles must, by nature, commit itself to nonviolence.  In 
this way, the prevailing myth of morally acceptable revolutionary action is that it must be 
nonviolent. 
 This section begins with a survey of pacifist positions, starting with the canonical 
views of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mohandas Gandhi and then moves to more nuanced 
and constrained forms of pacifism.  This survey of pacifist positions demonstrates the 
contours of the pacifist landscape and shows that pacifist positions occupy a spectrum of 
possibilities, motivations, and justifications.  In the end it will be argued that while 
pacifism is not a univocal or monolithic position, a commitment to nonviolence, no 
matter the motivation or justification, remains a deeply flawed position which one ought 
not accept as a necessary perimeter of resistance actions. 
 The most widely known, and often referenced, pacifist positions are those of King 
and Gandhi.  Both King and Gandhi publically defended the exclusivity of nonviolence in 
revolutionary movements, and the impact of their positions can hardly be understated.  
While the pacifism espoused by King and Gandhi are importantly different, both men 
expressly tied prohibitions on violence to the moral position and it is their views which 
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best serve as both an anchor-point and launching pad for understanding doctrines of 
nonviolence.   
 In many ways it is Gandhi that represents the voice of absolutist pacifism.154  
Gandhi's understanding of nonviolence is rooted in two equally important principles or 
concepts; satyagrahi and ahimsa.  Satuagrahi, a word that Gandhi coined, is a derivation 
from the Gujarati word sadagraha (meaning firmness to a good cause).  Satuagrahi is the 
"[hope] to convert the heart and soul of the opponent by virtue of adhering to the truth, 
enduring self-suffering, remaining sincere and chivalrous and by avoiding hurting, 
humbling, or embittering the opponent."155 Ahimsa, a Sanskrit word, means nonviolence 
('himsa' is Sanskrit for violence and ahimsa adds a prefix to indicate the rejection of 
'himsa').  The connection between satyagrahi and ahimsa takes root, for Gandhi, in his 
epistemological worldview.  Gandhi held that there exists an immutable and eternal truth 
of existence but also held that people remain, in whole, unable to know this truth.  This 
skepticism about human knowledge standing before eternal and absolute truth forced him 
to deny that violence was ever an option.  Gandhi believed that satyagrahi could never 
use violence "because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and therefore [is] 
not competent to punish."156 The two moral pillars of satyagrahi and ahimsa established, 
for Gandhi, the moral framework of not only resistance to oppression but also the moral 
framework for the virtuous life.  Gandhi's commitment to nonviolence was necessitated 
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by his understanding of what he say as the only "right, or pure, means to a right, or pure, 
end."157 
 In a similar way, Martin Luther King Jr. advanced a conception of nonviolence 
which held a moral, not strategic, view of pacifism.  King, in describing his so-called 
'pilgrimage to nonviolence,' chronicles how he came to understand the unique moral high 
ground which pacifism, and pacifism alone, offers.  King describes how the nonviolent 
resister must come to commit herself to the denial of both "external physical violence" 
(which prohibits the use of violent actions against an opponent) as well as the use of 
"internal violence of spirit" (as manifest as hatred).158  For King, the moral prohibition on 
all forms of violence, both physically and emotionally, takes root in the Christian notion 
of universal love.  It is love, for King, that is the basis of all commanded moral action 
thus all forms of violence, even in service of noble and libratory ends, must be forsaken.  
Throughout King's description of the nonviolent position one sees countless overt 
references to "moral resistance" and "moral resister." Where one might expect to find 
King distinguishing between the moral goodness of the struggle for justice and the moral 
evil of oppression, they actually find King often distinguishing between the "moral 
resister" of nonviolence and the "immoral resister" who rejects the pacifist doctrine.  
King expressly ties morality to pacifism and describes those who accept even a limited 
role for violence (even for libratory ends) as morally failing.159  For King, the connection 
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between nonviolence and moral necessity was so strong that he concluded not only that 
the pacifist position was available only to those who have "morality enough" to end the 
cycle of hate and injustice,160 but also that "[nonviolence] was the only morally and 
practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom."161 
 Positions such as those expressed by Gandhi and King, with their overt attempts 
to constrain all resistance actions to the moralism of pacifism, defines the axiomatic core 
of absolutist pacifism.  Here, absolutist pacifism (often called "universal pacifism") holds 
that violence, in all forms and in all circumstances, is morally reprehensible and 
unjustified.  As is often the case with absolutist positions, heavy criticism has been 
launched at this view.  Jan Narivson, arguing from a politically rights-based tradition, 
holds that absolute pacifism is "far from being plausible" and claims that it suffers from 
being "morally inconsistent."162  For Narvison, the failure of absolutist pacifist stems 
from a commitment to the proposition that violence is wrong.  This commitment, while 
allowing pacifists to condemn any violence that is waged against them, also commits 
them to abide the existence of violence in that it constrains individuals in their attempts to 
stop impending acts of violence.  For Narvison, the pacifist must condemn violence as 
categorically wrong but also hold that violence which cannot be stopped by anything 
short of a violent response is morally justified, as any potential violent reaction is morally 
worse than the violence committed by the aggressor.  This 'commitment' that Narvison 
sees the absolutist pacifist having to make leaves their position "confused" as "their 
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position involves a contradiction: violence is wrong, and it is wrong to resist it."163  
Others, such as Daniel Farmer have argued that absolutist pacifism (or as he dubs it 
"deontological pacifism") is "morally indefensible" as it leads to the "unpalatable 
conclusion" that individuals should forgo violent responses in situations of dire self-
defense.164  Where Narivson objects to pacifism as a contradiction in rights, Farmer does 
so on the grounds of incomparable value.  For Farmer, the absolutist pacifist holds that 
the refusal to defend one's life, at a minimum, is of comparably higher value than the life 
that is threatened.  This means that for the absolutist, the immorality that is a violent 
threat to one's life is somehow morally superior to the life that is threatened.  This 
devaluing of the life threatened, for Farmer, is an obvious case of moral confusion. 
 The pacifist response to the arguments launched by Farmer and Narvison is to 
back away from absolutist strains of pacifism to positions of qualified or contingent 
nonviolence.  Here, the pacifist denies the absolutist line found in the positions of King 
and Gandhi and opts to advance a position which holds that nonviolent resistance is to be 
sought except in the most dire of circumstances.  To my mind this seems the only 
appropriate response to the insensibility of the absolutist position.  In fact, Farmer 
himself argues that criticisms of absolutist pacifism, such as those he offers, act as straw-
man arguments given that qualified pacifism "represents the commitments of actual 
pacifists."165  Here, Farmer is absolutely correct.  
 Possibly the most easily adaptable position to this qualification on violence would 
be strands of utilitarian pacifism.  Here, the use of violence is weighed by means of a 
utilitarian calculus and the utilitarian pacifist assigns especially heavy negative utility to 
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the use of violence making it an available option only when its prescribed low utility is 
overcome by the achievement of significantly higher utility.166  A position such as this 
does seem to avoid the problems of absolutism and may appear plausible, at least on the 
surface, (and is probably the position of many non-academic pacifists), the details of its 
possibility need not be discussed here as such a position seems out-of-step from the larger 
virtue-based approach detailed in this work. 
 Of interest here are positions of so-called "virtue pacifism" which seek to morally 
ground pacifism in an ethical framework which avoids the problems which plague 
absolutist stands of nonviolence.  Franco Trivigno argues for a form of contingent or 
qualified virtue pacifism.167  Here, Trivigno considers the damning and harmful effects of 
violence on the characters of individuals who, in war or in their attempts to resist 
oppression, commit themselves to violent means.  Trivigno notes the harmful 
psychological effects that a learned willingness to killing (or harm) has on agents and 
how this severely damages their character.  His argument begins with the way a 
willingness to kill (or harm) others erodes an agent's empathic abilities.  From here he 
moves to show how a willingness to use violence makes the acquisition of multiple 
virtues, beyond empathy, seemingly impossible.  The dehumanization needed to carryout 
acts of violence requires agents to habitually cultivate a lack of empathy and erodes the 
seemingly natural instinct to identify would-be victims as similar to one's self.  Here, the 
would-be violent agent must lose, or work to lose, the empathy which would otherwise 
interfere with their ability to act violently.  This loss of empathy, which otherwise would 
"play a role in causing virtuous action and also virtuous character," results in agents who 
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lacks the necessary traits to achieve virtue and therefore eudemonia.168  The result of this 
negative habituation, for Trivigno, is the yielding of an agent who can only be described 
as morally damaged.  "One may becomes (sic) callous and insensitive, when confronted 
with the suffering of others; one may become cruel and malicious in what one says about 
them and hope for them; one may become spiteful and vindictive when confronted with 
their wrongdoing"169  Here, Trivigno claims a cascading of harmful effects that are 
leveled against this agent; while possibly beginning with a loss of empathy, the result is 
an inability to cultivate the goods of "compassion, sympathy, benevolence, and 
kindness.”  This moral harm, found at the level of character, leads Trivigno to claim that 
"states should refrain from putting its citizens [in the form of soldiers] in situations that 
are likely to hinder eudaimonia" and (moving beyond the question of war) that one 
should endorse contingent pacifism for political resisters.170   
 The contingent nature of Trivigno's virtue pacifism emerges as he expressly 
accounts for some of the ways that violence may, in fact, be necessary in certain 
circumstances.  He specifically notes instances of life-saving self-defense and I suspect 
this would extend to other forms of severe harm, such as rape, which might not result 
necessarily in one's death but may bring about severe harm to one's body or sense of 
being.  While Trivigno allows for the possibility of a violent response in these cases he 
severely qualifies the use of this violence.  He says: 
If violence must be used, because he is being directly attacked and cannot avoid 
its use in order to resist, then the virtuous person will use only the minimum 
amount of violence necessary to defuse the situation.  If, after all nonviolent and 
nonlethal violent strategies have been fully exhausted, it turns out that the 
minimum amount of violence necessary is deadly - because the only way to resist 
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the violence involves killing - then the virtuous person will feel pain and regret 
afterwards.171  
 
 The violence permitted by Trivigno is constrained by three factors (1) it is only to 
be used as a way to resisting impending harm towards oneself (thus making it purely 
reactive), (2) all other forms of resistance must be exhausted before violence is 
considered, and, (3) any warranted violent response is minimal in nature and the amount 
of violence used is only enough to avoid the impending harm in this situation (making its 
acceptable duration quite short).  When these criteria are met, and violence is used, the 
acting agent should experience the appropriate moral regret for their action, even if such 
actions are warranted, justified, and necessary.   
 Trivigno's account of a virtue-based qualified pacifism clearly avoids inescapable 
problems faced by absolutism and carves out a pacifist position which might seem 
amenable to the account of resistance being forwarded here.  Yet, while positions of 
qualified pacifism, such as Trivigno's, can (easily) avoid the charges of logical 
inconsistency and moral indefensibility, they remain deeply morally problematic and I 
want to outright reject them as acceptable models of virtuous resistance.  The grounds on 
which I want to reject these accounts follows the arguments made by Peter Gelderloos172 
and Ward Churchill173 who have argued, I believe successfully, that all pacifist positions, 
including those with the necessary qualifications to make them minimally morally 
palatable, remain inherently patriarchal and racist and therefore ought to be rejected. 
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 Gelderloos' charge of the patriarchal nature of even qualified pacifism takes root 
in the ways which patriarchy assigns and normalizes gender roles.  Patriarchy advances a 
view of gender which is fundamentally dualistic and essentialist whereas gender norms 
establish what is appropriate for men and women.  While much has been written about 
the excessively problematic nature of gender dualism, Gelderloos focuses upon the ways 
patriarchy assigns the appropriateness of violence between the genders.  For Gelderloos, 
"Patriarchy gives both the ability and the right to use violence almost exclusively to 
men."174  Under patriarchy, men are expected to be violent and the violence expressed 
and enjoyed by men is explained as a byproduct of their masculinity.  This manifests as a 
patriarchal license for men to use 'appropriate levels' of violence against women and 
children, often grounds explanations of why men engage in wars and warrior behavior, 
permits men to be quick to fist fights over insults and to defend honor, and even explains 
why men relish violent sports like rugby and football.  The opposite is true for women.  
Patriarchy essentializes women to roles of mother and caregiver, and presents femininity 
as a compassionate foil to the violence that is expressed in masculinity.  For Gelderloos, 
when women resist the oppression that is patriarchy, and do so by committing to any 
strand of pacifism, they replicate the gender norms of the very same patriarchy they seek 
to resist.  "Because patriarchy clearly prescribes a one-sided male violence, women 
would be disrupting this power dynamic, not reinforcing it, by relearning their propensity 
for violence."175 The insistence, which even qualified pacifism has, on tactical decisions 
which makes violence a last-ditch-effort means that women who subscribe to such a 
position must only explore those resistance options which replicate the unjust association 
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of gendered violence perpetuated by patriarchy.  In effect, the resisting pacifist is only 
morally allowed to consider violent options once all the other womanly options are 
explored and exhausted.  When one applies Trivigno's constraints on the use of violence, 
the revolutionary women is left to (1) only break away from patriarchal femininity to stop 
violent acts from taking her life or violating her body, but in no other circumstances of 
oppression is she to abandon her femininity, (2) she must explore all peaceful, and therein 
stereotypically feminine, responses before breaking the patriarchal connection between 
masculinity and violence, and, (3) must restrain herself to only temporarily abandoning 
her femininity and must do so for the shortest time possible.  The insistence on 
nonviolence, with limited qualifications, means that women who resist patriarchy are 
restricted to continually play-out the damning essentialist feminine myth which 
patriarchy perpetuates. 
 In a similar vein, Gelderloos argues that pacifism, even of a qualified nature, is 
racist.176  The basis for such a claim is that the ideology of pacifism comes from a racially 
privileged context and unfairly harms and burdens people of color.  Racialized systems of 
social privilege endorse certain acceptable forms of resistance for people of color.  When 
people of color struggle against oppression they are permitted, to a certain extent, to do 
so as long as they stay nonviolent.  When they diverge from nonviolence, the response 
(even by self proclaimed white anti-racist activists and resisters) is often quite vitriolic.  
"Black people marching is photogenic.  Black people with guns evokes the violent crime 
reports on the evening news.  American Indians holding a press conference is laudable.  
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American Indians ready, willing, and able to take their land back is a trifle disturbing."177  
The social acceptability of militant non-whites is almost universally nonexistent, and the 
fear that is provoked by the arming of people of color is nearly universally condemned 
both by the powers-that-be as well as by those who otherwise claim to stand in solidarity 
with their anti-oppressive ends.  People of color are doubly demonized for turning away 
from the sanctified avenues of nonviolence.  People of color are asked to accept 
institutionalized violence and are vilified for responding to this violence with anything 
other than Christian love and a turn-the-other-cheek attitude.  And here lies the tragic 
reality; the nonviolence that pacifism commands carries with it disproportionate 
consequence for people of color.  Here, Gelderloos summarizes this tragic reality: 
[Pacifism] ignores that violence is already here; that violence is an unavoidable 
structurally integral part of the current social hierarchy; and that it is people of 
color who are most affected by that violence.  Pacifism assumes that white people 
who grew up in the suburbs with all their basic needs met can counsel oppressed 
people, many of whom are people of color, to suffer patiently under an 
inconceivably greater violence, until such time as the Great White Father is 
swayed by the movement's demands or the pacifists achieve that legendary 
"critical mass."178 
  
 The burden of institutionalized violence is beared disproportionately by people of 
color, and pacifism asks people of color to be victims of this violence in the name of 
"bearing witness" while numbers are massed and consciences can be affected.  In effect, 
pacifism disproportionately asks people of color to act as cannon fodder for the violence 
doled out by oppression.  This is why pacifism is an all too easy position for privileged 
(white) people to endorse as they, by and large, are not asked to directly suffer the violent 
retribution that resistance carries with it.  When militant Native Americans or Blacks 
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reject this dogma of nonviolence they are seen as unwieldy, unreasonable, and 
uncontrollable mobs with savage intent.  To borrow the analogy made by Malcolm X, 
pacifism asks people of color to conform to socially acceptable tropes of blackness; they 
become the acceptable “house negro” and discuss resistance as "our resistance" and to see 
their struggle as “our struggle.”179  When people of color fail to abide the message of 
pacifism they are cast as "alienating" other (white) people who are reluctant to support 
their armed movements while claiming to yearn to share in the ends they seek.  Pacifism 
acts as if the violence that is doled out against the oppressed is equal, and in its equally 
this violence is to be absorbed and reacted to with the same direct noncooperation.  The 
reality is that the current state of racial privilege "punishes the resistance of people of 
color more harshly than the resistance of white people."180   
 One can see the evidence of the patriarchal and racist nature of nonviolence in the 
ways in which resistance narratives are constructed.  The story, if not outright myth, of 
the civil rights struggle in the United States is that it was gender inclusive and, for the 
most part, safely nonviolent.181  The actions of the Black Panthers and the Nation of 
Islam are often excluded from the civil rights story while the actions of the NAACP and 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference are held as paradigms of virtue.  Similarly, 
Rosa Parks has been cast into the acceptable tropes of both the "tired seamstress who 
tiptoed into history" and of "angry grandmotherlyness."182  This fictionalization of her 
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actions and life allowed for her public veneration to the point where, upon her death in 
2005, she became the first women in history to have her body laid in honor in the 
Rotunda of the US capital building.  I suspect that no such honors will be bestowed upon 
Angela Davis or Kathleen Cleaver upon their deaths.   
 Beyond the ways that nonviolence furthers, rather than resists, the oppressive 
structures of racism and patriarchy, pacifism suffers from a further, equally troubling, 
problem of ineffectiveness.  The problem of ineffectiveness represents the practical 
failure of pacifism which, in conjunction to the deeply troubling moral and political 
dynamics of pacifism's perpetuation of patriarchal and racists ideals, helps show why 
pacifism ought not be a criteria for moral resistance. 
 The claim that pacifism is ineffective for bringing about revolutionary change 
stands in direct opposition to the historical "victories" that pacifists cite as evidence for 
their commitment to nonviolence.  To explore pacifism's ineffectiveness it is essential to 
first debunk these historical fictions.  Once these historical fictions are taken off the table 
as evidence for pacifism's ability to accomplish ends, we can see why, by the very nature 
of any pacifist position, effectiveness must be rejected as an essential component of 
political action.  In short, when one actually investigates the claims made by pacifists 
about the effectiveness of nonviolence one is left with little evidence that pacifism can act 
as an effective tool for resisting oppression. 
 Pacifists are often quick to cite India's independence, "the" Civil Rights 
Movement in the US, and the anti-nuclear movement as examples of the successful 
deployment of nonviolence.  Sadly, none of these examples help demonstrate a 
meaningful measure of effectiveness.  Take for example the story of India's independence 
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from the British.  The prevailing myth of India's independence struggle is that the Indian 
people, unified under the leadership of Gandhi, adopted a doctrine of pacifism and after 
years of struggle and suffering, forced the British to relinquish control of India to the 
Indians. 
 While uplifting and inspiring, this story is, at best, a radical oversimplification, 
and at worst a lie.  While the Indian independence movement did embody many 
nonviolent tactics, it cannot be claimed (1) only nonviolence was used in this struggle, or, 
(2) it was nonviolence that caused the British to relinquish colonial control.  The struggle 
for Indian independence was not monolithic and certainly not guided exclusively by 
Gandhi.  Advocates for nonviolence, who evoke the name of Gandhi with religious 
fervor, often are ignorant of other revolutionary figures such as Chandrasekhar Azad 
(who lead an army of Indians in armed campaigns against the British), Bhagat Singh 
(who gained mass support for his bombing campaigns aimed at "overthrowing both 
foreign and Indian capitalism"), Subhas Chandra Bose (who, as a militant candidate 
called for and organized open warfare against colonial rule, was elected twice to the 
presidency of the Indian National Congress in 1938 and 1939), and even Nehru (whose 
pragmatism led him to deny the universality of nonviolence).  The Indian (and Pakistani) 
independence movements cannot, without dangerous oversimplification, be called a 
movement of nonviolence.  Nonviolence was used by some, but rejected by others.  
Further, the claim that it was, specifically, the nonviolence of Indian revolutionaries 
which brought an end to British rule is false.  There were a number of factors beyond 
nonviolence which forced England to relinquish control of India.  These forces, aside 
from including the violent aspects of the Indian independence movement, include violent 
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forces outside India.  One such force which weakened British control over India was the 
actions of Palestinian revolutionaries in the mid-to-late 1940’s.  The British Mandate for 
Palestine, also called the Palestine Mandate, created British rule over Palestine after 
World War I and in the 1930’s a large scale war by was waged by Palestinian guerilla 
fighters against the occupying British army.  This war consumed considerable resources 
from the British, and resulted in large numbers of British causalities and, according to 
many historians, presented a clear threat to the British that the Indians, like the 
Palestinians, might give up civil disobedience and take up arms in masse if ignored for 
long enough.183  This factor, rooted in the violent actions of Palestinian anti-colonists, 
influenced British decisions concerning India and it and it alone is enough to show that it 
cannot be claimed that the nonviolent tactics used by some Indians was, in itself, what 
caused the end of British rule in India.   
Similar analyses can be performed on the myths of the Civil Rights Movement184 
and the US's anti-nuclear movement.185  While it is true that many in these movements 
were committed to pacifist principles, it is not the case that pacifism can be said to be 
singularly and causally responsible for the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the 
minimal movement towards ending nuclear proliferation and bringing about nuclear 
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disarmament.  In each of these historical cases there is no evidence that pacifism can be 
cited as the causal force which brought about these "victories." 
 While these historical fictions, when exposed, help dismantle the perceived 
effectiveness of pacifism, the failure of pacifism's effectiveness is not purely to be 
inferred from past historical failures.  The fundamental failure of pacifism, as an effective 
route to resistance and revolution, is found in the ways that pacifism cannot be 
incorporated into a sensible organizing model.  The pacifist must begin organizing from 
the principle that all actions must be nonviolent and then work backwards to tactics, 
strategy, and goals.  In effect, the pacifist can only plan in reverse.  Tactics are not 
considered in reference to their strategic ability to achieve goals, but in their ability to 
adhere to the principle of nonviolence.  In this way, the pacifist must privilege their 
commitment to remaining nonviolent over the effectiveness that this nonviolence may or 
may not possess.  This backwards reasoning explains why pacifist organizing often, and 
continually, performs the same set of actions regardless of the goals or the reality of their 
campaigns.  Protests, boycotts, letter writing campaigns, political lobbying, petition 
signing, and consciousness raising are the "activism in a box" for pacifists, and these 
different tactics are dragged-out and deployed in almost all pacifist campaigns as these 
tactics can be done without the use of violence.  This leads to political campaigns which 
begin and end with ineffectiveness.  Surely there are times where these tactics are 
important and strategically warranted, but the belief that we must begin our organizing by 
placing parameters on our tactics and then work backwards to see what strategies are 
available to us based on these limited tactics places the preverbal cart before the horse.  
Effectiveness, as a value, is taken off the table as an organizing necessity and is replaced 
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by the ability of one's actions to expresses nonviolence.  While this conclusion may seem 
bold to some, to the pacifist this is not a contentious conclusion as the pacifist openly and 
avowedly holds their nonviolence as the central value needed in organizing.  For the 
pacifist, remaining committed to nonviolence is superior to efficacy. 
 Given that pacifism is not only ineffective but also patriarchal and racist there is 
more than sufficient evidence for rejecting pacifism, even in its qualified and contingent 
forms, as an acceptable moral parameter on resistance actions.  While this conclusion 
may sound, to some, quite bold, it is essential to see that this outright rejection of 
pacifism does not entail the adoption of a "pro-violence position."  In fact, to my mind, 
there is no one who adopts or advocates for a "pro-violence" position.  Such a position 
would entail relying exclusively on violent tactics in any and all situations, and not only 
is no one folly enough to defend such a position but the belief that they must is beyond 
absurd.186  What one must accept when they reject pacifism is simply a position which 
might be called "diversity of tactics."  Here, agents are asked to consider and weigh 
possible tactical actions in light of their connection to strategy and goals.  Whereas 
pacifism demands agents to accept tactical parameters before considering specific 
actions, the diversity of tactics asks agents to consider tactics as they flow from strategies 
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and as they work to accomplish goals.187  As Gelderloos points out, it is an unfortunately 
reality that people seem to approach tactics and strategy backwards, "enacting tactics out 
of a habitual response or marshalling tactics into a strategy without more than a vague 
appreciation of the goal.”188  The diversity of tactics demands that this tactical habituation 
be upended, and asks agents to consider all of the political and ethical dimensions of 
tactics (and strategy) when setting courses of action.  While the resisting agent may come 
to decide that nonviolent options are preferable to violent ones in a given campaign, and 
therefore align themselves with the pacifist, they do so only after active deliberation and 
consideration and not by simply conforming their actions to a pre-established tactical 
order they feel compelled to enact.   
 It is also equally important to understand is that these active discussions about the 
availability of a plurality of tactics which the diversity of tactics demands does not deny 
the moral and psychological reality of the harms that violent resistance may carry with it.  
The psychological and moral harms chronicled by Trivigno, which lead him to adopt his 
virtue-based qualified pacifism, are quite real and the diversity of tactics does not deny 
this reality.  In fact, these harms need to be understood by resisting agents and these 
dangers must help frame discussions of resistance actions.  What the diversity of tactics 
demands is these harms are weighted by resisters in light of the reality of oppression.  
The resisting agent must be free to consider all options, weighing moral demands and the 
often high moral costs which resistance entails, when determining the details of 
resistance.  The determination of tactics, no matter their form, must be part of a continual 
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discussion within revolutionary movements.  Tactics must be continually determined 
through the use of practical wisdom and not guided at the outset by a commitment to a 
nonviolent axiom. 
 The appropriate resisting agent who properly considers the high moral cost that is 
beared by one who engages in violent actions will likely act in accord with other activists 
who swear to a doctrine of nonviolence but between the two there are important 
differences.  First, the resisting agent who accepts the diversity of tactics is empowered to 
consider options, even if they ultimately reject them, which the pacifist cannot even bring 
to the table for thoughtful consideration.  Secondly, the agent who accepts the diversity of 
tactics will be determining their actions under the light of their strategic necessity, 
effectiveness, and moral acceptability rather than beginning with a set of tactical options 
which must be worked backwards into a strategic plan. 
  In the end, violence and violent tactics must remain an option for the resisting 
agent and cannot be removed from consideration.  While the choice to use violence is by 
no means a decision that agents should arrive at easily nor quickly, it must remain a 
viable option for activists and revolutionaries who seek to struggle against oppression and 
who seek to alleviate the harms which oppression levels against the oppressed.  The 
heavy burdens beared by resisting agent, as chronicled by Trivigno and Tessman, are all 
quite real, but these harms cannot, in principle, outweigh the necessity of effective 
resistance to oppression. 
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Section 4 - The Emerging View of Resistance and the Demandingness Objection 
 
 The general picture of resistance that begins to emerge here has many 
complicated facets.  Agents are obligated to engage in resistance to oppression and the 
dischargement of this obligation can only be determined by agents embedded in specific 
contexts.  The actions of resistance must strategically target multiple targets, must be 
relentless in their pursuit of liberation, and are not limited to merely combating the 
oppression an individual faces in their own life.  On top of this, the practical 
determination of appropriate resistance actions and campaigns requires agents to engage 
in a diverse range of tactics, and the determination of these tactics (and the strategies 
which make these tactics necessary) can only be uncovered through a timely process of 
deliberation, discussion, and reflection.  Taken together, these demands begin to mount 
and it might be argued that the conception of resistance being advanced here ought to be 
subject to the criticism of demandingness. 
 The demandingness objection, in its simplest form, is "describable as the problem 
of the ease or difficulty of fulfilling a moral theory's demands - its 'moral 
obligations'..."189  When a moral theory advances a schema of moral demands that 
extends beyond a 'reasonable' degree of difficulty, and the fulfillment of these moral 
demands become onerous to the obligated agent, the moral theory is said to be suspect or 
problematic.  Alan Thomas claims that the belief that morality ought not be onerous is 
"an uncontentious core of common sense morality."190  The breadth and depth of our 
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obligations to resist, as being advanced here, more than seem to qualify as onerous and 
demandingness objections appear quite apt. 
 While the demandingness objection is most often associated with consequentialist 
theories, virtue theorists such as Swanton and Thomas have attempted to outline, and 
guard against, accounts of virtue ethics which stray into excessive demandingness.  On 
these accounts, and particularly Swanton's, the conception of resistance being advanced 
here seems to run afoul of these warnings and I suspect that the arguments made here will 
be met with charges of onerous demandingness.  In anticipation of such responses I want 
to address this important issue.  To do so, I will outline Swanton's understanding of the 
demandingness objection, and the principle(s) she asks us to abide to keep virtue 
theoretical accounts free of this so-called problem.  Following this, I will argue that 
Swanton's approach ultimately fails and that one ought to accept the onerous nature of 
our obligations to resist oppression. 
 Swanton's work on the demandingness objection, as it relates to virtue ethics, 
works to establish limits on the scope of demands that any virtue theoretic account can 
make.  She begins by acknowledging that the "The Demands of the World are limitless; 
there are limitless needs to fulfill, there is no end to the value we could promote..."191  
These seemingly limitless demands are exerted by both strangers in need as well as by 
loved ones with which we have relationships.  For Swanton, there is no lack of need in 
the world given the high amount of existent suffering, and the relationships we hold to 
our loved ones continually ask us to devote more than all of our energy to their 
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maintenance and flourishing.  When taken individually, it might appear that agents ought 
to be obligated to radical sacrifice in the face of competing demands.  Mirroring Singer's 
famous dictum that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought morally 
to do it,"192 Swanton claims that when one considers individual actions which makes 
demands of us to sacrifice it would appear obviously obligatory that one make such 
sacrifices.  She considers a variety of semi-fictional cases, drawn from her own life, 
where she is asked to choose between using available resources (of both time and money) 
to aid in famine relief or use these resources to see a movie, restore a classic Vauxhall, or 
continue to use her gardening as an outlet for her creativity.  Beyond cases of famine 
relief, similar dilemmas are encountered when one weights the expenditure of time and 
money for these ends as compared with the possibility of devoting these resources 
towards furthering more meaningful aspects of one's relationships.  When each of these 
courses of action are considered individually, it seems rather obvious that the moral need 
expressed is both (a) of significantly higher priority demanding one's time and money, 
and, (b) exactly the sort of needs that the virtuous agent (who has cultivated the other-
regarding virtues of sympathy, empathy, and benevolence) would find compelling.  In 
each case, as in the classic Singer examples, it would seem that the pressing moral 
demands of famine relief or relationship maintenance ought to trump one's desires to 
creatively garden, see movies, or restore old cars.  While Utilitarians might claim that the 
loss of these quite minimal goods is far outweighed by substantive goods that can be 
secured by reallocating these resources, one might expect Swanton to demand the same 
sacrifice as these actions are exactly of the type demanded by virtue.  Yet Swanton rejects 
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such a view and maintains that actions such as these cannot, nor should not, be 
considered individually, where one weighs off each expenditure against other possible 
outcomes.  While sacrificing in any one of these situations may not leave an agent in ruin, 
Swanton maintains that the cumulative force of acquiescing, even happily, to these 
demands is damning to one's character and results in a withering of self.  Returning to her 
examples, she proposes that if she were to give up seeing the movie, and restoring the 
car, and abandoning the creative outlet that is gardening she (hypothetically) would find 
herself "gradually becomes more miserable" and, in the end, would find that, in 
Nietzsche's terms, "her self wilts away."193  This disruption of one's self, and the 'wilting 
of one's self' that comes from continually meeting the otherwise moral demands of 
sacrifice, is a price too high to pay. Swanton uses this evidence to show that radical 
sacrifice is, in fact, not obligatory, even when each individual instance of need appears 
more morally significant to the desires/plans of the agent.  In this way, she defuses the 
demandingness objection by denying that such sacrifices are obligatory.  From here, she 
abstracts to a general understanding of moral demands and holds,  
Moral demands (whether arising from authorities such as bosses, from the needy 
in general, from our nearest and dearest, or from the general demand to promote 
value) should not tax our strength to the point where the self wilts away, we 
neglect our children and loved ones, we ignore ethics altogether ... and resentment 
becomes rife.  ..... A plausible ethics must not require contortions of our 
psychological apparatus.194 
 
 Returning to the question of obligatory resistance, I suspect that Swanton would 
object to the view being advanced here seeing as how the obligation to resist does 
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demand continual effort, personal sacrifice, and the abandonment of otherwise morally 
significant projects on the part of the resister.   
 The problem with Swanton's account is that it relies on a false dichotomy of 
assumed privilege.  Swanton asks us to consider the damning effects of the 'wilting of the 
self' as if this wilting was only brought about through continual sacrifice.  In Swanton's 
model, the acting agent is placed into a moral bind because they are asked to choose 
between sacrificing for other's needs or achieving (or working towards) a state of self 
flourishing where this flourishing of the self is otherwise possible.  The would-be movie 
going gardener who drives a beautiful old Vauxhall is presented as otherwise fully 
capable of self-fulfillment but conflicted by the seeming need to respond to moral needs 
of others.  The damning reality of oppression is that agents do not begin with the prospect 
of self-fulfillment which they may be asked to unfairly abandon.  The existence of 
oppression wilts and withers characters and contorts psychological apparatuses long 
before agents are placed into circumstances where they are asked to sacrifice their 
otherwise good characters.  Swanton seems to assume that the unwilted person is 
somehow plucked from their previously unsullied world of blissful self-fulfillment and 
suddenly and unfairly asked to jettison this otherwise flourishing life.  Only in a semi-
ideal world could such a choice exist.   Even if we were to grant that such a prospect is 
possible, and believe that an agent can morally develop in an oppression-free vacuum, it 
certainly only be a problem for a very select and privileged few.  In reality, the harmful 
and costly demands of resistance exist alongside the harmful and costly effects of 
oppression.  When the reality of oppression is understood, and taken seriously, the 
overarching demands of resistance are no more wilting than the lived reality of the 
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oppressed.  When these circumstances are understood, the obligation to engage in 
resistance is no longer trade-off between flourishing and harm, but rather the swapping of 
the harms of oppression for the harms of resistance, and between these two positions only 
resistance holds the promise of liberation. 
 Agents engaging in, and committing themselves to, resistance will have to 
sacrifice, and sacrifice dearly.  The demands of resistance ask us to prioritize our 
projects, and it seems quite reasonable that the agent who develops the revolutionary 
attitude and commits themselves to the project of resistance might find that this 
revolutionary life cannot accommodate children, or continued schooling, or fine art, or 
vacations to the beach.  To the privileged, the reality that these goods might not be able to 
be sought, let alone acquired, during the course of the revolutionary life may sound 
shocking.  Yet to the oppressed, the existence of such 'goods' has never been real and 
asking them to abandon these goods is tantamount to asking them to feel regret for 
accepting a life that will probably not experience interstellar space travel. 
 
Section 5 - Conclusion 
 
 In the end, the determination of resistance actions cannot be specified without 
context, and resistance cannot be reduced to a codified list of necessary actions.  It is 
impossible to say, with specifics, what resistance must look like.  Resistance is a category 
of actions which address the issue(s) of oppression.  Resistance is not a specific tactic, 
nor is it a strategy, but rather resistance captures the strategic and tactical actions one 
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undertakes when the issue they address is, specifically, oppression.195  To fulfill the 
demands of virtue ethics agents must act in a plurality of ways, in a multitude of 
situations, and must organize themselves in such a way that their actions (be they 
collective or individual) effectively fight to break down the harmful apparatuses of 
oppression and work to make avenues to flourishing a reality for the oppressed.  
Committing oneself to resistance, and working to fulfill the demands of virtue ethics, is a 
costly endeavor and places continual and onerous demands on agents.  As it is the soaring 
harms of oppression which create these demands, it is at oppression and oppressive 
structures which our actions must be targeted.  The sad reality of oppression is that there 
are individuals who, even when engaged in active resistance to oppression and 
committing to the fulfillment of the moral demands placed on them by the existence of 
oppression, will not achieve the flourishing virtue promises.  Yet it is only through the 
concerted effort of individuals working in tandem that there is any promise that these 
harms can be alleviated or eliminated and flourishing made an available goal for all 
people. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
By way of summery, this project took a paradigmatic understanding of oppression 
and opened it up to a virtue-based analysis.  This analysis allowed for a substantiation of 
the all-too-obvious prima facie claim that oppression is harmful to those oppressed.  The 
holistic framework of virtue ethics, as the lens through which this harm was investigated, 
showed that oppression warps the acquisition of the virtues in a multitude of ways, 
systematically manipulates the external goods necessary for the development of the 
virtues, and unduly presses agents into the habituation of base and shameful actions.   In 
each of these ways, oppression acts as a barrier for the achievement of flourishing.  By 
exposing oppression’s harmful influence on the ability for the oppressed to flourish, one 
finds not only the need for agents to engage in resistance struggles against these 
corrupting forces, but the obligatory nature of this need.  The source of this obligation is 
found in the ways that agents are obligated by the so-called d-rules implied by virtue 
ethics’ schema for action guidance.  In the end, the d-rules which emerge in conjunction 
with oppression compel agents to engage in revolutionary actions to combat the existence 
of oppression.  It was argued here that this moral engagement cannot be said to discharge 
our responsibilities through the mere cultivation of dispositional attitudes, but requires 
that agents act in such a way that they maximize efficacy and actually combat the 
oppressive structures and systems which limit avenues to flourishing.    
This project has sought to make important contributions to both the existing 
discussions of oppression found in social and political philosophy, as well as to the 
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expanding tradition of virtue ethics.  To this end, this dissertation makes three important 
contributions in these areas.  
This project contributes, in an important way, to the expanding literature on 
oppression.  Theorists like Frye, Cudd, and Harvey (to name just a few) have sought to 
explore the philosophical and political dimensions of oppression, and this project 
contributes to this expanding field.  The contributions made here helps show the 
substantial psychological, emotional, and moral impact of oppression as revealed by 
virtue ethics and thus this project expands existing discussions by substantiating these 
impacts. 
The second way this project contributes to existing philosophical literature is that 
it develops neo-Aristotelian understandings of action guidance.  While Hursthouse stands 
as the foremost figure in this field, and her explanation of the v-rules has helped 
schematize and explain how virtue ethics provides a framework for action guidance, the 
establishment of the d-rules here helps push this idea further.  The d-rules allow for a 
more refined explanation of action guidance as found in virtue ethics and, in what is 
expectedly the most controversial aspect of this work, this action guidance works in such 
a way that one can establish the generation of obligations in virtue ethics. 
The third way this work makes important contributions to existing philosophical 
literature on oppression is that it works to answer the looming question of ‘what is to be 
done.’  Often philosophical works on oppression hint at, or vaguely suggest, the ways 
agents should be acting in our struggles against oppression, but more often than not these 
overtures stop short of providing a way to practically understand what shape these actions 
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should take.  As an example of this we can look to the way that Tessman walks up to the 
question of effective resistance and then leaves it as an open question.  She claims: 
 
It is not my intent here to enter into… the question of whether liberatory goals are 
best achieved through a commitment to nonviolence … or through a readiness for 
violence. Nor will I try to determine the relative efficacy of ending oppression 
through negotiation and communication with dominators—requiring virtues like 
compassionate understanding….  Not settling these questions, I leave open 
the possibility that the more‐militant or more‐radical approaches are the most 
effective.196  
 
Similarly, at the end of Cudd’s book length treatment of oppression she addresses 
four potential strategies of resistance.197  These “strategies” include rhetorical and 
symbolic strategies, economic strategies, armed strategies, and legal strategies.  In each 
arena she looks to past struggles and suggests a similar replication of past tactics, but she 
does so without any schema for evaluating these potential actions as either effective, 
realistic, or feasible.  Where this work adds to existing literature is that it works to draw 
practical resistance organizing into existing discussions of oppression and allows for a 
robust substantiation of the concrete ways that the political resister must act. 
Looking forward from here, this project sets forth multiple paths for future 
exploration.  The establishment of the d-rules, as outlined here, allows for continued 
exploration of ways in which Aristotelian virtue ethics can make important inroads into 
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discussions of practical and applied philosophy.  The d-rules established here are only 
explored in one area, the experience of oppression as an impediment to flourishing, but 
the d-rules need not be limited to this one discussion.  Their general form lends to their 
application in a variety of arenas, and continued work on these derivative rules of action 
guidance provide fertile ground for continued exploration. In this way, the d-rules set out 
here seem to provide rich possibilities for continued exploration and scholarship in 
practical and applied philosophy. 
Beyond further exploration of the d-rules as an avenue for providing virtue 
theoretic inroads into contemporary discussions of practical and applied philosophy, the 
d-rules seem posed to answer important theoretical questions about the nature of the 
supererogatory and the existence (or non-existence) of such a category in virtue ethics.  
Chapter four, in part, worked to defend the account of obligation established here against 
the potential charge of demandingness.  While the work done here defended the specific 
d-rules which emerge in conjunction with oppression against this potential objection, this 
work also treads closely on the category of the supererogatory.   People like Jason Kawall 
have argued that virtue ethics lacks the tools necessary to make sensible headway on the 
existence (or non-existence) of the category of the supererogatory, and Kawall claims 
that the lack of these tools means that virtue ethics falls into circularity.198  On the 
surface, it seems that the d-rules might be just the necessary tools which neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethics needs to address this question, and this possibility represents an important 
avenue for further exploration and future scholarship. 
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Beyond future academic work, this project begs for practical implementation.  
The second half of this project aims to establish a way to mobilize people to combat 
oppression and does so by outlining an organizing model which stresses the need for 
continual praxis.   In this way, the continued struggles against oppression require constant 
and perpetual reflection and re-evaluation.  By engaging in this unceasing and self-
critical evaluation, revolutionary movements of the oppressed are ensured that our 
actions, campaigns, and efforts achieve the highest degree of efficiency.  The practical 
implementation of the suggestions made in this project work as both a forward plan for 
real-life engagement and a reflective praxis of review, and the moral and social 
philosophy used here has an important role to play in both these tasks.  Here, the 
philosopher and the activist become one and same person.  The revolutionary agent must 
take the abstract theoretical lessons learned from praxis and find ways to continually 
shape their actions and campaigns, and the tools outlined here not only aid in the process 
but make the reality of this process palpable.  To this end it is worth considering a few 
facts: 
• In 2014, The Walk Free Foundation completed a global survey and concluded 
that, globally, there are currently 38.5 million slaves.199  This global estimate 
includes the conservative estimate that there are 60,000 currently in the US.  
Commenting on this report, Rick Noack, writing for the Washington Post, notes 
that these shocking numbers are “twice the amount estimated… in 2012.”200 
• The Sentencing Project, a non-partisan research and advocacy origination, claims 
that “The United States maintains its distinction as the nation with the highest rate 
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of incarceration in the world… [with a] total correctional population of 6.9 
million.”  And according to the 2010 US Census, African Americans were 5 times 
more likely than whites to be incarcerated, and while representing 13% of the US 
population, African Americans represent over 40% of the incarcerated 
population.201 
• Dr. Brian Mustanski, writing for Psychology Today, noted that in 2013 the 
number of hate crimes perpetrated against members of the LGBT community has 
doubled in New York City alone.202  And according to a 2011 FBI report, while 
hate-crime numbers have decreased nationally, anti-gay hate crimes are nationally 
increasing (and this report excludes anti-transgender hate crimes).203 
• The Wall Street Journal reported in 2014 that the Average income for the 
wealthiest 10% of U.S. families rose 10% between 2010 and 2013 while at the 
same time families in the bottom 40% saw their average inflation-adjusted income 
decline over that same period.204  The AFL-CIO reported in 2013 that CEO pay 
was an “eye popping” 331 times the salary of the average worker and 774 times 
the take home salary of a minimum wage worker.205 
One need not abstract very far from these facts to see that oppression, and systematic 
injustice, is alive and well.  It is the experience of oppression, which generate statistics 
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like these, which provides the impetus for the need of revolutionary thinking about 
resistance to oppression to which this project focused.  While much of this work is 
academic in nature, this project, and in particular chapter four, has sought to bring an 
academic analysis of oppression into conversation with the reality of resistance struggles.  
By engaging in practical resistance organizing, and by deploying a model such as the one 
outlined here, oppressed peoples are equipped with the basic tools needed to actively 
combat oppression.  In this way, this project has sought to bridge the divide between 
academic work on the reality of oppression and the resistance struggles oppression make 
necessary.  It is in the actual implementation of the suggestions made here that this 
project hopes to move from an academic setting to the reality of liberation. 
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